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ABSTRACT 
 
Darker and Darker Still: Media-Technology, Darkness Narratives, and Fear 
 
by 
 
Jeffrey J. Bellomi 
  
 This dissertation examines the relationship between select media-technological 
phenomena and historically configured narratives concerning darkness. Approaching said 
narratives through the work of Hans Blumenberg’s “metaphorology”, Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
conceptual paradigm, and Frederic Jameson’s concept of the “master narrative”, this project 
argues that darkness metaphors function as irreducible and fundamental blocks of meaning 
from which more complex narratives are built. This is informed principally by Blumenberg’s 
concept of the “absolute metaphor”, those being metaphors which serve to explain 
phenomena that evade empirical or logical deduction, such as evil, supernatural or 
metaphysical entities, and invisible threats, amongst others. From this, I argue that 
contemporary deployments of such darkness metaphors or their more complex narrative 
permutations link back to their nascent forms, thus imbuing their use with a trace of their 
early explanatory force. I examine four case studies in which darkness metaphors and 
narratives are used to describe or articulate different media-technological phenomena, 
namely the Dark Web, light pollution maps, numbers stations, and hypothetical nuclear EMP 
strikes.  After identifying the operating darkness narrative for each, I offer historical and 
literary lineages in an attempt to locate the root source of these narratives, all in the service of 
  vii 
attempting to explain the particular sense of fear or anxiety associated with each of these case 
studies.  In doing so, I identify unproductive or dangerous relationships with said media-
technology that draw from the taproot of these darkness narratives, and then offer potential 
strategies to reevaluate and reconfigure these relationships into a more productive form. 
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Introduction: Living in Shadow 
Even absolute metaphors therefore have a history.  They have a history in a more radical 
sense than concepts, for the historical transformation of a metaphor brings to light the 
metakinetics of the historical horizons of meaning and ways of seeing within which concepts 
undergo their modifications.1 
-Hans Blumenberg 
On December 4, 2017, around 9:00 PM, I lost all power in my apartment. There was 
little to distinguish it from any other short-lasting power outage that one experiences from 
time to time, and I could only chuckle inwardly at the moment, having recently solidified my 
plans to write my dissertation, this dissertation, on technology and darkness. I decided to 
reach out to a colleague who lived closer to the UC Santa Barbara campus and ask if she too 
had lost power, only to find that I had no cell phone service at all, the first sign of the 
situation’s exigency. I walked outside and was struck by precisely how dark it was, realizing 
in that moment that I could not remember the last time I had experienced a darkness so 
consuming and total. Making my way to the closest street intersection, I could faintly make 
out that this was not a localized fault of my apartment complex’s electrical system: 
streetlights, traffic lights; all was pitch black, and I still lacked the means to reach out to 
anyone via phone call or internet. And so, I got into my car and headed to my colleague’s 
apartment, at first to check in on whether or not she too was experiencing the same thing. It 
was as I noticed the lack of illumination on the freeway, something I had never seen occur in 
a blackout, that I too noticed a gnawing dread in my chest. I realized that I was no longer 
                                                             
1 Blumenberg, Hans. Paradigms for a Metaphorology. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010. 5. 
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going to my colleague’s to simply ask if she had power, but was doing so because I distinctly 
did not want to be alone. I knew that this feeling was misplaced. I, as an adult, had no reason 
to be afraid of the dark: I slept in the dark, I mulled over work in the dark, I pulled the covers 
over my head on especially early mornings to keep myself in the dark for just a bit longer.  
As I arrived at my destination, only my headlights illuminating the route, I realized that I do 
not quite like darkness when I have no guarantee that it will cease on command, save the 
rising of the sun. My colleague and I exchanged pleasantries, and curiosity got the better of 
me, prompting me to drive southward as far as I could go before seeing a region with power.  
I did not find that point before turning around and heading back home, but on the way, I 
decided in a last-ditch effort to get a bird’s eye view, driving up the Santa Barbara mountains 
as a means to peer out over the landscape. I could see a single area holding the line, a small 
group of streetlights illuminating a tiny stretch of a residential road in the distance.  
Everything else was as dark as the ocean that meets the city’s shoreline. Something was very 
wrong. 
For myself, and the residents of the Santa Barbara area, this was the first sign of the 
Thomas Fire, a devasting wildfire that consumed hundreds of thousands of acres, in turn 
becoming the largest fire in California’s modern era.  It started as the result of a power line 
fault in a plant run by Southern California Edison, the principle reason for the trenchant and 
widespread blackout that engulfed the surrounding areas.2  It is not altogether that common 
for a power outage to also effect cellular service, but cell phone use remained greatly 
hampered throughout the night, almost certainly compounded by the amount of calls 
                                                             
2 Weber, Christopher. “Report: power lines sparked massive California fire.” apnews.com.  
https://apnews.com/5b5695bb61ca44ad9079eba0f57cee77.  13 Mar 2019 
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attempted during the time. The blackout would eventually stop with time, and the fire would 
be quelled after an agonizingly long burn, but in the early moments of its effects, the 
moments when I realized just how extended the blackout was, my mind experienced what 
amounts to a Proustian effect, dancing through memories I had of such scenes. It did not 
matter if I had directly experienced them or not: they just rushed forward with ferocity. I 
thought about Hurricane Maria and the endless blackouts the Puerto Rican people suffered 
only months earlier in 2017. I thought about growing up in Mountain View, California, right 
at the heart of the Enron scandal. I remembered how, during that time period, a rolling 
blackout hit our city while my family was in Target, and I remembered how it hit only weeks 
after the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center. I remembered the customers 
inside screaming, sprinting towards the doors in fear that the blackout was the first sign of a 
terrorist attack, one on our neighborhood Target. I thought back through the little blackouts, 
the ones that were fixed within minutes, and still could feel the falling sensation from the pit 
of my stomach when the light vanished. I thought about how those times feel like I am in the 
start of my own horror movie. “What if,” I thought to myself, “an EMP strike hit the United 
States? What if this blackout right now were a taste of that, and how unprepared would I be 
to survive that unimaginable disaster? What would I do if we were suddenly at war?” Two 
days later, still in Santa Barbara proper, I struggled to pump gas into my car in between 
intermittent outages, standing at a Shell station helplessly with several of my fellow 
residents, ash raining at midnight; I passed out any extra masks I had to them, ones I had 
been so lucky to get at our local Home Depot before they ran out; I waited anxiously to fill 
my tank so that I could just get out of town, drive back to the Bay Area and see my mom; I 
waited for my chance to run. But no matter how hard I tried, the gas station could not get its 
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system operational, and I could not go home. I was not prepared, and as I learned, I was very, 
very afraid of the dark. 
 
 There is a minor trend in media theory to privilege moments of disconnection, to 
celebrate the places where the “network” falls to pieces. For example, the work of Ulises Ali 
Meijas critiques the inherent disparities of network access and how this inequality runs 
aground of network culture’s egalitarian principles.3 McKenzie Wark finds resonance in the 
phenomenology of wirelessness with a new form of embodiment, so that the myriad 
reconnections and disconnections so indicative of contemporary media culture can be 
transposed onto a new experiential paradigm. 4 Where connections break away can be just as 
productive as where they are formed, allowing for novelty and modularity to take root. Hito 
Steyerl calls for a practice of withdrawal from a world of incessant images, done so as a 
means to shield oneself from an onslaught of targeted marketing and image manipulation. 5  
Her work speaks to a loosely knit post-digital subculture, theorizing and practicing 
disconnection as a holistic, regenerative project amidst a culture fueled by data collection and 
exploitation. These three make up a small sample of such a trend, but are representative 
nonetheless of its aims, as niche as they may seem. But they are not without reflection in the 
“real world”: wellness retreats away from technology, Apple’s “Screen Time” function 
monitoring phone usage and promoting healthy habits, Yondr pouches at concerts requiring 
attendees to surrender their phones at the door, both to curtail recording and promote 
                                                             
3 Meijas, Ulises Ali. Off the Network: Disrupting the Digital World. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2013 
4 Wark, McKenzie. Wirelessness. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010. 
5 Steyerl, Hito. “The Spam of the Earth: Withdrawal from Representation”.  e-flux. Journal #32.  Feb 2012 
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attentiveness. Disconnection is a goal, a practice towards a more authentic and healthier state 
of existence. And the work of the aforementioned theorists is critically significant across the 
board: network culture does engender unequal access, and data collection is wielded as an 
exploitative weapon with frightening efficacy, to date most dramatically displayed in the 
Cambridge Analytica scandal of 2018. In certain instances, disconnection can be a liberating 
and productive exercise, and the untethering of subject from technological object can lead to 
a sense of restored autonomy. In layman’s terms, disconnection can free us. 
 There is a caveat to this claim, however. As my own anecdote shows, disconnection 
can also be smothering; it can entrap you and leave you adrift, lay existence bare and reveal 
weaknesses. Taken as a philosophical framework, it can serve as the groundwork for 
revolutionary practice, but it is not something to be applied universally, and this is a reality 
that I am sure these writers know in good faith. My original point of intervention for this 
project was to examine technological disconnection as a source of anxiety, and my aim was 
to pry into the particular affects of disconnection that lead to distress within the affected 
parties. As I developed this idea, what continued to capture my attention was the mitigating 
factor of darkness in these situations: blackouts, radio transmissions “going dark”, the spider-
web of “dark fiber” beneath the United States as a monument to the failed fiber-optic 
revolution6. My interest shifted away from exploring disconnection proper, and instead 
turned to the particular modality of darkness in media-technological culture. What I 
discovered was a relatively subterranean narrative history, wherein darkness is applied in 
such ways that extend beyond the typical associations with disconnection or system failure. 
For example, Eugene Thacker’s essay “Dark Media” posits its titular subject as media that 
                                                             
6 For more on this parallel history, see: Hui-Hu, Tung.  A Prehistory of the Cloud.  Cambridge: MIT Press, 2015. 
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connect too well, opening up gateways to unknown realities or planes of existence and 
confronting their users with a unique type of horror.7 Further, one can see this inverted 
application of darkness in the term “dark web”, which signifies not a faulty network, but a 
fully functioning “shadow” network whose operations are perfectly solvent.  As the first 
chapter of this dissertation will show, the term “dark web” is by no means a universally 
positive, or even neutral, nomenclature: its name conjures images for many of violence, 
illegality, and, frankly, evil. 
 Given that media and technology are colloquially taken to be tools of enlightenment 
or illumination (metaphorical or literal), my fascination takes root in the moments wherein 
the concept of darkness is affixed to certain media-technological phenomena. This 
dissertation will examine four case studies thereof, and it will principally explore the 
hermeneutic processes through which these phenomena are deigned fearful, dreadful, or 
unsettling. To establish my terms from the start, “darkness” will be applied liberally in 
certain cases, functioning metaphorically or symbolically within the parameters of its 
application. While two of the following chapters examine moments of darkness in its 
experiential, visible form (namely that of blackouts and visible dark zones on maps), the 
other two examine the dark web and numbers stations, the latter of which opens up the 
complex dynamics of “dark sound”, the former using darkness as a metaphorical proxy for 
secrecy and obscurity. The reasoning behind this motley selection extends beyond the simple 
link of darkness in each, and in actuality serves as the core thrust of this dissertation. I argue 
                                                             
7 Thacker, Eugene.  “Dark Media”.  Exocommunication: Three Inquiries in Media and Mediation. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2013.  
 
 I will take up this point with more detail in Chapter 3. 
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that despite the vast gulfs between these four examples, in concert they lend further support 
to the idea of a fundamental and unimpeachable narrative/metaphorical complex concerning 
darkness at a generative level. Their differences in scale and sensory domains find 
themselves drawn together through the hermeneutic application of darkness as an 
explanatory function.  In an ironic twist, there is an attempt to render the phenomena in these 
case studies intelligible through the deployment of a metaphor closely associated with the 
unintelligible. I use “phenomena” here to indicate a complex of the object or event and the 
way that they are experienced, and by extension this includes the way in which these objects 
or events are “read”. Conditioned by “darkness”, they function as a sort of bizarre text, and 
as such are drawn into fundamental darkness metaphors that stretch back to Antiquity.  
Furthermore, their “betrayal” of the cultural assumption of technology as illuminating makes 
them particularly efficient vectors for the particular narrative of darkness as a frightening or 
dangerous force. As such, these cases take within them a particular permutation of the 
darkness narrative, and this allows them to be generative, in that they further propagate the 
originating metaphorical circumstances from which they took their shape. Through tracing 
onto these cases fundamental metaphors of darkness, they then become further steps into a 
larger darkness narrative, in turn bolstering and further affixing its persistent cultural 
relevance. Furthermore, this aspect also allows them to be approached hermeneutically, or, in 
other words, interpreted as textual objects, with concomitant historical traces and 
applications. In selecting “dark zones” within media-technological culture that inspire fear or 
dread, I also aim to approach the ways in which these particular affects disrupt the 
development of productive relationships with technology. They regenerate narratives of fear 
that, in certain cases, propagate deleterious effects. Finally, I put forth the claim that despite 
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these particular darkness narratives being linked to the greater genealogy of darkness 
narratives dating back to Antiquity, they reemerge into the media-technological sphere in 
surprisingly unadulterated fashion. As such, I will often turn to literature as a point of 
comparison, done so as a means to chart certain evolutionary strands of these narratives 
through their most resonant field of application: novels, poetry, etc. Where possible (and 
practical), I also will offer counternarratives or steps towards more productive relationships 
with these “dark zones” in an attempt to perhaps disarm especially pernicious aspects of 
these dominant narratives. 
 With the overall trajectory of this dissertation set up, for the remainder of this 
introduction I will develop the theoretical framework through which I arrived at this project’s 
formation. The first, and most significant, idea comes from Hans Blumenberg, whose work 
on “metaphorology” serves as the groundwork for my treatment of the darkness narrative. I n 
his book Paradigms for a Metaphorology, Blumenberg attempts to establish a historical 
foundation for the relationship of metaphor to truth, ultimately arguing that metaphor’s 
perceived indexical failings perhaps could be read as its unique strength.  He notes that in 
Antiquity: 
The traditional classification of metaphor among the ornaments of public 
speech is hardly fortuitous: for antiquity, the logos was fundamentally 
adequate to the totality of what exists.  Cosmos and logos were correlates.  
Metaphor is here deemed incapable of enriching the capacity of expressive 
means; it contributes only to the effect of a statement, the ‘punchiness’ with 
which it gets through to its political and forensic addresses.8       
Consequently, the “proper” domain for the acquisition of truth was rigid philosophical 
examination and deductive reason. The poetics of metaphor found little room for their input 
                                                             
8 Blumenberg, Hans. Paradigms for a Metaphorology. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010.  2. 
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outside of the aesthetic dimension, in this regard, and Blumenberg traces this provision all 
the way to Descartes’ philosophical method.9 While possessing great utility in the domain of 
rhetoric, metaphors at best could only ever augment the impact of inferable concepts gleaned 
as the product of deductive reasoning: in other words, ideas that correspond directly to the 
terminology set out for them. Describing something as another thing only works to distance 
concept from reality in this case. 
 And yet, as in all assumedly “complete” systems, the aberrant radicals and glitches 
sing loudest.  Blumenberg notes the existence of some particularly obstinate metaphors 
throughout the history of philosophy, seemingly the lowest reduction possible concerning a 
given relationship.  Otherwise stated, these metaphors either form such a tight relationship 
with a given concept or prove so rich in conceptual connectivity that they themselves become 
integral components of the creation of concepts rather than simple adornments: “a catalytic 
sphere from which the universe of concepts continually renews itself”.10 Naming these 
phenomena “absolute metaphors”, Blumenberg further asserts that while, like all metaphors, 
these unique types still may not offer a direct apprehension of a truth, they still serve to fill 
voids created by existential questions or aporias with no discernable answer. He explains: 
Metaphors are unable to satisfy the requirement that truth, by definition, be 
the result of a methodologically secure procedure of verification.  They 
therefore not only fail to say ‘nothing but the truth’, they do not say anything 
truthful at all.  Absolute metaphors ‘answer’ the supposedly naïve, in principle 
unanswerable questions whose relevance lies quite simply in the fact that they 
cannot be brushed aside, since we do not pose them ourselves but find them 
already posed in the ground of our existence. […] By providing a point of 
orientation, the content of absolute metaphors determines a particular attitude 
                                                             
9 Blumenberg, Hans. Paradigms for a Metaphorology. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010. 1. 
10 Ibid. 4. 
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or conduct; they give structure to a world, representing the nonexperienceable, 
nonapprehensible totality of the real.11  
It is the final line of this excerpt that proves most bracing, as Blumenberg’s claim that such 
absolute metaphors effectively structure the world on a representational level, and this 
imbues them with no less power than the “pure” elements of truth that they enjoin. They 
would have to be metaphors of such resilience that they serve as a generative font for 
concepts, by which I mean that the metaphorical relationship itself produces conceptual units 
or constants, similar to those used in mathematics or physics equations. For example, the 
association of darkness with evil (evil itself being notoriously undefinable through 
philosophical logic) becomes so ubiquitous that it calcifies into a replicable conceptual unit, a 
certain “type” of darkness that functions to signify “evil” with pronounced aptitude. This 
conceptual block (i.e. “evil darkness”) then may serve as a composite unit in an evolving 
narrative of darkness and evil over time, evolving and being redeployed to serve the needs of 
cultural development or alteration. A particularly damaging example of this would be the 
association of darkness and evil being taken from its metaphysical function in Biblical 
parable and being transposed onto racist ideology of the 20th century. As such, if “darkness” 
serves as an Ur-metaphor, an “absolute metaphor” in Blumenbergian terms, then the resultant 
fragmentary concepts can be traced back to it along the lines of their evolution. Hence the 
quote which starts this introduction: absolute metaphor provides the “way of seeing” (or lens) 
through which concepts are created. 
 This play between “metaphor” and “concept” can be elucidated further by referring to 
a work to which Blumenberg almost certainly is responding with his “metaphorology”, and 
                                                             
11 Blumenberg, Hans.  Paradigms for a Metaphorology.  Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010.  Pp. 14 
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that is Friedrich Nietzsche’s “On Truth And Lying in a Non-Moral Sense.” In this, Nietzsche 
critiques the human sovereignty of knowledge, questioning the ability of language to fully 
capture the truth or essence of a designated object. He writes, “We believe that when we 
speak of trees, colours, snow, and flowers, we have knowledge of the things themselves, and 
yet we possess only metaphors of things which in no way correspond to the original 
entities.”12 Familiar territory for 19th century philosophy, Nietzsche accepts the inability to 
know a “thing-in-itself”, instead deploying metaphor as a means to best approximate the truth 
content of an object. But these metaphors are at the core artificial stopgaps, standing in for 
total knowledge on the part of humanity as a whole. This is a significantly less forgiving 
view than Blumenberg’s, the latter of whom appears to acknowledge the ability of deductive 
reason and sciences to truly grasp worldly phenomena, with absolute metaphor operating 
only at the limits of these fields. Nevertheless, Nietzsche presses on to claim that “each word 
immediately becomes a concept”, an admittedly confusing turnaround as it quite closely 
follows his earlier pronunciation of all language as metaphor. 13 He elaborates that when a 
word is spoken into existence, it always will be modified into a designation that can be taken 
as representative of a unified group rather than necessitate rearticulating each unique instance 
of a phenomenon.  Put more simply, he uses the example of the word “leaf”, which can be 
used to indicate an individual leaf or represent the concept of leaf in general.14 Through the 
development and combination of concepts, human beings thus form a consistent system of 
truth that explains the outside world. Furthermore, this removes the need to develop 
                                                             
12 Nietzsche, Friedrich.  “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense.”  The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 144. 
13 Ibid. 145. 
14 Ibid. 145. 
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metaphors for each instance of a phenomenon, thus dropping the need for a type of  “truth-
poetics” (a significant point of despair for him.) Nietzsche writes: 
  What then is truth?  A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies,   
  anthropomorphisms, in short a sum of human relations which have been  
  subjected to poetic intensification, translation, and decoration, and which,  
  after they have been in use for a long time, strike a people as firmly  
  established, canonical, and binding; truths are illusions of which we have  
  forgotten that they are illusions, metaphors which have become worn by  
  frequent use and have lost all sensuous vigor, coins which having lost their 
  stamp, are now regarded as metal and no longer coins.15 
In relying on concepts to build a network of truth, humans lose not only the ability to 
recognize truth as an artistic creation, but also risk losing the ability to see oneself as 
artistically creative.16 Concepts, themselves “the left-over residue of a metaphor”17 are 
stacked into what Nietzsche famously calls a “Roman columbarium”.18 What is meant to be a 
monument to human knowledge is instead a vast mausoleum of dead metaphors, an epitaph 
for human creativity. 
 The danger, for Nietzsche, is what then follows over the span of centuries, and his 
remarks on this are critical for my own argumentative aims.  He writes: 
  Even a relation of a nervous stimulation to the image produced thereby is  
  inherently not a necessary relationship; but when that same image has been 
  produced millions of times and has been passed down through many  
  generations of humanity, indeed eventually appears in the whole of humanity 
  as a consequence of the same occasion, it finally acquires the same  
  significance for all human beings, as if it were the only necessary image and 
  as if that relation of the original nervous stimulus to the image produced were 
                                                             
15 Nietzsche, Friedrich.  “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense.”  The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 146. 
16 Ibid. 148. 
17 Ibid. 147. 
18 Ibid. 147. 
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  a relation of strict causality – in exactly the same way as a dream, if repeated 
  eternally, would be felt and judged entirely as reality.19 
Taking his opaque phrasing of nervous stimulations and images to mean the sensory 
experience of a phenomenon and the word/description/thought/metaphor/concept used to 
explain it, Nietzsche quite adeptly summarizes the manner through which such associations 
reify and crystallize into replicable patterns. As a concept or, more accurately, conceptual 
relationship repeats itself, it assumes the form of the only plausible conceptual relationship 
between a phenomenon and its meaning. For a practical example, as darkness is associated 
with danger time and time again over the course of humanity, the conceptual complex of 
darkness and danger takes the form of a given relationship, and it loses its sense of artifice or 
“created-ness.” Granted, the dark does contain unique dangers: predators hunt at nighttime, 
activity is less easy to see, one can even trip and fall down. In this sense, the link between 
darkness and a sense of fear can be explained in biological or evolutionary terms. However, 
Nietzsche would question the nature of the systems of biology or evolutionary sciences in the 
grand scheme of truth, and I pose the following wrinkle: what rationally explainable reason 
exists for the association of darkness and evil? 
 To find some middle ground between Blumenberg and Nietzsche, Blumenberg 
rehabilitates the desiccated metaphor of Nietzsche’s argument and finds a home for it in such 
instances. Metaphor may still persist in a world of concepts, but it only holds shape for cases 
in which the metaphor is used to capture that which is difficult to conceptualize on its own: 
something such as “evil.”20 However, as Nietzsche suggests, this does not preclude the 
                                                             
19   Nietzsche, Friedrich.  “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense.”  The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 149. 
20 Granted, one could quite succinctly define evil as “That which is not good”.  Of course, all one must ask then 
is “What is good?” to then ignite a millennium of philosophical inquiry. 
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human tendency to repeat these absolute metaphorical relationships as if they were replicable 
concepts. Hence my earlier point: these quasi-concepts are taken as givens and can be traced 
onto a multitude of objects or phenomena, dragging along with them age-old metaphorical 
histories that (either consciously or subconsciously) condition the response to these 
phenomena from the start. I argue that this set of operations create and/or contribute to a 
narrative history, changing over time and producing a chartable trajectory of evolution not 
unlike the development of a literary trope over time, or even the plot of a novel. Media and 
technological objects are by no means exempt from this process, and as such form the 
grounds for this dissertation.  
 I turn to more concrete examples here to further elaborate on this point.  The first 
absolute metaphor that Blumenberg identifies is “light.” He summarizes this claim quite 
succinctly, as follows: 
If, however, we pursue the history of the metaphor most closely linked to the 
problem of truth, the metaphor of light, the question [“What is truth?”] 
explicates itself in a concealed plenitude never yet hazarded by any system.  
The metaphorics of light cannot be translated back into concepts: analysis 
seeks to disclose the questions to which answers are sought and risked, 
questions of a presystematic nature whose intentional fullness ‘provoked’ the 
metaphors as it were.21  
Essentially put, the question of what truth is in itself proves so vast that it proves functionally 
unanswerable on the terms of consensus.  Certainly, there are and have been myriad answers 
to the question ‘What is truth?’, but it still resists any sort of systematic pinpointing that 
proves universally satisfactory.  In such a case, an absolute metaphor such as “light” steps in 
as if it were summoned to fill this gap, and it does so in such a way that it allows for such 
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discussion to even happen in the first place. In other words, light in some cases offers a 
grammar through which truth can be articulated prior to any attempted schematization or 
categorization. Due to its attractive simplicity, “light as truth” thus repeats over time and 
enters into the cultural consciousness as a useful conceptual relationship.   
 Again, what signifies the ascension of a metaphor into the realm of the absolute, for 
Blumenberg, is when it gains a history, i.e. a pattern of usages so consistent that it functions 
as a truncated but no less fascinating summation concerning both the function of light as a 
metaphor as well as the means through which it is historically engendered. I cite the 
following in full: 
Light can be a directed beam, a guiding beacon in the dark, an advancing 
dethronement of darkness, but also a dazzling super-abundance, as well as an 
indefinite, omnipresent brightness containing all: the ‘letting-appear’ that does 
not itself appear, the inaccessible accessibility of things.  Light and darkness 
can represent the absolute metaphysical counterforces that exclude each other 
and yet bring the world-constellation into existence.  Or, light is the absolute 
power of Being, which reveals the paltriness of the dark, which can no longer 
exist once light has come into existence.  Light is intrusive; in its abundance, 
it creates the overwhelming, conspicuous clarity with which the true “comes 
forth”; it forcibly acquires the irrevocability of Spirit’s consent.  Light remains 
what it is while letting the infinite participate in it; it is consumption without 
loss.  Light produces space, distance, orientation, calm contemplation; it is the 
gift that makes no demands, the illumination capable of conquering without 
force.22 
The accumulation of such readings over time coupled with a discernible homogeneity of 
readings gives the absolute metaphor its force, and in turn the ability to be used as a concept.  
Deriving the following from Blumenberg’s analysis, light is power, it is consuming and 
radiating, and it operates via revelation, destruction, and purification. In action one can see 
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how the metaphor assumes the illusion of a concept here, as it can be discussed and defined 
in a similar manner. Thus, over time, light as metaphor lapses into light as pseudo-index, and 
its own historical trajectory weaves into the fabric of its meaning over decades and centuries. 
 However, what stands out to me in this excerpt is the emergence of darkness, peeking 
out from behind light’s metaphorical force. Blumenberg himself notes that the two 
effectively must always be entwined, light and darkness serving as “metaphysical 
counterforces.” His implication here is, of course, that darkness functions as an absolute 
metaphor of its own. In the same article, he offers claims such as, “Darkness is unable to 
bring about [the congruence of reality and perception]; it is ontically and ontologically 
impotent”23, or that darkness generally serves as a “vanquished emptiness.”24 He does also 
acknowledge that darkness can sometimes in fact serve as a productive force, but his 
historical framing provokes some questions. Citing Novalis, he states: 
Here, the light of the diurnal world signifies limitation and unfreedom through 
its association with the finitude of a gaze that it is bound to and determined by 
material things, whereas the dark of the night signifies the diminishment of 
material determination, which makes it possible for the horizonless entirety of 
Being to be affectively present as a unity.25   
While I do, in fact, agree with his reading here, that darkness ultimately contains a productive 
potential inaccessible to light, he frames this claim as follows: “There is yet another, extreme 
form that this metaphor can take, one that can be asserted only after “darkness” has gained a 
positive value, as in the Romantic concept of night and darkness.”26 I find the scope of this 
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claim puzzling in what appears to be an overly strict limitation. In claiming that darkness 
transitioned to a symbol of productive and unrestricted change or growth only after the 
Romantic period, it would seem as if Blumenberg does not account for the fact that darkness 
frequently serves as a generative font in creation myths. This would position this particular 
use of the darkness metaphor (or reading thereof) at the dawn of narrative formations rather 
than as a comparatively new development.  Furthermore, it reinforces certain immutable 
characteristics of the darkness metaphor, reinforcing its “absoluteness” beyond even the 
scope of Blumenberg’s own analysis on the matter. Simply put, darkness as a productive 
force far predates the age of Novalis, stretching back to the primordial gods of Greek 
mythology, namely Nyx and Erebus.   
 These two gods—particularly the latter—prove quite difficult at times to define, 
directly appearing in only a handful of mythological sources, if any at all. What is certain is 
that these two gods both served as representations of darkness, with Nyx developing into a 
feminized metaphorical construct for night, indicated by one such euphemistic instance at the 
start of Hesiod’s Theogony, one of the few written Classical sources to make direct reference 
to both deities27. Erebus, however, proves a greater interpretive challenge, possibly because 
his name shared the same meaning as a semiotic marker of darkness in general.  Nanno 
Marinatos addresses this confusion in his essay “Light and Darkness and Archaic Greek 
Cosmography”, in which he notes that not only Hesiod but also Homer makes reference to 
erebos as a location, a darkness into which people are cast upon death or from which they 
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arise to speak directly to Odysseus, respectively.28 That said, Hesiod explicitly makes 
reference to Erebus as a deity in itself, the sibling of Nyx, no less. He writes, “Chaos 
whelped Erebos and blackest Night./Out of Night were born Aither and Day,/Conceived in 
clasping love with Erebos.”29 While I will return this later on, it is worth noting the inversion 
here regarding day as being birthed by the coupling of twinned darkness. Erebus appears to 
be a darkness of a similar metaphorical register than Nyx, something likewise argued by 
Marinatos, “[Erebos] is clearly distinguished from Nyx, its sister and consort. Erebos, then, 
may be defined as primeval perpetual darkness as is also Nyx, although the latter is female 
and gives birth to day.”30 I assert that the definition is, once again, similar, but that one 
cannot describe them as the same due to the far greater implications of Nyx’s multiple births 
than Marinatos appears to acknowledge. 
 Indeed, Blumenberg’s very bifurcation of darkness into two registers (that of pure 
emptiness, diametrically opposed to cleansing light, versus darkness as productive and 
liberating in terms of the imaginary) appears to function within this singular moment in 
Greek cosmology. Whereas Erebus functions as an all-consuming and treacherous darkness, 
Nyx quite literally produces new phenomena, most notably a metaphorical surrogate for light 
itself. The implications here are fascinating: in this generative moment, wherein darkness and 
light perhaps take their first step towards forming the history indicative of an absolute 
metaphor, it is darkness that precedes light, giving it shape and form before introducing it 
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into the world. Fascinating, but perhaps unsurprising, as a plethora of mythological or 
religious cosmology begin with a void out of which creation arises: a blank canvas for a 
designer’s vision. But even still, Hesiod denotes both Erebus and Nyx as first order creations, 
appearing out of an even more primeval void in the form of Chaos. Whether or not this 
implies that both Erebus and Nyx are of higher levels of orderliness is an interesting, if not 
wandering, question. My point here is that in this instance, Nyx represents a darkness that 
functionally emulates Novalis’s poetic claim: a font of imagination divorced from material 
sensibility, and a darkness out of which the concept of order is abstracted.   
 This is of course not a darkness, akin to Erebus, that threatens to consume all light or, 
more stereotypically, be eradicated by it. In fact, Hesiod depicts Nyx/Night and Day as two 
aspects of a synergistic cycle, writing: 
  Unfaltering, there where Night and Day draw near to one another, 
  Nodding as they trade places across the great threshold 
  Of bronze.  When one ducks inside the door, the other leaves; 
  Never does the ceiling shelter both within, 
  But every time one ventures from the house 
  To circle over the earth, the other stays at home.31 
A rhetoric of eradication or purification holds no place in this cycle, depicting day and 
night—light and darkness—in close proximity but never encroaching upon the other.  The 
metaphorically combative32 interaction of light and dark, one that Blumenberg sees as 
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emblematic to the progression of philosophy (most notably in the Enlightenment), seems 
inelegant in light of this system, wherein the dark inhabits a harmonious relationship within 
the order of existence rather than acting as a consuming void that threatens to rend it asunder.  
But one must stop short of falsely portraying Nyx/Night as benign or beloved in this regard, 
as this is explicitly disproven within the same text.  Hesiod gives Nyx the epithet 
“doomful”33 before describe two more of her children, Hypnos and Thanatos, gods of sleep 
and death, respectively.   
He writes: 
  There the children of blackest Night keep chambers: 
  Hypnos and Thanatos, dreadful divines.  Never upon them 
  The radiant sun gazes with his rays, 
  Neither mounting to heaven nor sinking down the sky. 
  Of the brothers the former wanders over the land 
  And the sea’s broad back, gentle and soothing to mortals. 
  But the other’s heart is iron, and merciless 
  In his chest his spirit of brass.  Whom once he snatches, 
  He grips that one fast.  Detested is he by the deathless gods.34   
Characterizing sleep and death as aspects of the dark, Hesiod is clear to note that these 
figures are ones that light cannot even affect.  They are two  metaphorical functions 
that cannot be purged or eradicated in the terms of Enlightenment rhetoric, nor can they be 
substituted for a sense of “truthlessness.”  Indeed, sleep and death remain unknowable for the 
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subject, as by the nature of their action, consciousness is either momentarily or permanently 
lost. But these two concepts are real and definable states. No metaphor of light holds force 
here, it being depicted as powerless, and this is a direct inversion of “ontological impotency,” 
as Blumenberg puts it. If anything, the unknowability of these particular descendants of 
darkness, their ability to transform and produce change within the shadows (something 
perhaps inherited from their own mother’s fertile nature) is precisely what instills them with 
a sense of dread (or in the case of death, detestation). 
 Taking darkness to be an absolute metaphor in line with Blumenberg’s definition, I 
argue that darkness as a productive or positive function is not in fact an extreme or 
exceptional form thereof, and certainly not one that finds its inception as recently as Novalis.  
Rather, darkness as an absolute metaphor for unknowable and unchecked production or 
change is fundamental to its internal consistency. Furthermore, darkness’s role in a 
hermeneutic network that links such productivity with chaos or total unknowability (i.e. 
Blumenberg’s “primary” reading of darkness), inspires a large portion of its associated fear.  
While this is not to argue that darkness stands as anathema to the liberating or imaginative 
principle articulated by Novalis, I do assert that obscured productive potential of darkness is 
one of its greatest sources of anxiety, perhaps even more than simple obscurity. Put more 
colloquially, it is not the unknown that inspires fear, but what the unknown could be doing in 
the dark, away from any illumination. However, productivity is by no means the only source 
of aversion or fear.  In his book From Light to Dark: Daylight, Illumination, and Gloom, Tim 
Edensor charts the fear of darkness into medieval times and beyond, referring to it as 
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“nyctophobia.”35 He writes, “In medieval times, besides the evident threats it posed to health 
and safety, darkness was the occasion for all manner of invisible, spectral, ungodly forces to 
emerge, negative associations that continue to linger across Western popular culture.”36 
Detailing the connection of nighttime with paganism and Satan, Edensor notes that darkness 
was a realm in which all evil could run amok, representing the very sense of baneful 
productivity articulated above.37 He then goes on to chart a wide variety of such negative 
associations, both religious and secular. These include the coopting of religious conceptions 
of light and darkness by the Enlightenment’s rational goals, the myth of Africa as a “Dark 
Continent” (a history I will cover in detail in Chapter 2), the association of dark alleys and 
slums with criminality, and even the Dark Ages themselves as a symbol of regression.38  He 
notes that, “criminal activities, sedition, political opposition, illicit romances, subcultural 
practices, urban exploration, flyer posting, and graffiti writing typically take place under 
cover of darkness,”39 and cites Bryan Palmer’s reading of darkness as a site of 
transgression.40  
 What I find compelling about this spread of references is that it is quite difficult to 
find a unifying principle underpinning the use of darkness as a negative force.  Some deal 
with productivity and illicit activity, others imply regression or ignorance, and others with 
the potential for violence and/or death (flyer posting and urban exploration notwithstanding).  
In the wide breadth of this historical survey, darkness is “bad”, something to be avoided if 
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not outright purged from existence.  Edensor is acutely aware of this effect as well.  Drawing 
the following conclusion from the variety of responses to electrical blackouts, he writes, 
“The examples of blackouts highlight how darkness is not essentially neutral, positive, or 
negative: its power depends on the temporal and spatial contexts in which it is 
experienced.”41 Indeed, Edensor spends great lengths to articulate historically positive 
associations with darkness, forming a narrative or conceptual history of their own. This 
history includes (but is not limited to) romantic activities, meditative practices, family 
gatherings, and even the most obvious of all: a good night’s sleep.42 For that matter, this is an 
analytic trajectory shared by Elisabeth Bromfen, whose book Night Passages examines a 
similar positive evolution in written or visual accounts of darkness.43 Notably, Edensor’s 
book focuses predominately on the historical evolution of artificial illumination as well as its 
reconfiguring force on the cultural conceptions of darkness all the more. As darkness shrinks 
away from public places, so too does the experience of darkness morph in suit. To connect 
back to his comment on blackouts, the very concept of an electrical blackout cannot exist 
prior to the development of electricity or, more importantly, the lightbulb. As he argues, 
artificial illumination is largely taken for granted by this point, and the titanic ramifications 
of its invention are “an ordinary miracle we no longer acknowledge.”44 Nevertheless, even if 
experienced passively through force of habit, I agree with Edensor’s claims that both light 
and dark “shape our everyday worlds”, and that “the atmospheres through which we 
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continuously move are cooked by levels of darkness and light, foregrounding their more than 
representational attributes.”45 While his work pays significant attention to the effect of light 
and darkness on space and its cognitive representations, my intervention is that the very 
narrative processes that give shape to the reception of such spaces can be deployed into even 
more unique and quizzical objects or events. 
 However, the main point I wish to make here in referencing Edensor’s work is 
twofold: Firstly, through this wide breadth of references one can see verification of 
Blumenberg’s (and by extension, Nietzsche’s) thought, that the absolute metaphor of 
darkness serves as a creative font for conceptual relationships of both positive and negative 
forms. Secondly, I also wish to situate myself into the burgeoning and critical conversation 
regarding these fundamental metaphors. In part, Edensor wishes to find a way to rehabilitate 
darkness, or at the least propose a means to restore more of its positive associations in a 
world growing ever brighter with artificial illumination. Further, he spends the first two 
thirds of his book examining the creative potentials of light and illumination both in terms of 
geographic/spatial planning and artistic fields. I will offer little in the way of considering 
light or illumination in this dissertation, save my second chapter on light pollution maps. My 
principle aim is to chart the manner in which some of these narrative configurations find new 
homes in the some of the unlikeliest of media-technological phenomena, and I consider here 
both the object or event itself as well as the interpretations thereof. It is a complex position to 
navigate, but a crucial one, as the resonant “dark” qualities of the following case studies both 
fuel and are created by cultural reception and interpretation. In the same vein, there is an 
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inherent slippage to the use of terms “metaphor” and “narrative” here as well. To elaborate, 
as the previous examples indicate, the metaphorical deployments of darkness are often far 
more complex and elaborate than one may expect. If fundamental metaphors of darkness lead 
to more complex and nested usages within cultural narratives over time, I take as 
fundamental that the complexity of these narratives can quite readily be absorbed into the 
continued transmission of these metaphors over time. As I make clear in my conclusion, in 
which I invoke Frederic Jameson’s work on narrative and political unconscious, the lines 
between Blumenberg’s “absolute metaphor”, Nietzsche’s “concept”, and Jameson’s “master 
narrative” begin to blur, as the three orbit the same interpretive process. That said, there is in 
all likelihood a rich conversation to be found within the liminal differences of these terms as 
they are used by these three thinkers, and it perhaps would serve as the springboard for a 
continued analysis of the  central issue put forth in this dissertation.  
 As mentioned earlier, two of the following case studies concern phenomena that are 
“dark” in metaphorical terms only, possessing no visual component of darkness whatsoever.  
My own ultimate goal for each case study that follows (the Dark Web, light pollution maps, 
numbers stations, and EMPs) is to decipher and identify the narrative genealogy (or 
genealogies) of darkness that clandestinely informs the cultural responses to each of these 
cases, and in doing so identify the particular timbre of fear for each. I then will demonstrate 
this genealogy (in part) by way of literary or cultural examples that provide a diachronic 
view of the conceptual evolution of the darkness narrative at play. I do this mainly for two 
reasons: First, situating the following media-technological phenomena within a greater 
narrative history resists the seductive lure of ascribing to these phenomena a false sense of 
total incomparability. In discussing the more destructive of these cases (namely EMPs but to 
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a lesser extent the Dark Web) as unique in their global effects, there is a real risk of paralysis 
in terms of addressing strategies of protection or the management of anxiety and fear. By 
locating these cases within a greater narrative history, I hold that the manner through which 
these phenomena are experienced and interpreted can be shifted in such a way that they 
possess less in the way of disturbing force. In short, if one can dig up the roots of fear, the 
less chance it has of sprouting back. For the second reason, I am before all things a literary 
scholar: it is the domain in which I have been trained and have cut my teeth until this very 
point. If these phenomena are interpreted and inscribed in narrative terms by the public, then 
so too may they be read as cultural texts. And if they may indeed be read as cultural texts, 
then it stands to reason that they resonate with the same narrative force as literature in the 
broadest sense. While my conclusion will treat the following quote with more detail, I 
preempt it by citing Frederic Jameson here: “I take [narrative] to be the central function or 
instance of the human mind.”46 I find this claim to be fundamental to my own scholarly aims, 
and as such the bridging of literature to these case studies is only natural for me. Finally, I do 
not wish to rehabilitate the positive aspects of darkness in these situations so much as I wish 
to deconstruct some of conceptual relationships between particular narratives of darkness and 
their associated media-technological objects. In three of the following cases, I argue that 
these associations promote unproductive, if not outright dangerous relationships with these 
particular phenomena, risking stunting the growth of functional anti-surveillant 
communication, perpetuating trenchant racist stereotypes, and in the last case, embracing a 
potential apocalypse as just recompense. This dissertation as whole then puts forth the 
following question: are some of these “dark” media-technological phenomena less 
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destructive than the fear or panic that their narrative associations engender? If this is in fact 
the case, to what degree are these narrative associations damaging, and are there productive 
steps that one could take to reconfigure their conceptual relationships therewith? Crucially, 
barring the examination of Japan in the final chapter of this dissertation, I must note that this 
analysis draws much of its force from primary research in the Western cultural domain, 
namely the United States and Europe. While darkness has a universal timbre, there are still 
cultural variants based on cultural context and time periods. Secondly, the focus of this 
dissertation on narrative construction goes hand in hand with cultural interpretation, and this 
latter factor plays a significant role in determining the lens through which these phenomena 
are experienced. As such, it bears noting the boundaries to my research and the inherent 
limitations thereof. While I have made fleeting references to the chapters up until this point, I 
offer a detailed outline of them below. 
 Chapter 1 focuses on the Dark Web, a segmented off portion of the Deep Web solely 
accessible through the use of the TOR browser. I will examine the way in which its cultural 
perception both invites the very kind of disturbing content that further reinforces its “dark” 
status. Following this, I will examine two prominent works of non-fiction concerning the 
dark web and discuss the efficacy with which they attempt a demythologization of the 
network’s “darkness”. I will then offer a brief history of “shadow networks” across literary 
history as a means to offer a subterranean conceptual history that may lend support to the 
reinforcement of the Dark Web’s macabre fascination. Finally, I will put forth a small sample 
of hidden service websites that defy the darkness narrative associated with the dark web, one 
of illicit activity and unchecked production, all in hopes of dispelling (in part) the notion that 
the dark web exists solely for criminality and is thus a tainted configuration at the core. The 
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Dark Web’s sordid reputation frequently precedes it, distorting its original egalitarian aims of 
free discourse.  My argument is that this very reputation not only fuels itself, but also helps 
condition the Dark Web to foster the very kind of illicit behavior so associated with it due in 
part to this narrative history.  
 Chapter 2 turns to light pollution maps, specifically satellite photography that reveals 
wide swaths of darkness around the globe. I will examine the ways in which such 
photography has been used to reinforce the darkness narrative of regression, focusing 
principally on North Korea and the African continent. After developing a theoretical 
framework to complicate the notion of photographic (and cartographic) objectivity, 
principally by way of Edward Soja and Franco Moretti amongst others, I will further discuss 
the manner in which these depictions of Africa join with the narrative history of the “Dark 
Continent,” turning to colonial literature as a means to uncover a trajectory that extends into 
the contemporary moment. Beyond the immediate connection to a racist history, these maps 
risk propagating and rejuvenating a culturally conditioned view of these “dark” regions as 
dangerous and derelict. My goal is to expose the threads of this history so as to make clear 
the narrative forces at work behind such images, all in the service of disrupting this trenchant 
metaphorical association.    
 Chapter 3 focuses on the perplexing phenomenon of numbers stations, mysterious 
transmissions that contain long strings of numbers read by synthesized voices. Publicly 
accessible by all shortwave radio owners and long considered to be spy transmissions, 
numbers stations serve as a means to approach the concept of “dark sound,” which I take to 
mean aural phenomena that inspire fear through means both inexplicable or easily 
  29 
identifiable. As numbers stations fall squarely into the former, I will approach their unique 
uncanniness through the theoretical lenses of Eugene Thacker’s concept of the World-
Without-Us and Roland Barthes work on the “genovoice,” a pre-signifying vocal utterance 
that communicates tangible human presence. I will also place numbers stations into a longer 
history of “spectral radio” by way of the archival work of Jeffrey Sconce, arguing that 
numbers stations fit into the narrative history of the radio opening up to a “dark” paranormal 
realm. While numbers stations appear on the surface to be a niche trifle, they nevertheless 
demonstrate the transversal power of darkness narratives, and as such demonstrate a unique 
application thereof. Of particular interest is the manner through which these stations are 
“read” both by aficionados and passers-by, offering a “real-world” example of the very kind 
of cultural textual analysis at play in this dissertation as a whole.  
 Finally, Chapter 4 will examine the theoretical phenomenon of a weaponized EMP 
strike, an event with the distinct capacity for global catastrophe if not outright destruction.  
After detailing the implications of an EMP strike for both the United States and Japan, both 
of which were recently threatened with such a strike by the North Korean government, I will 
first examine the official responses to the threat on the part of both countries, followed by 
three depictions of an EMP strike in popular media, specifically a film, video game, and 
anime series. In these responses I locate a distinct rhetorical similarity to myths concerning 
darkness plagues, specifically those of the Christian Bible. I argue that the connection to this 
narrative history betrays a dangerously eschatological attitude, one that views an EMP as a 
divine punishment, earned through the sin of overreliance on technology. This imbues the 
darkness of EMPs with a purgative force, and as such reveals an unsettling reflection of the 
death drive within this particular conceptual relationship. 
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Chapter 1: Into the Abyss: The Narrative Construction of a “Dark” Web 
1. Intro – A Selection of Portraits 
 In late August of 2017, a series of setbacks befell the white nationalist/neo-Nazi 
website The Daily Stormer. Spearheaded by avowed white nationalist Andrew Anglin, the 
website unifies once disparate strains of far-right extremist thought under the banner of a 
shotgun radius approach to racism and discriminatory rhetoric, aiming its sights at women, 
the LGBTQ community, people of color, and most explicitly Jewish individuals with a 
scorched earth philosophy of total rejection. Peppered with inflammatory slurs and references 
to genocide, the frontpage of the website nonetheless claims that: 
  We here at the Daily Stormer are opposed to violence.  We seek revolution 
  through the education of the masses.  When the information is available to the 
  people, systemic change will be inevitable and unavoidable. Anyone  
  suggesting or promoting violence in the comments section will be   
  immediately banned, permanently.47  
Legitimacy of this claim to disciplinary action aside, the statement was (and still is) not 
without some truth, as the website was indeed freely available to the people.  Hosted by 
domain registry company GoDaddy, The Daily Stormer held a comfortably transparent 
position on the surface web for several years despite facing a veritable assault of fiery 
criticism and calls for its immediate deletion on the part of the public.  Under the aegis of 
free speech, Anglin’s noxious hatred found its platform, drawing in readers at a steady rate.   
 This period would come to a swift end shortly after the tragic events that occurred 
during the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia on August 12th, 2017, in which 
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James Alex Fields Jr. drove a car into a crowd of counter-protesters in a fit of rage. One of 
these people, Heather Heyer, died on site from her injuries.48 Wasting little time, The Daily 
Stormer ran a post celebrating Heyer’s death, claiming that “most people are glad that she is 
dead,”49 amongst a myriad of degrading insults to her appearance and “social worth”. The 
backlash was swift, with so many decrying the post that GoDaddy finally buckled and 
removed the website from its hosting. Shortly thereafter, The Daily Stormer had a brief 
period of revival on Google, only to be promptly dropped again, all under the justification 
that the post in particular unveiled the website’s potential as an incitement to violence, a 
claim that even its disclaimer finally could no longer dispel.50 After a similar sequence of 
rejection from several domains, the site finally found a home on the deep web51, with several 
news articles referring to this move as a “retreat”52 or, more colorfully, a move to the 
“shadows”53. Despite its tacit permission, the move prompted a notably passionate response 
from The Tor Project itself, creators of the very routing system that effectively cordons off, 
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structures, and allows access to a designated section of the dark web.  In this statement, the 
admin Steph stated: 
  We are disgusted, angered, and appalled by everything these racists stand for 
  and do. We feel this way any time the Tor network and software are used for 
  vile purposes. But we can’t build free and open source tools that protect  
  journalists, human rights activists, and ordinary people around the world if we 
  also control who uses those tools. Tor is designed to defend human rights and 
  privacy by preventing anyone from censoring things, even us.54 
While the philosophical and critical utility of this statement is more than apparent, such 
considerations will wait for the time being. What is, however, noteworthy is that what 
effectively occurred here was a guardian of the aforementioned “shadows” announcing their 
revulsion to one of its own denizens, tantamount to Hades retching in disgust at one of its 
demons. Nevertheless, Anglin proclaimed the move a victory for free speech, a curious claim 
given its sovereign claim of freely available information taking one step back behind the 
curtain of a proprietary routing program. While the site now is accessible via a standard 
domain name on the surface web, there still exists the all too brief moment wherein The 
Daily Stormer found itself cast into the pit. 
********************************************************** 
 Experian, one of the three major United States credit bureaus, offers a novel service, 
the “Dark Web Triple Scan”55, a tool that claims to run an extensive search of the “dark web” 
and can locate compromised social security numbers, e-mail addresses, and phone numbers.  
The search itself claims to reach back to 2006, and if one’s information is located, Experian 
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then offers steps and advice for the user to take as a means of self-protection. Beneath the 
product’s description Experian offers the following statement: “Identity thieves use the Dark 
Web to buy and sell personal information. If you have ever been a victim of a data breach, 
the Dark Web is a place where your sensitive information might live. If your information is 
there, criminals can potentially use it to commit fraud.”56 This statement is in actuality a 
response the following question hanging above it: “What is the Dark Web?” 
 As a dose of frightening rhetoric, Experian’s description serves its purpose, but as an 
ontological claim it is somewhat inept.  This shortcoming is cast into greater relief given that 
on another page the bureau actually offers a particularly good (if not a bit too succinct) 
explanation of what the “dark web” actually is.  Employing the all but canonized image of an 
iceberg at sea, the page points to the visible tip of the iceberg as the “public web” (already a 
questionable choice of words), and states, “If you’re like most people, this is where you 
spend the majority of your time—doing things like online shopping, searching for 
information, and sharing photos and videos on social media.”57  Experian’s claim the 
majority of people exclusively use the public web can only be taken as true, even in the 
absence of a full-scale empirical study thereof, something that does not exist in this context.  
However, Joseph Cox’s article for Wired titled “The Dark Web as You Know It is a Myth” 
does report the following: 
  The Tor Project58 claims that only 1.5 percent of overall traffic on its  
  anonymity network is to do with hidden sites, and that 2 million people per 
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  day use Tor in total.  In short, the number of people visiting the dark web is a 
  fraction of overall Tor users, the majority of whom are likely just using it to 
  protect their regular browsing habits.  Not only are dark web visitors a drop in 
  the bucket of Tor users, they are a spec [sic] of dust in the galaxy of total  
  Internet users.59 
Cox’s article hails from 2015, worthy of consideration in the context of a medium that can 
experience radical change or augmentation in the course of months. But one is inclined to 
believe that his citation still holds merit, and that no matter what level of growth dark web 
use could experience, surface web exclusive users still would eclipse the total amount of dark 
web users at any given moment. While this effective reality adds merit to Experian’s claims 
at first glance, it becomes more than a bit problematic as their descriptions continue. 
 Moving to the center of the iceberg beneath the water line, the “deep web” is 
described as follows: 
  The deep web is the next level of the Internet, representing approximately  
  90% of what’s actually online.  These sites aren’t indexed by search engines, 
  meaning they won’t show up in any search results.  Just because information 
  is here, it doesn’t mean it’s something bad or illegal though.[…] These sites 
  may live in this space because they’re something that the owners don’t want 
  accessible to the public.  Many deep web sites are legal, just purposely hidden.  
  Sometimes you may hear the deep web referred to as a “bad” place to go, but 
  that’s usually because many people confuse the deep web with the dark web.60 
While this passage alone contains scores of rhetorical decisions ripe for unpacking (of 
particular note is the manner in which it frequently defaults to conceptualizing the internet in 
terms of rigid spaces), I focus now on the second half of the description. Without having 
defined the “dark web” by this point in any sort of detail, the indisputably suggested 
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takeaway is that the “dark web”, as opposed to the “deep web”, is a principally “bad” or 
dangerous space. By acknowledging the frequent conceptual slip of transposing the relatively 
benign deep web onto the threatening spaces of the dark web, Experian effectively force a 
binary opposition of good and evil onto their object of analysis, and it is difficult to 
determine if it is earned. If any doubt remains, though, the following two sections of their 
description dispel it with ease. Under the “Dark Web” heading, it explains, “At the bottom 
part of the deep web lies the dark web.  The dark web isn’t an actual place, but rather a 
hidden network of websites.61[…] When you visit a website on the world wide web, IP 
addresses trace online activity on your computer. But on the dark web, with the masking 
software activated, a computer takes a randomized path to its file destination, bouncing 
around a number of encrypted connections to ultimately mask both location and identity.”62  
This is for all intents and purposes an adequate description of Tor’s processes for an 
uninformed reader, but the following section, “Why Is the Dark Web So Popular with 
Criminals?” presents some rhetorical concerns. To summarize, Experian claims (not without 
reason) that the inherent anonymity of the dark web fosters the ability for criminals to act 
with more fluidity, and as such it serves as a “haven for all kinds of illicit activity”, including 
identity theft and the sale of sensitive financial information.63 Once again, this is not 
expressly untrue, but it is also a very clear case of cherry-picking to serve an established 
narrative. As this chapter will demonstrate later on, there are a variety of both criminal and 
absolutely un-criminal sites accessible via Tor, and given the fact that such sites are by their 
very nature hidden, there is no verifiable way to speak for the whole. That the final section 
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on the page is titled “How Can You Protect Yourself from the Dark Web?’ as if it is a 
sentient menace creeping into the idyllic “space” of the surface web essentially belabors the 
point already established. In short, what starts as an apparently informative piece ends up 
leaning into the bolstering of a predetermined narrative, one example of a pattern amongst 
many pieces concerning the nature of the deep web/dark web conceptual divide. Of course, 
one might suggest that given the content, such nitpicking is itself misguided, as the piece is 
delivered with the best of intentions: letting people know how to better protect their 
information in an age of great access. As a riposte to that, consider that the final suggestion 
in their list of tips is their very own protection service at a fee of $19.99 a month following a 
30-day free trial period, and further consider that in the case of advertisements, single word 
choices do in fact matter greatly. Like a screenplay, all ads need a pitch. 
********************************************************** 
 The pitch of the film Unfriended: Dark Web is that using the dark web is a quick way 
to get yourself murdered. The plot progresses as follows: A computer engineer named Matias 
obtains a secondhand laptop as a means to develop a program so that he can better 
communicate with his deaf girlfriend, Amaya. After receiving messages from a person 
named Erica directed towards the laptop’s previous owner, Norah, the audience is introduced 
to Matias circle of tech savvy friends via video chat. It is revealed that Erica is in fact Norah, 
and further that Norah is a pseudonym for a user who goes by the screenname Charon.  
Matias is lured by Charon onto the dark web and is quickly targeted (along with his friends) 
by a hacker group called “The Circle”, all of whose members use a permutation of Charon as 
their handles. In typical horror movie fashion, the film embarks on a sequence of disturbing 
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murders, all colored with Web 2.0 iconography. One of Matias’s friends is pushed off of a 
roof while on video, posted on the dark web for public viewing. Another is “swatted”, 
meaning that The Circle calls the police to his house and takes the extra step of splicing clips 
of his voice together in such a way that it suggests he is planning to commit a mass shooting.  
The police, of course, shoot him first. Another is goaded into having to choose between 
saving the life of his mother who is on life support or the life of his own girlfriend.  Unable 
to choose, the hackers remove his mother from life support, murder his girlfriend, and in a 
final flourish, push him in front of a train, again all caught on video. In a particularly 
disturbing reference, another friend is hanged with a fake suicide note placed beside him, 
perhaps referencing the ongoing phenomenon of live-feed suicides in video chat websites.  
Finally, Matias’ girlfriend is kidnapped and The Circle creates a public poll to vote on 
whether he lives or dies, with the vote decidedly not going in his favor. After being run over 
by a member of The Circle in a van, the members celebrate and the camera pans back, 
revealing that the audience has served as a proxy viewer, watching all of the events occur 
from their screen at home. 
 It is difficult to know where to begin discussing this film in terms of its narrative 
conceits. Not only does Unfriended weaponize a selection of genuinely disturbing real-life 
internet phenomena (swatting, on-screen suicide, etc.), it also taps into the persistent cultural 
myth since the dawn of video: the snuff film. The term “snuff movie” comes from a peculiar 
origin, that being a biography of Charles Manson’s family from 1971.64 While in this context 
the term was used to describe the simple filming of a murder for personal pleasure (many 
examples of which do in fact exist), the term over time evolved into a greater specificity.  
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Namely, snuff films are videos of murders or suicides created either for the financial gain of 
the creator or for the entertainment of other viewers or customers (of which a single 
verifiable example has yet to be officially noted.). This concept found narrative resonance all 
too easily with the dark web, as its very existence lends itself to the idea of a shadow 
economy of violence, one supported by single-faceted descriptions such as Experian’s. That 
said, the existence of snuff films on the surface web existed long before the dark web was 
solidified as a distinct cultural phenomenon, so what is at play here is less a matter or genesis 
but of narrative convergence. 
  Similarly, Unfriended gleefully taps into a separate, but no less pervasive, cultural 
history of fear: the existence of secret societies. This chapter will embark on a short history 
of such fears later on, but it is worth noting here that this film nurtures its terror a step 
beyond the concept of the dark web as a lawless or chaotic zone of toxicity and evil.  Instead, 
the dark web allows for the organization of evil, a way in which similarly disturbed 
individuals can mobilize as a unit and besiege the “surface world” with nearly unstoppable 
force due to the apparently infinite powers of anonymity. Unsatisfied even with this 
demonstration, Unfriended’s final twist taps into a moral platitude that extends into the 
deepest foundations of ethical philosophy: “The dark web is a reflection of humankind’s 
darkest desires.” As will be shown in this chapter’s review of literature, even the most 
purportedly neutral examinations of the dark web are prone to falling into this claim, perhaps 
in an attempt to rationalize a relativist flattening of the playing field. The irony is not lost that 
project likewise seeks to bridge the artificial gap between contemporary mediatechnology 
and narrative histories in a flattening of its own, but there is something conceptually 
unsatisfying about this particular claim’s deployment of complicity onto the public at large.  
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While I am sympathetic to the idea that pre-existing narratives tend to influence or outright 
produce cultural objects that enable their continued existence, it is at best troubling to claim 
that the dark web exists solely as the result of humankind’s inherent desire to commit and 
view unspeakable acts. Reduction seems almost inescapable when discussing the dark web, 
and perhaps it is this apparently universal tendency on the part of humans that is worthier of 
exploration.     
********************************************************** 
 In May of 2018, the New York Times ran an opinion piece by Bari Weiss titled 
“Meet the Renegades of the Intellectual Dark Web” (dubbed the IDW), highlighting a group 
of thinkers who have almost universally found themselves the object of ire of the left in the 
2010’s. Taking its name from an off-hand comment made by self-proclaimed “professor-in-
exile” Bret Weinstein65, the group is unified by a sense of exclusion, one engendered by what 
a portion of its members saw as acts of persecution or silencing on the part of mainstream 
media for their transgressive thoughts and statements. The members are a rogues gallery of 
figures that range from the political center to the Alt-Right (if it the term can be used with 
any sense of solidity): Ben Shapiro of college campus debate fame; James Damore, author of 
a swiftly publicized memo criticizing the forced diversity and culture of repression fostered 
by Google; Jordan Peterson, enemy to extremism and political correctness and successful 
self-help author; Christina Hoff Sommers, critic of 20th century feminism (not to be confused 
with 20th century femin-ist critic); etc. What its members share is indeed a contentious 
position amongst contemporary discourse, and their college talks, media appearances, and 
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books have been met with a remarkable amount of push-back, both popular and 
organizational in the case of cancelled talks and the like. Yet if there is indeed resonance 
between the sense of suppression that unites these figures and the treatment that they have 
received in the public, and there very much so is, it is the co-opting of the term “dark web” 
that begs more than a few questions.   
 What these figures generally do not lack is mainstream media exposure, for as 
contentious and embattled their contributions to popular discourse may be within the 
contemporary social and political discussion, they are in fact part of that discussion 
nonetheless. If Weinstein is to be taken as a proxy head of the I.D.W. (already a conceptual 
paradox), his own words carry their share of peculiar impact. Weiss quotes Weinstein’s 
response to the growing fame of the I.D.W as follows: “I’m really only interested in building 
this intellectual movement.  The I.D.W. has bigger goals than anyone’s buzz or celebrity.”66  
Unfriended: Dark Web aside, to ascribe a sense of organized goals to anything that adopts 
metaphoric similarity to the dark web proper (semi-facetious or otherwise) is to assume a 
uniform momentum and direction of a network that has offered no unified sense of effect 
outside of its own conceptual space. To be sure, discrete organizations such as narcotics 
markets breach the boundaries of Tor into the “surface world”, but the dark web’s existence 
as a network is by no means contingent upon the sale of drugs, and it cannot be reduced to a 
single goal in kind. But this assignment of a teleological engine to something as amorphous 
as the dark web is quite typical, as it is within human nature to conceptually fuse ontological 
status with a concomitant sense of ends. Through the lens of motivated goals, perhaps the 
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definitive existence of a concept or entity will come into greater relief, something adopted in 
spirit by the “IDW”. 
 Whatever the case may be for them, there is in fact (as I will later expand) at least one 
aspect of the “IDW”’s motivations that does in fact resonate with the dark web proper, and 
that is the desire for illumination or (paradoxically) transparency. As I will demonstrate 
further along in this chapter, a significant portion of sites on the dark web attempt to offer 
freedom of access, be it information, goods and products, services, or expression. This 
freedom, of course, comes at the price of fostering frankly disturbing content in certain 
amounts, but amounts that do not compose the entirety of the dark web proper. Nonetheless, 
the great irony is that behind the veil of secrecy lies a space that appears to embrace classic 
Enlightenment values of thought and liberty, partially a response to the increasing monitoring 
and regulation of “surface level” network culture. This positive comparison, the IDW’s self-
characterization of a loose-knit renegade group cast into the shadows maintains a one-
dimensional appropriation of the dark web as metaphorical conceit; it is an appropriation 
shared by The Daily Stormer, for worse. Even if the “dark web” serves as a refuge for those 
escaping repressive or surveillant network cultures (and it certainly does, in part), this cannot 
and does not preclude the existence of incipient or “native” subcultures. In other words: the 
dark web is not solely the space for refugees. Rather, it is (as with all networks), a practically 
undefinable mix of cultures and individuals both experienced and inexperienced who use the 
dark web for a vibrant set of purposes. That its endemic disturbing content captures the most 
attention is an expected result, something with which the “IDW” appears to want to align.  Of 
course, it is safe to assume that they would not in fact want to be associated with pedophilia, 
murder-for-hire scams, and drug sales, in which case their metaphorical hijacking of the term 
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“dark web” seems all the more baffling. Once again, its uncontainable aspects are reduced to 
an operative metaphor that communicates but one sense of its multifaceted significance, and 
one is left wondering if such a move would have unintended results. 
********************************************************** 
 In fact, the self-mythologization of the “IDW” serves as a paradigm for this chapter, 
matched in step by the other three portraits offered above. As a phenomenon that by its own 
definition resists easy approximation, the dark web frequently finds itself reduced and 
abstracted to a metaphorical episteme, either in an attempt to give structural meaning to the 
whole or in order to be appropriated for its charged tonal and affective significance. In 
practical terms, the mainstream media tends to use the most unsettling content associated 
with the dark web as a means to define the whole, thus establishing a direct correspondence 
between the two. In turn, this constructed understanding of “dark web” overcodes the full 
breadth of its functions, and assumes the position of a fully-realized concept. Consider in this 
regard Experian’s negation of the dark web to nothing more than a criminal haven, 
something that it is in part (no matter how large that part may be). This concept then holds 
great force in determining the future deployment of the dark web for aesthetic purposes, as 
evidenced by Unfriended: Dark Web, the justly earned plight of The Daily Stormer, and the 
“IDW”’s appropriation of the term. Here, “dark web” is used for its narrative import, a 
constellation of revulsion and fear that serves to signify a sense of danger or violation. So far, 
this would be par for the course, and nothing more than a flat explanation of how narrative 
works in general. But what this potentially obscures is the fact that the epistemic 
conceptualization of “dark web” from which these narratives draw force is not empirically 
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determinate. In other words, “dark web” as a concept is likewise narratively charged in the 
sense that as an attempt to epistemically enclose a portion of the concept “network” at large, 
it already imports aesthetic and affective functions prior to the empirical experience of its 
contents. 
      There is a simple litmus test for this claim: in a vast array of cultures from 
antiquity to the contemporary moment, darkness is associated with a pronounced sense of 
anxiety or fear, a claim in alignment with the introduction to this project. These particular 
anxieties (eradication, unchecked production, etc.) do not speak for the whole of darkness’s 
aesthetic development over the course of history, but as Blumenberg claims, darkness, like 
any metaphor, does have a history. In the case of the dark web, the deployment of the term 
“dark” has a relatively practical and uncontroversial purpose: the activities are kept as 
anonymous as possible behind unique (and often difficult to parse) web addresses. Thus, the 
obscurity of the dark web makes it seem as if the activities within are undertaken in the 
darkness or shadows, effectively unseen. But the history of the metaphor “darkness” can 
never be excised from its use in any capacity, and as an absolute metaphor – qua Blumenberg 
– it frequently comes part and parcel with deep narrative histories amassed over time for the 
purpose of grasping the ungraspable. More straightforwardly, one cannot call the dark web 
“dark” and expect it to not bestow onto it this very same narrative history, one that by default 
provokes an affective, almost reflexive, response of fear. In turn, the commandeering of the 
term “dark web” by the “IDW” or Unfriended, for instance, recursively bolsters this 
metaphorical aspect to the point that “darkness” as a source of fear, this ancient metaphor, 
strangles the nuance of its functions for cultural passers-by. Furthermore, the truly terrible 
activities that occur on the dark web (as they do off the internet behind closed doors, for that 
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matter), find an easy path to speak for the whole, creating an autopoietic loop of 
signification. 
 The aims of this chapter are multifarious, but all serve the purpose of exploring the 
narrative history and development of the term “dark web” since the inception of the Arpanet 
until the present moment. While the dark web is in fact a distinct and identifiable network, 
“dark web” in its conceptual usage functions as a nexus of narrative operations, oftentimes in 
direct conflict with the ostensible goals of the dark web as a network service. The 
ramifications of this interaction extend far beyond the scope of a single network, instead 
illuminating a longstanding cultural aggression against “darkness” in the pursuit of control 
and intellectual enlightenment (ironically opposed to many dark web users’ pursuit of 
capital-E Enlightenment values, namely freedom of speech and individualism). In concert 
with this, while unique in its computing operations, the dark web is another inscription into 
the similarly lengthy narrative fascination with secret societies and shadow organizations that 
pockmark both literary and cultural history. Even when directly unspoken, I argue that this 
narrative history haunts contemporary deployments of the term “dark web” as much as its 
metaphoric history in the absolute sense, which is to say its use as a proxy to explain 
otherwise “un-totalizable” phenomena. From this fundamental darkness metaphor or mythos, 
the calcification of this particular sense of darkness into a deployable concept distorts and 
taints the dark web, self-generating its nefarious reputation and quite likely adding incentive 
the criminal activity which does occur within it.   
 This chapter will begin with a short history of the dark web proper in material terms, 
followed by a discussion of two recent pieces of journalism concerning the network: Jamie 
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Bartlett’s The Dark Web and Eileen Ormsby’s The Darkest Web. These are complex works, 
each hailing from a different epistemological approach (sociology and journalism, 
respectively), but they both share a desire to demystify or demythologize the dark web via 
case studies of particular figures or phenomena. Nevertheless, each of them still lapses into 
bolstering the insidious and frightening narrative structure of “dark web” as a conceptual unit 
in ways both conscious and potentially unintentional. My claim here is that if such works of 
formidable research and objectivity can still be drawn into this operation of this narrative 
complex, then it goes to show the trenchant resilience of such processes. In light of this, I 
will then examine a selection of literary works that engage with the topic of shadow societies 
or secret organizations as a means to demonstrate the deep historical lines that potentially 
inform the current cultural consensus of the dark web. While some of these works are 
relatively well known (such as Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49 and Kafka’s The Trial), 
others are less so, namely Balzac’s History of the Thirteen. While this will by no means be a 
complete sample (something that would likely require a book triple this size), I attest that this 
literary history shines light into the way in which narrative production gives force to the 
conceptual and affective import contained within the term “dark web”. In other words, while 
the dark web appears to be (and in some ways actually is) a unique instance in the history of 
network culture, I argue that reactions and attitudes towards it come preloaded with this prior 
narrative history. Finally, I will offer a sample set of dark web pages from my own direct 
research and analyze them through a philosophical lens, drawing from the work of Michel 
Serres as a means to offer an alternate (but not dominant) hermeneutic. 
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2. My Little Corner of the World 
 Contrary to its popular depictions, the dark web did not spring into the world fully 
formed and without precedent. There is a directly causal sequence of events and prototype 
networks that form a kind of genetic lineage of anonymous or alternative network cultures.  
While I will address Bartlett’s book The Dark Net more closely later on, I introduce it here to 
draws attention to its exceptional historical scope. Bartlett traces the dark web’s line all the 
way back to the first instance of what would become the internet at large – Arpanet. Arpanet 
originated as a project of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)67 in the 1960’s, 
fully government funded and designed as a way to link both academics as well as weapons 
installations around the world.68 While its early ambitions were large, its first form was 
charmingly bespoke by contemporary standards, a small TCP/IP packet switching network 
linking four computers at UCLA, SRI International, UC Santa Barbara, and the University of 
Utah.69 Despite its limited material framework, its network infrastructure would essentially 
remained unchanged at a fundamental level over its evolution into the internet of today.  For 
instance, IP packet switching (i.e. the reduction of data into smaller “packets” for ease of 
sending, then sent to a destinations indicated via IP [Internet Protocol] addresses) remains the 
standard mode of data transmission that composes the foundation of the internet as it 
currently stands. This early form was quite rudimentary, determined (and thus bound) in 
terms of space by the length of the cables that connected it. Bartlett notes that it would not be 
until July 1973 that the Arpanet finally expanded overseas to the UK via undersea phone 
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cables, first signaling the potential of the Arpanet as something truly “world-wide”.70 This 
potential access would for the moment remain potential, however, as the Arpanet was 
effectively a self-restricting service. The equipment and costs needed to maintain an Arpanet 
connected computer was out of reach of the public, and due to this it remained largely the 
domain of government or academic institutions.71 Despite this relative restriction, though, 
even then researchers were developing key platforms that would give rise to the open 
communication of the internet as it is known today. For instance, Bartlett mentions that soon 
after the development of Arpanet, its TALK function became the dominant mode of 
communication across the network, setting the stage for e-mail to follow.72 This function 
would eventually give shape to mailing lists, newsgroups, and the BBS (Bulletin Board 
System)73, widely seen as the progenitor to modern forums and chat rooms. This latter 
platform in particular was comparatively more accessible to the public, requiring simpler 
equipment that could be connected via simple telephone lines rather than the large cable 
system of Arpanet proper.74   
 At the time, Arpanet’s rudimentary IP and packet switching technology offered total 
transparency in terms of which computers sent and received packets of data, something not 
all that distant from how IP addresses are used to identify individual computers even today.  
The major difference, however, was the relative scarcity of computers even amongst the 
research teams behind Arpanet’s inception. As such, while one could trace a single computer 
in terms of IP addresses, the user who had sent or received the relevant data could be entirely 
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obscured if a multitude of people used the same computer in the same time frame.  In 1979, a 
group created a system called “Finger” that would log and record who was on the computer 
at any given time, thus offering user transparency as well as that of each device. This was 
almost immediately met with the proposition of a function that would allow people to opt out 
of this system, something rejected by fellow academics as betraying the “open, transparent 
nature of the Arpanet.”75 It is worth noting how bizarre this response seems in the context of 
contemporary fears towards net neutrality, internet surveillance, algorithmic advertisement, 
etc. In the halcyon days of the internet’s birth, such transparency and openness was lauded, a 
clear realization of liberal values of freedom and the exchange of ideas. Now, this is not to 
say that the desire for internet transparency has completely vanished, especially in terms of 
the dark web proper, but this is a matter that will be taken up more directly in due time. 
 What is important here is that within a decade of its creation, what would come to be 
the internet was already facing its own internal conflicts regarding privacy and access, ones 
that would come to inform the eventual evolution of VPN’s and the dark web, amongst other 
methods of identity obscuration. This sense of partitioning would only continue to grow as 
the proto-internet expanded as well, a necessity given how swiftly Arpanet became congested 
with traffic that far exceeded expectations. By 1987, several other discrete networks (such as 
CSNET, BITNET, and NSFnet, among others) began to merge with Arpanet as a means to 
alleviate congestion issues, taking a large leap towards what would become the World Wide 
Web in the 90’s, and finally the internet as it is known today.76 Bartlett’s account takes 
particular note of Usenet, created around the same time as the BBS77, as it fits into the minor 
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history of trolling that he offers in his second chapter. Despite this pointed examination, 
however, his discussion of Usenet reveals more links in the chain that lead steadily to the 
dark web as an “alternative” space. Usenet never seemed keen to merge with Arpanet as the 
process began, instead positioning itself as an alternative rival to Arpanet’s inaccessibility. A 
little under a decade into its existence, Usenet admins reorganized all groups into the follow 
seven major headings: “comp. (computing), misc. (miscellaneous), news., rec. (recreation), 
sci. (science), soc. (social), and talk.”78 Ostensibly, this organizational hierarchy would 
include all potential topics, if for nothing else than the fact that misc. would be the default 
selection for alternative topics. Instead, it did not, as a group of Usenet users, irritated at the 
presence of censorship amongst the boards, created an eighth heading, titled alt. for 
“alternative”.79  Alt. swiftly became the home for a nearly unhinged amalgam of trolling 
groups, hacking collectives, and irreverent threads amongst others, positioning itself as 
something more than an alternative communication channel: a subculture of its own. Bartlett 
essentially argues that this development paved the way for the more anarchic image boards of 
the contemporary moment, most notoriously 4chan’s /b/ board, itself the “random” heading 
for the website. 
 The takeaway from this series of events is that a conscious debate and push towards 
both privacy and hyper-specification existed almost from the dawn of the internet itself. Alt. 
did not directly evolve to the dark net proper, but the sentiment of a group wishing for a freer 
space (either from surveillance or censorship) permeates the context of its inception. This 
libertarian spirit would eventually come to be attached to the dark web as a conceptual 
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community (as much as the word community could even apply to the disparate groups that 
use the dark web). However, in order to discuss the material evolution of the dark web, it 
would actually require returning to the first years of Arpanet, decades before the arrival of 
alt. itself. While Arpanet was the first functioning network, it was not the only network to co-
exist at the time, as the aforementioned sequence of events demonstrates. The creation of the 
internet as it is known today was the result of a consolidation of several networks, not a 
single dominant one winning out over failing alternatives. Furthermore, despite referring to 
internet as a singular idea today, this is more of a conceptual placeholder than indexical 
signifier, as the internet remains a constellation of networks to a certain degree, the dark net 
included.  In any case, several concurrent networks to Arpanet were known as “darknets” in 
the 70’s for a variety of reasons, most frequently that of security reasons. While information 
from Arpanet could be sent to them, they remained invisible in lists and could not have 
information extracted or read from them.80 81 Note that in this formative instance, the “dark” 
aspect of “dark net” solely referred to the invisible or secretive form of said networks rather 
than “dark” as a metaphorical reference for the moral quality or depravity of the content 
found within, a conceptual elision that will become significant in short order.  In short, these 
early “darknets” were overlay networks, networks that were built onto the pre-existing 
structure of a larger or more stable network. As a demonstrative example: peer-to-peer 
networks are networks of computers that share in the workload for a certain task or set of 
tasks. File-sharing networks (such as torrent networks) utilize the computing power of each 
user by having them upload and seed files once having downloaded them, expanding the 
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number of instances of said file and contributing to faster overall downloads. This type of 
peer-to-peer network would be considered an overlay network as it builds up from the 
general infrastructure of the internet (namely the ability to connect with each other) in order 
to construct a semi-independent satellite network “on top.” By this definition, Arpanet (and 
by extension the internet as a whole) originated as an overlay network insofar that it used the 
telephone network as a means to send and receive information. As it stands today, the 
internet is replete with such overlay networks, many integrated and many sealed off 
(relatively speaking) in the same manner as these original “darknets.” 
 It is this aggregation of clandestine networks that compose the dark web in its current 
form, but this definition can only provide the bare minimum of information, as the variety 
and purposes of these networks is as varied as those on the surface web. As the internet 
expanded in the 80’s, the question of where to store sensitive data proved more and more 
pressing, as the simple use of private computers akin to the early days of Arpanet became 
untenable in the face of exponentially growing data. To combat this, one of the first solutions 
was the creation of “data haven” servers that would be placed in relatively remote locations, 
thus able to store a variety of information, both legal and illicit.82 The privacy of said servers 
proved to be especially attractive to the latter ends, and this was one of the key shifts that 
established the link between dark networks and illegal activity. Once file compression and 
storage costs became reasonable in the following years, peer-to-peer and private networks 
blossomed, giving shape to the expansive reaches of the deep web (and the dark web within 
it.)83 Note that the use of the term “deep web” here is considered, as this growing array of 
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isolated and private networks did not necessarily function as dark web networks. Experian’s 
definition once again comes to mind here, as deep web content is information that is merely 
absent from search engine returns, such as password protected login credentials, banking 
information, streaming services, academic databases, etc. While these functions are similar in 
part to the dark web, insofar that they are contained in servers and networks relatively 
detached from the searchable surface web, the information contained within is still accessible 
through a standard internet browser. For example, logging into a bank account requires 
accessing the deep web, as both the password function as well as the actual banking 
information are stored in deep web networks disconnected from search engines, but the 
information is returned via the standard browser through which the customer accessed the 
site to begin with. Dark web content or websites, as a rule, cannot be accessed via standard 
browsers in any form, thus placing them separated from the surface web to a larger degree. 
 One of the first special browsers designed for accessing the dark web (or a dark web) 
was Freenet, debuted by Ian Clarke in 2000.84 Clarke first proposed the system in his 
graduation project for the University of Edinburgh, titled “A Distributed Decentralised 
Information Storage and Retrieval System” and written in 1999. He starts his report with a 
prophetic, and characteristically dramatic, flourish: 
  At present the Internet is seen as a hotbed of anarchy, beyond the  controls of 
  individual governments, a system which ensures free-speech and free-thought 
  by its very nature.  Unfortunately, while this seems true at present, it is caused 
  more by a lack of knowledge about the technology involved, rather than being 
  a feature of the technology.  It is actually the case that the Internet could lead 
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  to our lives being monitored, and our thinking manipulated and corrupted to a 
  degree that would go beyond the wildest imaginings of Orwell.85  
A far cry from the protestations of the original Arpanet members, bemoaning the loss of 
transparency. Given the ever-increasingly shocking displays of social engineering in the age 
of social media, one can only, unfortunately, read Clarke’s claims as correct. He further 
targets the traceability of all actions and information on the internet to source computers, 
proposing that such transparency could be wielded as a deterrent for those fearing retribution 
for their actions, or even what they search.86 He notes that while most see the internet as a 
fluid and open system, this is an understandable but incorrect assumption, as the central 
architecture of the internet is deeply centralized. He explains, “Internet Protocol (IP) 
addresses are passed down from a centrally controlled system. The Domain Name System 
(DNS) upon which the modern Internet depends is ultimately controlled by one 
organization.”87 This centralized aspect (that both the identifying markers for computers and 
the domain addresses that allow sites to be hosted are handled by single authorities) allows 
for both catastrophic system failures as well as an easy source through which one could trace 
any user. Clarke’s proposed solution is a truly decentralized network that also provides 
anonymity and could handle errors more effectively due principally to its less fragile 
infrastructure.88   
 Incidentally, the model that he takes as his principle inspiration for this proposed 
network is Usenet, as Usenet’s information distribution system relies on users storing and 
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distributing new posts between each other rather than be transmitted from a single 
transmission point or server.89 Clarke considered this system to be inefficient at the core, 
unable to handle amounts of information comparable to standard internet traffic at the time.  
But it nonetheless stood to provide the central model for what Freenet would become, and 
not just in an infrastructural scope. Recall that by this point, Usenet’s establishment of alt. 
had long since gained traction, and the spirit of a censorship-less and free information 
exchange had become associated with Usenet proper, at least in part. After finally developing 
a preliminary build of Freenet, Clarke explained the general architecture in a follow-up 
paper: 
  Freenet is implemented as an adaptive peer-to-peer network of nodes that  
  query one another to store and retrieve data files, which are named by  
  location-independent keys.  Each node maintains its own local datastore  
  which it makes available to the network for reading and writing, as well as a 
  dynamic routing table containing addresses of other nodes and the keys that 
  they are thought to hold.  It is intended that most users of the system will run 
  nodes, both to provide security guarantees against inadvertently using a  
  hostile foreign node and to increase the storage capacity available to the  
  network as a whole.90 
In layman’s terms, every computer connected to Freenet stores files or portions thereof (as a 
node), along with identifying information for each chunk of information (keys). No node is 
definitively marked as holding a particular file, and file requests via a key can only send the 
request to an approximate location. If the request does not locate the desired information at 
its first approximate destination node, it then moves onto the following possibilities until it is 
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found.91 In short, this allows for no computer to be definitively traced in terms of either 
stored information or requests made, directly countering the comparatively transparent 
searchability of the surface web. The drawback to this is that in order to access websites or 
information stored on the surface-web, that information must be replicated and directly 
loaded into the Freenet peer-to-peer network in order to allow access via Freenet’s 
anonymous process. In turn, Freenet cannot function as a proxy that simply obscures 
identifying information on the surface web, instead functioning as an alternative overlay 
network that obscures its users’ information via a special browsing system. Otherwise stated, 
it is a proto-darknet. 
 If Freenet set the stage for accessible anonymity networks, it would be the ascension 
of Tor that would catalyze the dark web’s narrative evolution in the eyes of the mainstream 
public. Tor (short for “The Onion Router”) was originally researched and developed by the 
United States Naval Research Laboratory in the 90’s, as its function as a network that 
obscured user location and IP addresses proved promising for national defense.92 Akin to 
Freenet’s spiritual predecessor in Usenet, DARPA continued researching Tor in the late 90’s, 
the very same DARPA who first developed Arpanet in decades prior. Rather than Freenet’s 
distributed storage of files or fragments thereof on users’ personal computers, Tor instead 
operates through designated relay computers, hosted either by volunteers or those who use 
Tor themselves. Packets of information are first wrapped in several layers of encrypted 
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information93, each layer containing directions for the next destination along the route of 
relay computers, or nodes.94  The only node that can identify its own position in this relay is 
the final one, or “exit node”, as the prior nodes in the chain can only identify their immediate 
predecessor and successor, thus sequentially obscuring the original node from which the 
packet of data was sent.95  Early versions of onion routing sent each onion via a combination 
of a public key that determined the route and a set of secret-keys that allowed each node to 
decrypt layers in sequence (thus having the route laid out from the start). Still, this was 
susceptible to being recorded by a single node and in turn having this recorded information 
used to trace the information’s path via this pre-determined sequence of keys, right back to 
the source and compromising anonymity. Tor, the current manifestation of onion routing, 
instead has each node negotiate a new set of keys at each instance in the relay and then 
deleting them once used, thus leaving the path almost entirely obscured and leaves 
anonymity intact.96  While markedly more secure than its prior incarnation, Tor still has one 
critical vulnerability, that being the susceptibility of exit nodes. In short, an exit node can be 
targeted as it is the only self-identifying node in every chain, and this node would contain the 
raw information that had been obscured along the route. If captured, this information could 
be used to identify sensitive information about the sender (such as identifying information or 
passwords), and it is well known that the NSA has used such exit nodes as “honeypots”, from 
which they can extrapolate that a user had entered and exited Tor (if not the activity 
undertaken on the dark web proper as well). In extreme cases (as will be approached when 
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discussing Ormsby’s book), the FBI or NSA have fully hijacked illegal piracy networks, 
black markets, child pornography exchanges, and even assassination markets on the dark 
web, collecting requests and financial information from potential buyers under the guise of 
being owners of the network, in turn using that to locate and arrest suspects. 
 Indeed, Tor’s space in the dark web does contain its fair share of such nefarious 
services, as its process can be separated into two procedures. On one hand, Tor can be used 
as a proxy, deploying the aforementioned anonymity system so as to allow users to surf the 
web with their identity largely obscured. Since 2006, Tor has been maintained by Roger 
Dingledine (cited above) and several other researchers through the non-profit organization 
The Tor Project (TTP), still largely funded by the United States Government.97 Keeping the 
faith that Tor serves as an innovative (if not crucial) development towards the ends of 
protecting internet users, TTP continues to update and improve Tor in the face of a growing 
deluge of bad press, questions of its deservedness notwithstanding. In an attempt to perhaps 
combat this alongside of offering education, TTP has on their website an entire page 
dedicated to explaining what kind of people use Tor in their everyday lives so as to promote 
its vast utility and overall benefit. The list of types is as follows: journalists, law 
enforcement, activists and whistleblowers, high and low-profile people, business executives, 
bloggers, militaries, IT professionals, and “normal people”.98  The reasons offered for each 
group are various and quite convincing, ranging from the need of anonymity for the purposes 
of exposing corruption, organizing sting operations, observing business competitors from a 
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clean entry so as to avoid information obscuring systems, and firewall system diagnostics.99  
The section on “normal people” is the most compelling, though, even beyond its intriguing 
deployment of the word “normal” in light of the common cultural opinion of what the dark 
web contains. In summary, its six reasons are a combination of egalitarian principles of free-
thought and self-preservation, citing Tor as a shield from “unscrupulous marketers and 
identity thieves” and “irresponsible corporations”, ways to protect children from 
inadvertently sharing their IP location to predators100, and as a significant deterrent for both 
surveillance and censorship. The final reason, that being a means to freely research sensitive 
topics within repressive locations via breaching national firewalls, is the most bracing, as it is 
essentially a call to illegal action amongst a list of “normalizing” quanta, regardless if it is in 
the spirit of a greater philosophical sense of justice.101 For “normal people”, Tor is a way to 
escape the ever-growing system of surveillance, a means to resist the quantification of the 
self and maintain autonomy or integrity. This is of course, unless you are part of law 
enforcement, in which case one of the listed benefits is easier online surveillance of internet 
users, all by way of leaving few traces of your presence. A muddled message, to be sure, one 
that calls into question the commonly held conceptions of Tor as principally a tool of 
resistance, as within its own list of definitions it claims to be a tool of the very establishment 
it can also impede. 
 The same page offers a total statement of intent at the bottom, perhaps in a way to 
resolve this conflict.  It reads: 
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  Like any technology, from pencils to cellphones, anonymity can be used for 
  both good and bad. You have probably seen some of the vigorous debate (pro, 
  con, and academic102) over anonymity. The Tor Project is based on the belief 
  that anonymity is not just a good idea some of the time – it is a requirement 
  for a free and functioning society. The EFF (Electronic Frontier Foundation) 
  maintains a good overview of how anonymity was crucial to the founding of 
  the United States. Anonymity is recognized in US courts as a fundamental  
  and important right.103 
A few things to note here: firstly, Tor does not claim here that anonymity is solely a right in 
terms of protecting oneself from surveillance, evading that direct statement entirely. Instead, 
they shift their gaze to a greater sense of societal function, that anonymity is necessary for “a 
free and functioning society”, something that is difficult to argue from the perspective of an 
academic researcher in the United States, but still one that Tor leaves unfortunately 
unexplored. This does however lead to the second point of note, that Tor almost exclusively 
justifies its beliefs in terms of the US legal system, fitting for a company funded by the US 
government but suddenly questionable given that it states breaking through national firewalls 
as a principle use for “normal people”. Such “national firewalls” almost certainly are thinly 
veiled references to countries such as China and Russia, and while users in those countries do 
in fact use Tor for this exact purpose, one can no longer consider Tor as a politically or 
ideologically neutral system in light of this claim: Tor is, frankly, a weapon of US soft-
power.   
 This is, however, a discussion that is perhaps saved for another time, as it breaches 
into teleological and ethical questions beyond the scope of this chapter. This is not to say that 
the ethical dimensions of Tor and the dark web will be passed over entirely, as the ethical 
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debate regarding the dark web’s uses approaches a complete conceptual absorption of its 
baseline functions, as signaled by even the aforementioned web page on Tor’s own website.  
The crux of this lies within the twofold functionality of Tor, the first aspect of which is its 
capability as a web proxy. In short, Tor can be used as a means to surf the internet 
anonymously via the previously explained masking system. After initializing the program, 
Tor boots its own browser (TorBrowser) and allows for standard access of the surface web 
with the benefit of leaving behind as little trace possible of activity or search pathways, thus 
achieving its stated goals of protecting users from “unscrupulous marketers” and so on. The 
second (and more famous) functionality is Tor’s access to “hidden services”, websites hosted 
on hidden servers that are set up as to only be able to receive communication via Tor, all the 
while never revealing their exact location. The process through which this occurs is relatively 
baroque and complex, a series of queries and cascading decisions that connect a user to the 
hidden server through a network of intermediary points. It is best explained in the words of 
specialists, in this case Lasse Øverlier and Paul Syverson.  They explain: 
  All the displayed message flows are anonymized, i.e., they are routed through 
  several anonymizing nodes on their path towards the other end…Every arrow 
  and connection in the figure represents an anonymous channel consisting of at 
  least two or more intermediate nodes. (Hereafter, we use ‘node’ to refer  
  exclusively to nodes of the underlying anonymization network, sometimes 
  also called ‘server nodes’. Although we are considering the Tor network  
  specifically, the setup would apply as well if some other anonymizing network 
  were used to underlie the hidden service protocol. The only exceptions are C 
  (client) and HS (hidden server), which may be anonymization nodes or they 
  may be merely clients external to the anonymization network.).  
  First the Hidden Server connects to a node in the Tor network and  asks if it is 
  OK for the node to act as an Introduction Point for his service. If the node  
  accepts, we keep the service open and continue; otherwise HS tries another 
  node until successful.  These connections are kept open forever, i.e. until one 
  of the nodes restarts or decides to pull it down.  Next, the Hidden Server  
  contacts the Directory Server and asks it to publish the contact information of 
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  its hidden service.  The hidden service is now ready to receive connection  
  requests from clients. 
  In order to retrieve data from the service the Client connects to DS and asks 
  for the contact information of the identified service and retrieves it if it exists 
  (including the addresses of Introduction Points).  There can be multiple  
  Introduction Points per service.  The Client then selects a node in the network 
  to act as a Rendezvous Point, connects to it and asks it to listen for   
  connections from a hidden service on C’s behalf.  The Client repeats this until 
  a Rendezvous Point has accepted, and then contacts the Introduction Point and 
  asks it to forward the information about the selected RP. The Introduction  
  Point forwards this message to the Hidden Server who determines whether to 
  connect to the Rendezvous Point of not.  If OK, the Hidden Server connects to 
  RP and asks to be connected to the waiting rendezvous circuit, and RP then 
  forwards this connection request to the Client. Now RP can start passing data 
  between the two connections and the result is an anonymous data tunnel from 
  C to HS through RP.104   
Essentially, hidden services mimic the rendezvous of two anonymous parties via an 
intermediary that ensures both of their identities remain private, all on top of the 
anonymizing systems the Tor uses to log in the user in the first place. It is worth nothing that 
the user (Client) does not make these decisions in real time as this passage would suggest.  
Like accessing any website, this sequence of events initiates simply by typing in an address 
to the top bar of TorBrowser. The catch is that these addresses rarely contain any identifying 
information regarding the content of the site, instead being a complex and seemingly random 
string of characters followed by “.onion”. In other words, the infamous (and now defunct) 
Silk Road would likely an address akin to “xB67dgbxHGDH78D.onion” rather than 
“silkroad.onion”. Further, given that none of these services can be accessed via search 
engines, their hidden nature is truly pronounced, often requiring users to learn of their 
existence either by word of mouth or through “hidden service wikis”, pages dedicated to 
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listing popular hidden services for easy user access. For all intents and purposes, the common 
cultural conception of the dark web is reflective of precisely these hidden services, and the 
content of these services is transposed onto the concept of dark web as a whole despite its 
material and structural composition being something far broader in scope. This is a critical 
point, as this very transposition serves as the genesis point for the very kind of cultural 
understandings of the dark web as seen in the four short examples that started this chapter.  
As such, for the remainder of this chapter, any use of “dark web” will henceforth refer to Tor 
hidden services unless otherwise specified. This will likewise serve as the foundation for the 
narrative analysis that will compose the second half of this chapter, necessitating one final 
and brief discussion of what these hidden services can contain.   
 Anonymous sites with anonymous users come with a predictable price. Scores of 
these services are black markets (selling a seemingly infinite variety of items, but most 
commonly drugs, weapons, and credit card information), child pornography 
databases/groups, and (to date unproven) assassination services. While these are the “big 
three” in terms of illicit hidden service categories, the well runs deep in terms of depraved 
creativity, as sites such as rape instructional guides, “pozzing”105 communities, and criminal 
advice forums exist, despite their comparatively rarer frequency.  Scores of these services, 
however, are not illicit or disturbing in scope, and yet these types of services rarely capture 
popular attention, for reasons that will be discussed in due time. The principle issue in terms 
of empirical analysis thereof lies precisely in the hidden nature of these sites, as a 
comprehensive survey of types of services becomes quite difficult in light of the fact that an 
unknown number of these sites exist out of the reach of even specified wikis. Certainly, there 
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could in fact be a variety of hidden services that were established for private groups, ones 
that do not want to be found and as such simply are not in terms of the general Tor user base.  
Despite this difficulty, studies have been attempted, and while the results do in fact confirm 
that the majority of hidden services are indeed illicit in nature, the actual statistical 
breakdown is far more intriguing than this seemingly foregone conclusion. 
 In December of 2014, a study carried out by the University of Portsmouth (in which 
they set up 40 computers to work as relays for hidden services) found that of 45,000 
computers accessing the dark web at any given moment, 83% of these computers accessed 
child pornography or child abuse websites/forums/databases.106 A truly disturbing figure, one 
that with good reason confirms a set of fears towards the dark web. This figure was not 
without two significant caveats, however, ones that by no means diminish the gravity of 
Portsmouth’s findings, but do significantly complicate the picture. Within the same study, 
researchers found that despite the massive amount of traffic, within the scope of the sample, 
child abuse websites only accounted for 2% of the total of hidden services.107 The dissonance 
between these two figures is profound, to say the least, and only further mystifies its actual 
economy of site traffic. The study found equally perplexing results in inverse, noting that 
black markets made for the largest single block of sites at 24% (despite these markets 
potentially offering specialized products/services or varieties in equal measure). Traffic to 
these sites, however, only amounted to 5% of the total.108 Fascinatingly, even whistleblower 
websites and data drops such as that of GlobalLeaks and The New Yorker eclipsed child 
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pornography websites by a small (but significant) margin at 5% of all sites, but accounted for 
a mere tenth of a percent of total traffic.109 Even more peculiarly, a similar study from two 
years later found that illicit hidden services of all kinds did in fact outnumber legal (and 
unknown) hidden services, but only by a margin of 7.1% (29.7% to 22.6%, respectively).  
Further, when narrowing the same categories to include only currently active sites, the 
percent difference doubled in favor of illicit sites, but this equates to a margin of 13.6%, 
hardly a dramatic majority.110 If this margin is this comparatively slim, and Portsmouth’s 
study produced such a dramatic traffic figure, for whose use then are these non-illicit sites?  
Furthermore, for whom are the rest of the (ostensibly) 27.7% of illegal sites given that only 
2% of them are directly child pornography? 
 Portsmouth’s researchers acknowledged a second caveat (and aporia) within their 
results, noting that the sheer figures alone cannot with total accuracy illuminate the nature of 
who is causing this traffic. There are factors at play that could easily produce volatility in 
such findings, Portsmouth’s team hypothesizing them as such: law -enforcement tracking 
registering as visits to the sites; DDoS (Direct Denial of Service) attacks, in which hackers 
flood the server with visits in an attempt to shut down the site via overload; the fact that 
many hidden services only last for a matter of weeks, potentially indicating that these sites 
just so happen to be relatively long-lasting by comparison; and finally, that the group of users 
who search for child pornography may do so more compulsively versus purchases made on 
black markets or document leaks, thus inflating the visits in contrast to a small user-base.111  
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The point here is that the findings cannot be taken as indexical for the whole, something the 
researchers themselves acknowledge. That said, the concern of this analysis is the narrative 
and metaphorical representation within popular culture, and such findings are precisely the 
kind of catalyst that would result in the dark web being represented as a dangerous zone.   
 Now, this is not to say that such assumptions are entirely without reason given the 
data, but Tor themselves challenge this depiction head-on, hosting a page on their home 
website devoted to discussing and dispelling ideas about the dark web as a zone for abuse. It 
is an utterly remarkable piece of writing, confident and steadfast in the face of the dark web’s 
increasingly negative cultural cache, and one that does not shy away from invoking ethical 
edicts and philosophical questions. The first question cuts to the heart of the issue, asking 
“Doesn’t Tor enable criminals to do bad things?”.  I cite the answer in full: 
  Criminals can already do bad things. Since they’re willing to break laws, they 
  already have lots of options available that provide better privacy than Tor  
  provides. They can steal phones, use them, and throw them in a ditch; they 
  can crack into computers in Korea or Brazil and use them to launch abusive 
  activities; they can use spyware, viruses, and other techniques to take control 
  of literally millions of Windows machines around the world. 
  Tor aims to provide protection for ordinary people who want to follow the  
  law. Only criminals have privacy right now, and we need to fix that. 
  Some advocates of anonymity explain that it’s just a tradeoff – accepting the 
  bad uses for the good ones – but there’s more to it than that. Criminals and 
  other bad people have the motivation to learn how to get good anonymity, and 
  many have the motivation to pay well to achieve it. Being able to steal and 
  reuse the identities of innocent victims (identity theft) makes it even easier. 
  Normal people, on the other hand, don’t have the time or money to spend  
  figuring out how to get privacy online.  This is the worst of all possible  
  worlds. 
  So yes, criminals can use Tor, but they already have better options, and it  
  seems unlikely that taking Tor away from the world will stop them from doing 
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  their bad things. At the same time, Tor and other privacy measures can fight 
  identity theft, physical crimes like stalking, and so on.112 
It is difficult to know where to start with this statement, as it is frustrating in its slipperiness, 
offering both satisfactory and weak points in support of its functions. Clearly, its primary 
gambit is the idea that Tor is not a unique phenomenon, that crime can (and does) exist 
exclusive from its services, an agreeable point in itself. Despite this, Tor seems to ignore the 
fact that while these crimes may be the same on or offline, there is a certainly a distinction in 
terms of access and execution, or more specifically, the image thereof. This is the primary 
source of fear for a large portion of the populace. Whether or not Tor does offer ease for 
criminals in this regard falters in the face of the common anxiety that it allows for the 
execution of crimes within the home, ones that would assumedly face deterrence were they to 
be carried out via “traditional” means (i.e. buying drugs on the street, finding child 
pornography offline, etc.). That said, there is no way to easily determine this difference in an 
empirical manner, because drugs and weaponry are sold off of the dark web, and child 
pornography is traded outside of its boundaries (often on the surface web). Despite the 
massive surge of dark web traffic for child pornography, the fact remains that regular dark 
web users compose a stark minority of the population at large, and as such the dark web 
cannot lay claim to the majority of global crime in these forms. The discussion then becomes 
one that must tackle fear, an affect that seldom responds to such logical claims, hence Tor’s 
own response seeming disappointing in scope. It does them no favors that they fail to 
acknowledge child pornography or illicit markets in this response either, focusing almost 
exclusively on identity theft, something that admittedly does have a presence on the dark web 
(as Experian uses to great effect in terms of intimidation). Still, Tor’s claim that if more users 
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were to use their service then identity theft would become more difficult is in fact sound.  
The problem is that this assertion comes in ouroboros form, pleading for users to protect 
themselves with the very service that supposedly harbors identity thieves with relative 
impunity. 
 This struggle becomes all the more apparent in the response that bookends the FAQ, 
in which Tor delivers a sort of statement of purpose regarding abuse in general.  They write: 
  We take abuse seriously. Activists and law enforcement use Tor to investigate 
  abuse and help support survivors. We work with them to help them  
  understand how Tor can help their work. In some cases, technological  
  mistakes are being made and we help to correct them. Because some people in 
  survivors’ communities embrace113 stigma instead of compassion, seeking  
  support from fellow victims requires privacy-preserving technology. 
  Our refusal to build backdoors and censorship into Tor is not because of a lack 
  of concern. We refuse to weaken Tor because it would harm efforts to combat 
  child abuse and human trafficking in the physical world, while remove g safe 
  spaces for victims online.  Meanwhile, criminals would still have access to 
  botnets, stolen phones, hacked hosting accounts, the postal system, couriers, 
  corrupt officials, and whatever technology emerges to trade content.  They are 
  early adopters of technology. In the face of this, it is dangerous for  
  policymakers to assume that blocking and filtering is sufficient.  We are more 
  interested in helping efforts to halt and prevent child abuse than helping  
  politicians score points with constituents by hiding it.  The role of corruption 
  is especially troubling… 
  Finally, it is important to consider the world that children will encounter as 
  adults when enacting policy in their name. Will they thank us if they are  
  unable to voice their opinions safely as adults? What if they are trying to  
  expose a failure of the state to protect other children?114 
This is a more satisfying response, for a variety of reasons.  Rather than rely entirely on  the 
argument that if they were not to exist then something else would, Tor offers a clear raison 
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d’etre here, principally that they exist to actually combat child abuse and other crime in more 
effective ways than before. This is a compelling claim, and it is in fact true that law 
enforcement does have novel options in terms of halting child pornography/trafficking or 
attempted murder via sting operations and site hijacking on the dark web115. It also is by no 
means the entire picture, something revealed by their swift shift to accusing government at 
large for corruption and suppression. Indeed, Tor reveals its hand here as a political 
operation, one that offers both protection and voices to a population increasingly crushed 
under the thumb of surveillance and corrupt politicians. They even go as far as to link to an 
article implicating corrupt governments in human trafficking, the very thing that they claim 
to assault with their network. It is the final passage, though, a veritable twist of the dagger, 
that is the most compelling. Tor meets its negative narrative as a festering hive of crime with 
one of its own, the bastion for freedom in the face of a dystopian future.  Indeed, a utopian 
streak runs through their claims, and betrays the very same in its lineage through Arpanet, 
Usenet, etc.: a world of free communication and the sovereignty of thought. If one’s children 
are at risk for predators now, what will these same children say when they look back at how 
their rights and freedoms were offered to a predatory state system in exchange? 
    It is utterly unprovable, as all hypothetical and quasi-hyperbolic projections tend to 
be, and this is not to say that I personally disagree with this danger. Despite my clear 
criticism of Tor’s approach, I attest that their overall motivation is positive, and that their 
goal of offering a step towards freer discourse is in fact an important, if not outright crucial 
development in the contemporary moment. The point is that even in this piece, empirical 
evidence is waylaid for narrative deployment, as the ethical pillorying so often directed at 
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Tor is met with Tor’s counterattack in similar fashion. There is no consistent or total 
understanding of what Tor is outside of its basic material structure, as it takes shape within 
the space between a total criminal network and a device of freedom: it is both and neither at 
the same time.  What remains, however, is the prominence of the dark web as a terrifying or 
dangerous conceptual space in popular culture, despite Tor’s valiant efforts to counter this 
with a positive narrative of its own. This begs the simple question: Why? Other than danger’s 
general allure, what about the dark web, in its relative unknowability, fosters such narrative 
depictions out of frank misunderstandings and exaggerations? If what Tor says is true, and 
there is nothing inherently unique to Tor in terms of its criminal affordances, why does it fail 
to shake this reputation and wind up the subject of a horror film? There is a simple and 
cynical answer to all of these questions: fear is strong, and fear sells. Experian’s 
advertisements and Unfriended: Dark Web stand as evidence to this claim.   
 But this does not consider the other two examples from the introduction to this 
chapter. If the goal is discursive normalization, why would The Daily Stormer celebrate 
retreating to a network in which 83% of recorded traffic are theoretically pedophiles? To that 
end, did the “IDW” find solidarity in such company as well? Clearly, the two embraced the 
idea of the dark web as a fortress for free expression, aligning themselves with Tor’s own 
philosophy, but this stark reality persists nonetheless. It is entirely possible if not probable) 
that such statistics are not commonly known offhand when making such claims, and this 
stands to reinforce the central argument of this chapter. The dark web, in its current cultural 
representation, transcends its infrastructural capacities and serves to symbolize a 
paradoxically modular and well-defined narrative: the terrifying potential of a deregulated 
space. Its volatility, its tortuous vacillation between idealized freedom and lurking danger 
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render it quite difficult to contain in simple parlance: it is a microcosm for the philosophical 
debate regarding freedom in its long and winding history. In response, it follows 
Blumenberg’s claim that where rational language fails to decisively totalize a phenomenon, 
metaphor is applied, and I argue that in the case of the dark web, “darkness” serves this exact 
purpose with more complexity than it may seem to at first glance, fusing with this 
fundamental metaphor and acting as a conceptual complex. The remainder of this chapter 
will in part interrogate the narrative history of darkness in terms of its literary deployment, as 
despite darkness’s “absolute” quality, it still possesses a multifaceted history of use. It can 
import and project certain dimensions of this history at the will of those who use it, and in the 
case of the dark web, I restate here that it taps into a longstanding literary history of 
fascination with shadow societies and networks since antiquity, thus allowing it to so easily 
lapse into its popular depictions as mentioned above. Before this, though, I will examine two 
non-fiction books that apparently set off in an attempt to dispel this narrative burden, only to 
find themselves drawn into the sticky grasp of the concept they partially reject. 
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3. Down the Drain 
 Jamie Bartlett’s The Dark Web is a formidable piece of research, something at which 
has already been hinted by his history of the Arpanet cited prior. As a whole, the book is an 
investigation into the less savory corners of the internet, utilizing ethnographic and 
investigative strategies as a means to uncover and humanize otherwise maligned web 
cultures.  He suggests from the start that his goal is to demystify such aspects, illuminating 
(fittingly) what lies behind anonymous and obscured channels. And yet, even from the start 
his project is tinted with the very symbolic register it claims to combat, approaching direct 
contradiction of these aims. For example, Bartlett echoes my prior claims in that he views the 
dark web conceptually rather than materially, stating “The dark net, for me, describes an idea 
more than a particular place: internet underworlds set apart yet connected to the internet we 
inhabit, worlds of freedom and anonymity, where users say and do what they like, often 
uncensored, unregulated, and outside of society’s norms. It is dark because we rarely see 
these parts of digital life, save the occasional flash of a hysterical news flash or shocking 
statistic.”116 This is a quizzical passage, as he claims the dark web to be an idea but does 
describe a material infrastructure, essentially. Still, the intent behind this statement shines 
through, and while his claim that the use of “dark” rests on a superficial level, it is not wrong 
in its claim. The dark web does in fact rarely break through to the public unless it is in a 
negative depiction, as exhibited in the past two sections. He closes the same paragraph with a 
statement of purpose, revealing its anthropologic intent: “This is not a book about Tor, since 
the net is full of obscure corners, of secret back alleys on parts of the internet you likely 
already know: social media sites, normal websites, forums, chat rooms. I focus instead on 
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those digital cultures and communities that appear, to those that aren’t part of them, dark, 
insidious, and beyond society’s gaze—wherever I found them.”117 Bartlett is quite clear here: 
The Dark Net is not about the “dark web”, but instead the “dark” web, a metaphorical 
encapsulation of aspects of the internet at large that he deems to be “dark”. Furthermore, 
within the span of sentences, he appends “insidious” to his description, shifting the use of 
“dark” to simply refer to things unseen on the internet to those that appear to carry harmful 
intent as well.  He does not exaggerate here, as only two of the nine chapters in his book 
concern actual hidden services on Tor, those being child pornography and black markets 
(specifically the Silk Road), respectively. The rest concern, in order: a history of the internet, 
trolling across the internet, white nationalism on the surface web, bitcoin, amateur 
pornographic cam-shows, suicide pact and pro-anorexia websites, and backing up human 
consciousness into data files. For a book that claims that “for every destructive subculture I 
examined there are just as many that are positive, helpful, and constructive.”118, one would be 
forgiven for looking at this list and assuming otherwise. In terms of establishing a narrative 
line through a book, Bartlett’s selection of subjects and ordering of chapters seems to be in 
direct opposition to his claim that “darkness” only stands for things unseen or obscured.  
From the start, a book that appears to interrogate the usage of “darkness” when describing 
certain elements of the internet fortifies (either intentionally or otherwise) the very same 
narrative framework it intends to challenge. In doing so, it risks hamstringing itself by 
presupposing a consensus regarding the metaphorical relationship between “darkness” and 
danger, and he doubles down on this hermeneutic circuit with frank consistency throughout.  
This is further complicated by a question he poses shortly beforehand on the same page: “By 
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exploring and comparing these worlds, I also hoped to answer a difficult questions: do the 
features of anonymity and connectivity free the darker sides of our nature? And if so, 
how?”119 Seemingly aligning himself with Tor’s own defense, Bartlett suggests here that 
there is a universal and irrepressible “darkness” looming within humankind, unleashed at the 
first opportunity that a neutral system like Tor could allow. Recall as well that by his own 
admission, Bartlett is not simply referring to Tor or the dark web here, but the internet in 
general. No matter what the structure, as long as a degree of connection and obscurity is 
afforded, evil finds a foothold, something echoed by Tor’s assertion that crime will find a 
way whether or not their services exist. Regardless of the truth of this latter claim, adhering 
his study to such a philosophical claim can do little but prime the question in advance, 
especially given the way in which Bartlett loads down his book with a selection of some 
communities that at best exist in ethical grey areas, and others that are beyond the pale. Even 
in attempting to absolve the internet (a valiant goal), such a claim struggles to wholly 
separate the “insidious darkness” of human nature from the very system that he posits as 
potentially enabling its development. In other words, it is unclear how such a question could 
dispel the myth of the dark web as something dangerous if it suggests that it inherently 
harbors a unique ability to amplify dangerous impulses and behavior. The comparative dearth 
of the “positive” examples he claims to have found does little else than augment this 
narrative in kind.    
 He answers this question in his epilogue affirmatively, confirming the very 
presupposition that he sets out as his metric of analysis. This is in and of itself unremarkable 
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in terms of methodology, but in the scope of questioning the presupposition of the dark web 
as “evil”, it seems to amount to confirmation bias.  He writes: 
  The dark net is a world of power and freedom: of expression, of creativity, of 
  information, of ideas.  Power and freedom endow our creative and our  
  destructive faculties.  The dark net magnifies both, making it easier to explore 
  every desire, to act on every dark impulse, to indulge every neurosis.  I came 
  to realize that the unspoken truth about the dark net – whether it’s closed  
  groups with password barriers, or Tor Hidden Services with its drugs markets 
  and child pornography – is that everything is close to the surface. 
  Hidden encrypted websites and mysterious underground drugs markets sound 
  like they exist far below the world of Google and Facebook. But cyberspace 
  doesn’t have depth.  If you know where to look, everything is as accessible as 
  everything else. In the dark net, we can simply find more, do more, and see 
  more. And that means we have to be careful, cautious, and responsible.120  
This passage raises several immediate issues. Given that The Dark Net cherry-picks its 
objects of inquiry so as to construct a parallel “dark” internet amongst both the surface and 
true dark web, Bartlett’s wording at the start of this passage appears to reveal a problematic 
transposition.  In describing the “dark net” (again, Bartlett’s “dark net”) with the positive 
claim “world of power and freedom: of expression, of creativity, of information, of ideas,” 
one is left to wonder if this exact phrase could not describe the internet in general. It 
certainly registers in the very utopian dialect used to describe the internet’s potential from its 
inception as Arpanet, and if this is the case, Bartlett’s assertion risks grafting his narrative 
assemblage of the “dark net” onto the internet wholesale. 
 The implications of this are greater than they may seem given what is to follow here.  
Bartlett makes recourse to the fundamental creative and destructive abilities of humankind 
once again (lapsing into the metaphysical) and then pathologizes it, claiming that now fuzzily 
                                                             
120 Bartlett, Jamie.  The Dark Net.  Brooklyn: Melville House, 2015. 237. 
  75 
distinct “dark net” allows for the freeing of “dark impulses” and the indulgence of 
“neuroses”. This is a sharp contrast from his earlier definition, in which he claims the “dark 
net” is dark simply because it is rarely seen, on top of its liberating power. Once again, 
Bartlett intentionally dispels the notion of the “dark net” as a single referent to the dark web, 
as the majority of his studies involve the surface web. Coupled with the aforementioned flux 
in defining his own terms, his claim appears to collapse into the well-trodden argument that 
technology’s inherent danger lies in its benefits; its freedom cuts both ways. This argument, 
while intriguing, has some difficulty in terms of its productivity, as it potentially cyclically 
confirms the original bias that the darkness of the “dark net” is an inherent quality, and it is 
now one that simply exists within the internet as a whole. He doubles down on this claim by 
asserting that the aspects of the internet that seem to be buried deep under hidden channels 
are in fact “close to the surface” after all. Bartlett is not wrong here, technically speaking, but 
once again, the majority of his examples hail from the surface web.  It is also true that one 
can access hidden services with relative ease, and his argument that cyberspace lacks depth 
should be commended in its attempt to adjust the prevalent narrative discourse concerning 
the deep web. The reasons why something that is in fact quite close would be so resolutely 
compartmentalized and pushed away into a narrative sphere of darkness are left open to 
interpretation, something I wish to pick up in this chapter. What appears to be a text that 
desires to answer this question, Bartlett’s inquiry into the construction of a “dark space” as a 
means to reject it, instead amplifies the existing rhetoric, and this occurs most forcefully in 
his closing remarks, in which he suggests that we all need to hold greater caution and 
responsibility. Since Bartlett attempts to collapse the apparently discrete cognitive mapping 
of the surface and dark web into something less defined in its separation (again, something 
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with which I do not fundamentally disagree), then what can one take from this other than that 
some people are bad and will use the internet for bad things? It is probable that this is meant 
to be his moment of dispelling, a catharsis in which he claims that the “dark net” is not in fact 
unique but that evil is present in any space or channel. If this is indeed the case, then it is a 
bit difficult to separate from his assertion that the “dark net” directly amplifies evil’s 
potential.  In neutrally qualifying the argument, Bartlett simply reaffirms it, all while 
avoiding a hermeneutic approach to the question of “darkness” in favor of ethical 
prescriptions. 
 Of all things, The Dark Net at times brings to mind the work of Georges Bataille, 
specifically the conception of wasteful expenditures of energy as a formative impulse.  To 
develop this argument, I turn attention here to a single section of the book as a means to offer 
a more focused foundation. Bartlett’s fourth chapter “Three Clicks” (once again, only one of 
two chapters that explicitly concerns the dark web) focuses its sights on child pornography 
and the relative ease through which one can access it via Tor. The chapter takes its name 
from an anecdote with which Bartlett begins, wherein he recounts opening his Tor browser, 
clicking to the Hidden Wiki, and then seeing an advertised link for child pornography.121  
After noting that this process involved two clicks, he states, “If I had clicked again, I would 
have committed an extremely serious crime.  I can’t think of another instance where doing 
something so bad is so easy.”122 Bartlett is not wrong here, and the streamlined ability to 
access child pornography on the internet is, at best, horrific. He highlights the growing 
phenomenon of what he calls “browsers” as well, these being offenders who start out 
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searching for legal pornography, but through a noxious combination of curiosity, 
desensitization, and compulsion find themselves searching and collecting increasingly 
obscene material until it reaches child pornography, as if it were a final destination.123  
Profiling one such browser named “Michael”124, Bartlett paints of a portrait of a man 
seemingly baffled at his own descent into criminality. Upon being caught with vast amounts 
of child pornography of all designated levels of obscenity,125 Michael expresses disbelief at 
how he reached that point, unaware of how the process began and how badly it had 
escalated.126 Cases like his are quite common, enough so that an organization dedicated to 
addressing them (amongst more traditional ones) was created in the United Kingdom.  
Named the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF), this group looks for websites that host child 
pornography and upon confirmation reports to the police and gets the site taken down by the 
relevant hosting ISP.127 Having been in operation since 1996, during which time they focused 
on Usenet groups, the IWF is particularly sensitive to cases such as Michael’s, as they have 
seemed to grow in numbers proportionate to the increased ease of access endemic to 
contemporary internet infrastructures.128 
 There is a large caveat to Bartlett’s profile, though, one that once again betrays the 
focus on the actual dark web with which he commences this chapter. The IWF principally 
tracks content on the surface web, ignoring Tor altogether. Bartlett explains: 
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  The IWF doesn’t investigate URLs of Tor Hidden Services. Firstly, because 
  they receive very few reports of material on there, and secondly, because if 
  they did, there isn’t very much they could do about it.  Tor Hidden Services 
  can be hosted on any computer, anywhere in the world, and the complicated 
  traffic encryption system used by Tor means it’s very difficult to work out  
  exactly where it is or who they could contact to take it down. But Tor Hidden 
  Services are vital to understand why the IWF’s job is so hard, because they 
  serve as a hub that produces new material and recycles old, making it  
  available to a wide audience to view, save, and share again (often using peer-
  to-peer file-sharing technology. Content on these sites is uploaded   
  anonymously using Tor and encrypted file sharing and downloaded by other 
  users, decentralizing and widening the distribution base of material.  Every 
  time a Hidden Service is taken down—it’s hard but not impossible—the  
  community dusts itself off, reorganizes, and starts again.129 
Tor’s infrastructure does indeed make the task of removing such sites exceptionally difficult, 
and Bartlett is correct that for an organization such as the IWF, the difficulty could seem so 
insurmountable as to not be worth the effort. And yet, there is a tone of passive acceptance 
on Bartlett’s part here, despite his valid analysis of such difficulty.  It is as if he discusses Tor 
Hidden Services as a kind of liver, taking in toxic material and repurposing it into the wider 
organism of the dark net to achieve new ends before returning to the cycle anew.   
 I would note here that Bartlett is in no way responsible or obligated to focus solely on 
the dark web proper in a book clearly concerned with a far broader picture, but throughout its 
length there grows a sense of futility regarding the dark web’s existence, something 
magnified greatly by his concluding remarks. Despite returning to Tor on more than a few 
occasions to highlight its culpability in these “dark” subcultures, Bartlett simply 
acknowledges its self-replicating abilities and inevitable existence, as if it is the end-stage of 
a type of incurable malignancy, a destination for criminality to expend itself.  It is here that I 
find resonance with Bataille’s thought, wherein he claims that all social organizations 
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inevitably experience a type of pressure from unchecked accumulation.130 Bataille is less 
than direct regarding precisely what kind of material accumulates, but through inference one 
could argue that it could be human bodies, capital, physical structures, sexual needs: any 
creation or bodily function necessary for social congruence. Taking the example of human 
bodies in general, when left to accumulate without regulation mechanisms in place 
(population control, birth restrictions, etc.), available space and resources deplete to 
unsustainable levels. When this expansion reaches a functional limit, Bataille affords only 
two possible outcomes: an expansion of the zone of pressure to afford for more 
accumulation, or destruction via war or disaster.131 This latter effect he argues is a universal 
impulse within humankind: a will to squander the excess. The term squander is loose here, as 
it is with several of Bataille’s terms, for it could refer to spending money on luxuries, sex for 
pleasure to release accumulated libidinal energy, or (as noted above) the squandering of 
human life in murder or mass conflict. This drive towards waste is a constant in the world, 
and it serves as a way to allow for society to continue operating smoothly. 
 I argue here that Bartlett’s resignation to either child pornography on Tor as well as 
his concluding argument concerning the inevitable presence of illegal activity in general on 
such channels both suggest a highly similar teleological thrust as Bataille’s writings, and 
consequently risk lapsing into a sort of futility. There is little way to contest Bartlett’s 
concrete claims concerning the improbability of eradicating illegal activity on the dark web, 
something that I would never contest on its own. But in framing this phenomenon as a sort of 
self-replicating zone in which “dark impulses” can be freed, it depicts Tor (and the internet at 
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large) as a kind of burn-off zone for the very kinds of libidinal or violent impulses Bataille 
sees as given to the human condition, a space that could be begrudgingly tolerated if only 
such impulses could remain contained therein. It remains, for Bartlett, a space against which 
the multitude must defend itself, but it is one that he concedes will continue to recycle and 
reform despite all efforts to stymie its growth. Whether or not this is the case, it nevertheless 
strengthens the preexisting conception of the dark web rather than dispels it. Bataille, to his 
credit, offers a general model to positively direct these impulses towards productive 
squandering (the redistribution of unnecessary wealth of a rich country to an impoverished 
one, for example132), and yet this is only presented as a preferable alternative to war or 
violence and not a more effective one: mass death still would do the job. Bartlett, however, 
leaves his conclusion open, in turn stopping short of offering a praxis towards utilizing the 
dark web for positive ends. It is The Tor Project who step in to carry out this task instead, 
and while I expressed reservations towards their argumentative approach earlier on, there is 
something noble in their attempt to offer justifications for Tor’s existence outside of simply 
offering bad resources for bad people. In light of Bartlett’s book, their claim that Tor can 
allow for greater legal efficacy in shutting down child pornography (via the same anonymity 
that fosters its existence) works as a dispelling maneuver. 
 Despite the considerable space given to Bartlett in this section, The Dark Web is not 
the only prominent book concerning Tor, and it takes a remarkably different approach.  
Eileen Ormsby’s The Darkest Web serves in part as a corrective antidote to the dark web 
mythos, and her efforts bear compelling results. This is admittedly quite surprising given her 
book’s title, as its use of the superlative suggests that the contents within would double down 
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on both the light/dark and good/evil binaries that emerged within Bartlett’s text despite his 
stated goals suggesting otherwise. Furthermore, given her occupation as an investigative 
journalist, Ormsby’s book swiftly adopts a markedly different style than Bartlett’s, frequently 
reading as a thriller that unfurls its denouements through plot twists and narrative jolts. The 
greatest twist, though, is that the first two of the book’s three chapters (all of which focus on 
Tor and Tor Hidden Services) reveal themselves as forceful demythologizations of the dark 
web, often times with a biting sense of humor. Prior to writing The Darkest Web, Ormsby 
wrote a multitude of pieces to this end, and was an active contributor to subreddits dedicated 
to deflating dark web urban legends in a similar manner. This career of sobered engagement 
shows throughout her book, something in contrast to Bartlett’s admissions of being a novice 
in the seedier portions of the dark web at the time of his book’s creation, something I do not 
write as a criticism or insult.133 Moreover, Ormsby almost entirely avoids any attempt at 
offering a philosophical/theoretical framework for her book, instead focusing on crafting 
revelatory narratives that gain their force through their findings instead (a hallmark her status 
as a journalist). I find this stylistic divergence to be the most compelling aspect of her text in 
terms of this analysis, and as such will focus principally on this to start. 
 Her first two chapters concern the Silk Road and its offshoot dark web black markets 
(hereafter referred to as “dark markets”) and dark web assassination services respectively, 
but they are narratives of collapse and failure rather than reinforcements of danger. This is 
not to say that Ormsby does not traffic in suspense and fear.  By the end of her introduction 
she writes the following: 
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  Many people refer to the dark web as the wild west of the internet,  where  
  anything goes.  In many ways, they are right. There are some depraved minds 
  out there and they have total freedom to buy, sell, share or create anything  
  they want, confident that they cannot be found. 
  Some people want to buy murderous substances and implements. Some want 
  to sell people and poisons.  Others want to share livestreams of torture or  
  create pictures and films of such depravity, seasoned cops who view them  
  need counselling. Most frightening is that the technology – simple to use for 
  those with basic computer skills – has meant that those depraved minds have 
  been able to find each other.134 
This is effectively a standard model for discussions of the dark web, similar in all respects to 
the selection of those that commence this chapter. What is remarkable, then, is that so much 
of her book is dedicated to a bait-and-switch tactic, in that she isolates several of these very 
frightening realities in order to dull their force or disprove them outright (child pornography 
notwithstanding). It takes little time for her to reach this point.  By the thirtieth page into her 
book, Ross Ulbricht, creator of the Silk Road and to that point the largest dark market the 
dark web had ever seen135, has already been ignominiously arrested due to his leaving an 
administrator account open on a computer in a public library, an account that held every 
possible piece of incriminating evidence against him and his staff.136 The most serious of 
Ulbricht’s crimes involved soliciting assassinations on several of his employees, those that 
had stolen funds or betrayed him in various forms. Unbeknownst to Ulbricht, none of the 
murders he ordered took place, having been orchestrated and simulated from their inception 
by the FBI with the help of a Silk Road employee turned informant named Curtis Green, 
incidentally the first employee on whom Ulbricht ordered a hit.137 Astonishingly, photos of 
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Green’s death were made using Campbell’s Chicken and Stars soup to simulate his post-
torture vomit, an apparently convincing enough touch so as to trick Ulbricht.138 The chapter 
continues with a step-by-step recounting of the eventual arrest and confession of the Silk 
Road’s staff, humanizing and unveiling its central weaknesses. It results in a peculiar effect, 
as Ormsby never denies that the Silk Road was an effective black market – on the contrary, 
she is very clear about its vast empire during its existence. But in highlighting the downfall 
of its creators over their infamy and efficacy, it is as if she strips away a layer of its 
“darkness”, revealing the members to be often hapless, ordinary people who swiftly found 
themselves in over their heads. While the dark web offers the potential to create an illegal 
empire, potential does not ensure total mastery, and the Silk Road’s explosive burn out 
exposes a severe weakness in the darkness myth: invisibility is often still contingent on a 
person’s surface life, and it is by no means a total guarantee. In comparison, Bartlett’s claim 
that the dark web/internet allows for an unleashing of impulses never specifies that these 
activities, like any, are subject to failure, in turn portraying the dark web as an impenetrable 
aegis for criminality. Furthermore, he also discusses the arrest of Ross Ulbricht in his own 
chapter on the Silk Road, but never mentions these unflattering details due to his aims of 
discussing dark markets in general. All this serves to do, in the end, is further bolster the 
looming threat and danger of these markets, a stark contrast once again to his stated claims of 
humanizing the agents behind such phenomena. This is a task that Ormsby instead achieves 
with flair. 
 For the rest of the chapter, she untangles the byzantine web of actors behind the Silk 
Road debacle, and goes on to chart the rise and fall of several subsequent markets in the 
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wake of its downfall. One major focus is a figure who went by the handles Variety Jones and 
Plural of Mongoose, later revealed to be a man named Roger Thomas Clarke, residing in 
Thailand.139 Clark served as a kind of advisor to Ulbricht during the Silk Road’s prime, 
offering advice and support to Ulbricht up to and including his assassination orders on 
several of his employees. Eventually identified and arrested, Clark was revealed to be an 
online drug-dealer with much experience, leading Ormsby to make the following claim: 
   The millennial generation likes to believe that they led the way in online black 
  markets, but there were many people involved in online drug sales while they 
  were still in primary school.  There were sites on the clear web that skirted 
  legalities by positioning themselves as informational sites, which did not  
  blatantly make drug sales, but brought like-minded folk together.140 
Again, Ormsby never downplays the augmenting effect of anonymity networks on black 
markets and drug sales, but this statement serves as a compelling corrective to the idea that 
the dark web brought forth a truly novel paradigm shift. By suggesting dark markets as 
genealogical descendants of clear web meeting sites, she dispels the notion that such 
criminality sprang forth from the dark web rather than simply migrating to a new space 
within. At first glance, this would imply that Ormsby is subject to the same relativism that 
affects Bartlett’s conclusions, that illegal activity and depravity finds its way into the dark 
web to thrive through some necessary expenditure or flow (something likewise implied in 
Ormsby’s own introduction). However, in couching this claim within a succession of arrests, 
failures, and shutdowns, she effectively argues that the same deterrents and failures of the 
surface world followed these groups into the dark web in pursuit. Its thick darkness is made 
porous and penetrable in certain areas. 
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 She closes this chapter by noting that despite the continued success of drug sales on 
the dark web in principle, “at the time of writing, the darknet markets are in disarray”.141  
Ormsby notes that while there are certain markets that continue to thrive, the environment of 
the dark web is currently inhospitable to massive centralized markets, despite growing 
demand. Instead, decentralized markets akin to the very meetup groups that served as 
precursors to the dark markets are making a resurgence.142 She does not predict the downfall 
of internet drug trade, a frank impossibility, but she is neither a doomsayer nor a romantic on 
the subject, evading the typical signifiers of the dark web as myth and offering a surprisingly 
uncharitable analysis of the market state. This is a productive form of demythologization, one 
that does not overzealously deny the presence of illegal activity, but instead mutes its effects 
and sense of novelty, and this approach affords Ormsby the ability to approach the topic of 
the dark web with a certain neutrality that does not lapse into ethical relativism.   
 However, the chapter that follows takes the demythologizing approach to an extreme.  
Focusing on Hidden Service assassination services, Ormsby structures the chapter as a 
murder mystery, leading with a flat description of a murder that took place following an 
exchange with an assassination service named Besa Mafia and the subsequent arrest of a 
Londoner named Chris Monteiro143 She then slowly uncovers the mystery step by step, 
interspersing each revelation with a series of analyses and statistics concerning hitmen both 
in the dark web and the surface world. What is critical to take into account is Ormsby’s 
sleight-of-hand style throughout the chapter, as she lures the reader into a sense of insecurity 
and fear while subtly hinting at the artificial nature of the hitman mythos at the same time. A 
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closer examination of this tactic is revelatory.  Immediately following her introduction of the 
Besa Mafia murder, Ormsby writes a section discussing the tension between the actual nature 
of hitmen and their depictions in popular media. Arguing that these popular depictions 
overcode and distort the reality of hitman assassinations, she cites several studies that erode 
the common conception of hitmen as professionally trained agents or even people with scores 
of murders on record. Instead, Ormsby claims, the majority of hitmen only ever have one 
target and lack the surgical precision seen in films and other entertainment media. This is not 
to say that professional hitmen and spies do not exist at all, but instead that the popular 
narrative has subsumed the significantly smaller reality of the situation. Furthermore, the fact 
that hitmen, by the definition of their work, require secrecy makes them understandably 
difficult to study with any amount of precision, leaving the reality an unknown space.144  
Ormsby writes, “The very fact that there is this unknown gives us an opening to believe in 
the hitmen presented to us by popular culture. Academics can’t study them because they are 
too good to get caught. The hitmen who evaded capture may be significantly different to 
those languishing in prison.”145 
 What is immediately odd, then, is Ormsby’s introduction to dark web assassination 
services only a few sections later, in which she appears to fortify the commonplace narrative 
that the dark web is a verified source of murder-for-hire. She writes, “Contract killing 
services were a natural progression for the dark web. All the elements were there: both 
customer and hitman could remain anonymous from one another, payment could be made in 
virtually untraceable cryptocurrency, and arrangements could be made away from prying 
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eyes thanks to encrypted text messages using anonymous email providers.”146  It is quite true 
that the dark web contains several assassination sites, with old ones folding and new ones 
springing into existence per the standard lifecycle of Hidden Service sites in general.  
Ormsby’s diction here, however, heightens a causal ontological chain that is all too familiar 
by this point. The dark web offers anonymity, anonymity encourages “dark impulses”, and it 
is a matter of course that arguably the darkest impulse would find a loving home within its 
shadowy corners. But looking back to her previous section places this observation into the 
exact same tension she unpacks earlier on: is this a claim to be taken as given, or a new 
mutation of the popular hitman mythos that obscures the actual presence thereof? It takes less 
than the span of five pages for Ormsby to whip her unfolding examination the opposite 
direction, as she succinctly asserts, “With no deaths that could be attributed to dark web 
murder-for-hire sites, it seemed clear that hitmen in cyberspace were yet another myth.”147  
Stunningly, this claim follows her effectively deceiving several hitmen sites with 
assassination inquiries (up to including offering victim information sourced from obituaries), 
only to receive no response back. 
 Ormsby plays this game of misdirection for the rest of the chapter, arguing that 
assassination inquiries and offers are quite verifiable, but only through arrests and stings, 
given that a large number of assassination sites are run by local police and the FBI.  Across 
this development, however, she continues to dangle the name Besa Mafia as a counterpoint, 
printing several e-mail correspondences that attest to them being verified killers, describing 
personal threats she received from the group, and returning to the murder of Amy Allwine, 
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apparently carried out at the hands of a Besa Mafia agent on the order of her husband 
Stephen Allwine. The arrest of Chris Monteiro described at the beginning is revealed to be an 
act of deceptive parallelism, Chris Monteiro in actuality being one of Ormsby’s colleagues.  
The two relentlessly investigated Besa Mafia, only for a Besa Mafia member to tip off the 
FBI member to Monteiro’s alleged hacking activities in retaliation. Following this, Ormsby 
ratchets up tension by describing Besa Mafia’s increasingly aggressive actions towards her, a 
“leak” (self -created) of one of their murders taking place, and a series of short biographies of 
the Allwine’s leading up to Amy’s death. 
 The final revelation reads as follows: “Besa Mafia was a scam. Nobody had been 
killed. Nobody had been raped or beaten up. Nobody had ever been refunded his or her 
money. The only criminal activity carried out on behalf of Besa Mafia was the torching of 
four cars by someone called ThcJohn.”148  It is a twist the rivals the greatest of mystery 
novels, one given tremendous impact by Ormsby’s narrative development. The reality of the 
matter is that Besa Mafia is only one man, Yura. He secures assassination orders from 
prospective clients and proceeds to report several mishaps and errors over the course of the 
assassination attempt. With each failure, he goads the client into paying more for “upgraded” 
services until he can get no further cooperation, then turning the client’s information over to 
the authorities. The apparent murder video circulated as proof was staged and fake, and so 
the most verifiable dark web murder site turned out to be one of its most sophisticated 
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vigilante procedures.  Ormsby investigation naturally exposed these exploits, leading Yura to 
embark on a series of increasingly pathetic and impotent revenge threats. Ormsby chronicles 
each one in detail, causing grievous harm to the “dangerous dark web” mythos at large.  
Rather than a murder den, it is revealed to be artifice of the highest order, and the chapter 
closes with no verified dark web hit discovered to date. Taken in tandem with her withering 
portrait of the Silk Road’s collapse, Ormsby’s dive into the “darkest web” by this point paints 
an almost comedic portrait of its denizens, amateur to the extreme and defenseless in the face 
of exposure. 
 The chapter does not end so cleanly, though, instead taking a turn for the tragic. Amy 
Allwine remains dead, and it turns out that in the face of having been scammed, Stephen 
carried out the murder himself. Through this development, Ormsby’s book touches on an 
ethical polemic as yet unseen regarding the dark web. Within his anemic threats, Yura 
frequently accused Ormsby of failing to see the forest for the trees, making accusations such 
as the following: “it is clear that you are protecting murderers and want to help them be safe 
from scams…If you expose any other hitmen scam, all the killings of innocent people will be 
on you…a real market is not hard to do.  Don’t push it.  If you love murders, you might get a 
real site as a result.”149 Following Amy Allwine’s death, Yura reached out to Ormsby again 
and accused her of facilitating the death in a similar fashion.150 This is a startling reversal 
when considered in concert with popular notions of the dark web, most notably Bartlett’s 
final claim, once again. While it is simple to conceive of the dark web as a release 
mechanism for criminal behavior, few depictions consider the dark web as a source of 
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regulatory mechanisms that actively combat said behavior, hence the Tor Project’s 
impassioned arguments to that very end. Yura switches the blame to the surface world, 
effectively positioning the dark web as a zone of just dissimulation, wherein one can harness 
this standing narrative and use it to entrap truly “dark” agents, i.e. those entering from the 
surface world to actuate terrible desires. Granted, Yura also claims that there could be such 
sites if one truly wanted to facilitate one, but as Ormsby notes, no such thing has been 
located to date. These two chapters of her book go great lengths to drawing the dark web into 
a far more complex conceptual space, in which its metaphorical attachment to darkness is 
scrambled at the core. Taking Yura’s accusations into this register, the truly toxic agent was 
in fact the illumination of Ormsby’s investigation, besieging a process with all the best 
intentions that required a veil to function. 
 Were The Darkest Web to end here, it would remain a remarkably strange and unique 
work in the small canon of dark web literature, but as the names of these two chapters 
suggest (“Dark” and “Darker”), there still is one step further to travel. It is this very chapter 
that draws Ormsby’s book back onto the standard line, as the nature of its content forces her 
hand, with good reason. “Darkest” covers the market for child rape and torture videos on the 
dark web, and she discovers that these very much so exist, unfortunately. It starts off in a 
similar fashion, though, with Ormsby putting to rest several mythic aspects of the dark web 
concerning snuff films and torture livestreams. Like dark web assassinations, a true snuff 
film has yet to be discovered, as I covered in my own introduction. The dark web analogue to 
this cultural symbol is the “red room”, and its ultimately fictitious nature functions in a 
similar manner as well. “Red rooms” claim to offer livestreams of the torturing and 
subsequent murder of a kidnapped victim, sometimes under the guise of an act of retribution 
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or justice.  Ormsby investigates a particular “red room” that claimed to torture members of 
ISIS, humiliating and injuring them in manners similar to the infamous Abu Ghraib 
containment facility.151 Ultimately, this room, like all other documented instances, turned out 
to be a scam not unlike that of Besa Mafia, wherein prospective viewers paid an entry fee 
only to see an error page the moment that the site’s countdown clock reached zero. A sense 
of “ethical” exploitation of its patrons cannot be ignored in this case. This leads Ormsby to 
make one of the most bracing claims of the entire book, flipping the dark web’s reputation on 
its head once again.  She writes: 
  Hoax or not, how far are we from the real thing?  If a red room ever comes to 
  fruition, it is more likely to appear on the clear web than the dark web,  
  perhaps even through our most familiar websites.  Facebook Live, the  
  application that allows anybody to broadcast live to their friends or the public 
  at large, has already provided a platform on which people have livestreamed 
  their crimes, including a number of suicides and at least one murder.152  
Unlike Bartlett’s equivocating stance on the “dark” aspects of the internet at large, Ormsby 
unabashedly incriminates the surface web as a far more likely platform for this exact kind of 
behavior. She is not without reason at all: along with her cited instances, several videos of 
murders have even gone viral on the surface web, such as a recorded instance of two teenage 
Russian spree killers, scores of filmed murders and beheadings during wartime, and several 
murders of journalists caught on tape from their camerapersons. All are horrifying and found 
vast audiences via the surface web and not the dark web, but they all lack the status of being 
done for profit.  As such, Ormsby’s hypothesis must remain speculative here, despite the 
strong circumstantial evidence lending strength to her supposition. 
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 This is only the introduction to the chapter’s focus, though, instead aiming its sights 
on the phenomenon of “hurtcore” videos, something that somehow surpasses repugnance of 
child pornography. It is worth mentioning first that Ormsby continues her unintentional 
riposte against Bartlett, writing “One of the most common fears of those venturing into the 
dark web for the first time is that they will accidentally stumble across child pornography.  
The fears are not without foundation[…] However, the chances of stumbling upon it 
accidentally are slim. The sites usually require registration and the leave the visitor in no 
doubt of what lies beyond the login screen.”153 Bartlett’s claim of the ease with which he 
could have found child pornography gains an element of sensationalism in light of Ormsby’s 
judgment here, as she is correct that such material is more closely guarded than one would be 
led to believe, rarely appearing on standard Hidden Service wikis that serve as most people’s 
gateway into the dark web proper. But with this added security comes amplification, and 
“hurtcore” videos take advantage of this. Put succinctly, “hurtcore” is the filming of child 
abuse (sexual and physical) that is sold for a profit. There exists a vast level of categorization 
and compartmentalization of acts for any desire, and there does exist an audience for them, to 
great horror. Much of the chapter focuses on an administrator turned curator named “Lux”, a 
man who set out to run the most perverse and reprehensible site for child pornography and 
“hurtcore” videos on the dark web, something that he succeeded in doing, for a time. Finally 
located and caught by a police task force, “Lux” was revealed to be a teenage boy named 
Matthew Graham, described in court as “… a sad , friendless little boy who was desperate for 
attention and accolades from his peers.”154 Only at times showing remorse, there is 
something nihilistic to this situation that proves deeply disturbing, even to Ormsby.  That 
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such gruesome material could be curated and traded for nothing other than a growing sense 
of respect can do nothing other than give great weight to Bartlett’s depiction of the dark web 
as a nurturing ground for evil, and Ormsby has little to say otherwise, understandably. 
      This is largely due to the discussion surrounding a particular “hurtcore” video titled 
Daisy’s Destruction, a mythical “hurtcore” tape proven real via Graham’s site, in which a 
two-year old infant is brutally tortured and raped by a man and woman over the span of 
hours. The horrifying nature of the video was powerful enough to fortify in part a sub-mythos 
of its own.  Ormsby explains: 
  The dark web is home to all manner of rumours and creepy stories, most of 
  which are exaggerations, lies or hoaxes. There were always stories of  
  websites and videos that were gruesome beyond anything anyone had ever 
  seen. Many people believed there was a further, deeper, darker section of the 
  dark web, called Mariana’s Web or the Shadow Web, where the select few 
  discovered the key to unlock the greatest horrors. Snuff movies, of course, and 
  worse.155 
This is a truly compelling phenomenon, one that almost single-handedly exposes the 
narrative and metaphorical operations concerning the dark web. That a culture that exists 
within and is conversant with the dark web, a conceptual space designated by the outside 
world as a festering environment of evil, could in turn develop their own tonally identical 
conceptual space is a testament to the cascading fortitude of the darkness metaphor as a 
solidified concept. Already situated as an “other”, a reflective and “darker” space is 
nonetheless composed by way of contrast and set as a space to fulfill the most extreme 
promises such a narrative offers but fails to realize. It is as if the conceptual paradigm at play 
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retains its trace composition even in the face of dissolution, simply establishing a side path in 
which it can gather strength and establish itself anew. 
 Whatever the case here may be, Ormsby discovers that Daisy’s Destruction is in fact 
all too real, choosing to avoid watching it for the sake of her own emotional well-being, a 
decision I myself have made with little difficulty, to say the least. Faced with one of the few 
cases of inescapable proof in the quest for the darkest regions of the dark web, Ormsby is left 
to designate the video (and the phenomenon of “hurtcore”) as such. The final lines of the 
book read as follows: “And for those who want to know just how far the dark web goes, they 
have an answer.  This is the darkest web.”156 It is hard not to read a tone of resignation or 
even disappointment in her diction here, not towards her findings but the implied desires of 
her readers. Faced with the task of defining the undefinable, Ormsby searches to the limits of 
her tolerance and finally locates the liminal point, one she cannot and will not cross, willing 
to keep it shrouded in the darkness. In doing so, her book for the first, and yet most 
significant, instance reverses its course of demythologization and instead doubles down on 
the mythologizing process. Rather than Bartlett’s comparatively neutral philosophical claims, 
she designates a single, defined point and designates it as the “darkest” aspect of the dark 
web, in turn positioning it as a nexus around which the rest of dark web activity (much of 
which she has previously dispelled) orbits. 
 It makes for a shift that proves uniquely difficult to analyze or critique in any simple 
fashion, and while the reason behind this is multifaceted, it is not difficult to understand.  
When it comes to the nature of the material to which she assigns this designation, I believe 
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that she is absolutely correct in her judgment. It is difficult if not outright impossible to even 
imagine something more horrific than the videos and materials that populate her final 
chapter.  To even hypothesize greater depths as such would be an exercise in masochism. In 
this sense, Ormsby could do nothing other than claim “hurtcore” and its ilk to be the 
“darkest” aspect of the dark web to date.  But looking at the entire book in terms of its 
narrative development and execution inscribes it into the very ethical debate fought 
passionately on the part of the Tor Project, once again. Given that each chapter unfolds as a 
mystery in miniature, each a journalistic progression towards deflation on the case the first 
two, the entire book then assumes the same progressive structure on a macro level. After an 
expedition into collapsing the architecture of the dark web myth via a series of twists and 
revelations, the final twist in the chain is that the “dark” metaphor is aptly deployed, as little 
else could stand to explain the inexplicable draw of “hurtcore” on the level of basic human 
decency.  In one sense, her book (like Bartlett’s) returns to the starting position, in which it 
can do nothing other than acknowledge the existence of criminality and in turn serve as a 
point against which the Tor Project can claim (correctly or not) that it functions as a means to 
address and erase the very same issues for which it allows. 
 The subtly bilious wording of Ormsby’s final sentences still cannot be shaken off in 
light of this.  It is as if she is acutely aware of the audience for which she writes, knowing 
that they arrived at her book in search of a masochistic quenching of thirst, that despite all of 
her efforts to lay waste to the baggage that the term “dark” imports, once again “darkness” 
proves too sticky, too conceptually solid to adequately dispel. No matter the efforts, the 
presence of “hurtcore” (and child pornography at large, for that matter) will always force the 
content of the dark web to subsume the structure and steal away the “dark” appellation for its 
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own.  Even though such material can be located on the surface web, something that Bartlett 
likewise proves, the association with the dark web proves too seductive, as if it must exist to 
justify the metaphorical contiguity of the dark web with its calcified popular conception.  
Considered through this lens, Ormsby and Tor Project would no longer serve as easy 
adversaries in the ethical debate concerning the dark web. It is clear that Ormsby appreciates 
the greater function of the dark web, or at the very least holds a particular fascination for its 
potential, and as such “hurtcore” appears as a devastating malignancy, one that poisons the 
whole for both herself and Tor in the same fashion. Despite his conclusions, the same could 
in part be said for Bartlett, who still finds in certain places positive potential for the dark 
web’s structure from a historical perspective alone. This does not even take into 
consideration the verifiable presence of drug sales, identity theft, etc. that still do exist on the 
dark web proper, but as all three assert, a plentitude of surface world analogues for such 
activity exists, even to a degree that in some cases eclipses what the dark web can offer.  
Ormsby’s unfortunate confirmation thus exists as a null point, wherein the question if 
“darkness” as a metaphor or conceptual paradigm presupposes the dark web’s popular 
reception is negated.  “Hurtcore” exists, and so the dark web is “dark”. 
     Left at this point, this would be a particularly unsatisfying conclusion, one with 
several unanswered questions remaining suspended in place. For one, the positive functions 
of the dark web (such as those enumerated by the Tor Project) still do not receive any 
significant attention at all within these two texts. Does there exist any satisfactory metric by 
which such positive applications could ever outweigh the harm of aspects such as child 
pornography, and would a discussion of these ever rise above the risk of irresponsible 
relativism?  Secondly, if so many mythical aspects of the dark web can be soundly disproven 
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as the case with Ormsby’s investigative work, why is it that these very aspects find 
themselves so desirable in terms of fictional media based on the network? That an 
exploitative horror film about child torture would be disgusting at best is somewhat beside 
the point here, as that would assume that films such as Unfriended are created with the next-
available subject so as to satisfy a need. If such a need exists, then from where did it arise 
and why does it remain so trenchant? Returning to a question that I posed earlier: given that 
child pornography is such an identifiable symbol of the dark web in the popular sphere, 
through what logic would a group such as the IDW consider it fashionable to associate 
themselves with it by proximity? One could read Ormsby’s final lines as a plea in this 
context, one for the reader to be acutely aware of what is actually “dark” on the dark web and 
to avoid being seduced by the legends and myths that serve as a conceptual smoke-screen of 
sorts. 
 Ultimately I argue that the work of the Tor Project, Bartlett, and Ormsby betray a 
clear struggle with an audience, specially an engagement with an audience who arrives at the 
works with a presupposed narrative to confirm. Confirmatory and contradictory in equal 
measure, these texts run headlong into a hermeneutic process that extends far beyond the 
cultural context out of which the dark web came to be. In this regard, despite the dark web’s 
original appellation in terms of its anonymity, it was all but destined (through a complex 
network of factors) to find itself attached to a greater narrative history of darkness in terms of 
the ease with which it could lock into darkness’s metaphorical and conceptual history. By 
nurturing the hidden and inexplicable, it courted metaphorical subsumption late in the history 
of darkness as a means to address the unknown, and it in turn served to confirm this 
deployment with ease. This is by no means a ontologic claim in terms of the content and 
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activity within the dark web. In other words, I do not claim here that in calling the dark web 
“dark” did this action serve as a directly causal force that attracted criminal activity. As all 
three of my primary sources acknowledge, it is anonymity in any form that fosters this 
behavior in part.  Instead, I wish to focus instead on the fascination with the dark web that 
gives rise to texts from the outlandish Unfriended to the Ormsby’s sobered analysis. Instead, 
it is this continuous redeployment of “dark” as a signpost for unchecked production and evil 
that stymies any rehabilitative efforts such as that of the Tor Project and results in the 
perhaps conciliatory conclusion of Ormsby’s text.   
 In order to adequately approach this difficult problem, the following conclusion will 
be formed into two discrete parts. For the first, I will explore a small selection of literary 
texts that I consider progenitors to the popular treatment of the dark web as it stands today.  
While the dark web is a product of the contemporary moment in many ways, a documented 
presence of shadow networks (both historical and fictional) exists nonetheless, and it is this 
that I consider an important genesis point out of which the narrative treatment of the dark 
web gains force today. If Bartlett and Ormsby both wrote for a considered audience as I 
argued prior, I further hypothesize that this very audience is preconditioned by this very 
narrative line, and as such this history fuels current representations of the dark web via its 
current conceptual hermeneutic. Where applicable, I will connect these literary texts 
thematically to the examples with which I introduced this chapter, as I believe that the 
similarities betray conceptual links that extend deeper than coincidence. Secondly, I will 
offer my own survey of a small selection of Tor Hidden Services that I explored on my own, 
reading them through the concept of Serres’ parasitism as a means to fortify Tor’s positive 
claims as best as one can. This is not an attempt at reducing the significance of the negative 
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presences on the dark web, especially that of “hurtcore” and its ilk. Instead, I wish to simply 
offer a framework for those presences that find themselves on the fringes of the dark web 
narrative overshadowed by the immensely disturbing and more attention-grabbing content.  
Both of these tasks require working with vast source pools: the history of literature on one 
hand, and the total extent of the dark web on the other. As such, both of these sections hold 
no illusion of being exhaustive, but are instead intended to broaden the discussion concerning 
a still remarkably unknowable phenomenon. 
4. Conclusion I: The Hidden Ones 
 Two of the earliest appearances of shadow networks stem from antiquity, the fertile 
period that gave shape to darkness in its metaphorical register. Thesmophoriazusae by 
Aristophanes and Euripides’ Bacchae both feature mysterious secret societies at the heart of 
their dramatic action. Whereas Aristophanes’ satirical take on Athenian democratic 
assemblies contrasts fundamentally with the Bacchic religious cult in Euripides’ work, what 
does unite the two is that they are both composed exclusively of women.157 One cannot speak 
of Thesmophoriazusae without first acknowledging its parodic nature, though, as the play 
unfolds through relentlessly bawdy jokes (more often than not focusing on homosexuality, 
gender roles, and genitalia), frequently sailing far past the limits of taste. Such jokes are 
central to the plot, as the bulk of the play focuses on a poorly planned scheme to infiltrate the 
women’s assembly by disguising a man, Mnesilochus, as a woman and using him to sway 
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their opinion.158 This is a life or death matter, as the assembly convenes to discuss the 
judgment and execution of Euripides himself, charged with misrepresenting and mistreating 
women in his tragedies.159  By the end, Mnesilochus is exposed (leading to a hostage 
situation and attempted infanticide on his part), and only through Euripides’ own rhetoric 
before the assembly (in which he promises to write about women more charitably) is he 
spared.160  The metatextual nature of Thesmophoriazusae  extends beyond its commentary on 
literary reception to a greater gender conflict within Athenian society at the time. The 
assembly does not convene for the expressly to address Euripides, but is implied to have 
existed for some time, secretly discussing inequality and enacting punishment on the greatest 
offenders thereof. This discourse is often explicitly political, most clearly seen in a speech 
given by the chorus leader, one in which she criticizes the male-dominant senate body and 
concludes, “Therefore we maintain that men are greatly our inferiors. You see no woman 
who has/robbed the state of fifty talents rushing about the city in a magnificent chariot; 
our/greatest peculations are a measure of corn, which we steal from our husbands,/and even 
then we return it to them the very same day.”161 The assembly is portrayed as an insurgent 
body operating in the shadows, working to equalize the distance between genders (if not 
outright invert them) through clandestine judiciary procedure. 
 That this assembly intended to be humorous is likely given the tone of Aristophanes’ 
prior works, but this does not deprive it of a critical force, albeit one conditioned by the 
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gender norms of the time period. The group of women target the irrationality of men in their 
society, claiming that for too long have they been associated with such behavior when the 
governing political bodies exhibit the same level of irrational hypocrisy. Some have argued 
that this inversion claims that men act as badly as women, a significant shift insofar that it 
does nothing to elevate women above their common depiction, instead chiding men for 
descending to their lower rank.  Hence wherein the satire lies, that a caste of citizens 
considered to lack the emotional and intellectual capacity to form a functioning political 
body must do so as a counterexample to the depths to which current politics have fallen.  In 
this case, the revolutionary timbre of Aristophanes’ work finds itself depleted through a 
contemporary lens, but it is no less significant for this analysis given that it still deploys a 
secret society as a destabilizing and critical force at its core, whatever that target may be.   
 Upon closer examination of the assembly’s charge, that Euripides has written his 
female poorly (and by extension, irrationally), what immediately comes to mind is his 
Bacchae, in which he populates his cults for the newly returned Dionysus almost exclusively 
with women.  Bacchae at heart is a complex of struggles: between rationality and sensualism, 
order and chaos, violence and ecstasy, and quite literally, Pentheus and Bacchus. Unable to 
accept the growing influence of Dionysus’s new presence in Thebes, its current king, 
Pentheus, has Dionysus arrested on the pretext of treachery and falsely representing godhood.  
Pentheus’s frustration is twofold: practically speaking, Dionysus represents a weakening of 
his power, as throngs of Thebans leave to join his forest cults and worship him. But Dionysus 
represents something far more toxic for Pentheus, a slippery figure who evades easy 
definition, something that insults and eludes Pentheus’s arrogant rationality. As hubris 
dictates, Dionysus targets this exact aspect of Pentheus, driving him mad and sending him off 
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to join his Bacchante (i.e. Dionysian cults). Promptly upon arriving, he is violently 
dismembered by the group, one of whom is his mother Agave, forced to realize her terrible 
act once having descended from her fugue state.162 While the play follows a relatively 
traditional tragic progression, the Bacchante themselves serve as a mysterious presence both 
for the audience as well as in a diagetic manner. Pentheus struggles with understanding their 
nature, first concluding: 
  Apparently their gatherings involve 
  huge vats of wine, and one by one, those girls 
  slink off alone to serve some man with sex. 
  They say this craziness is for the god, 
  but they like Aphrodite more than Bacchus.163 
Assuming the Bacchante to be orgies of libidinal excess, Pentheus is swiftly proven 
otherwise by one of his messengers, who reports that after catching a group asleep, he 
watches them awaken and peacefully draw from the earth quantities of milk, honey and 
wine.164 It is only after seeing the group of men spying on them that the Bacchante lash out, 
whipping into a vicious frenzy and assaulting the men as if they were prey on a hunt.165 
Failing to capture the men, the Bacchante lay siege to a town, attacking the residents and 
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dismembering cattle in a nearly identical fashion to the way in which Pentheus will meet his 
fate at their hands.166   
 The cults resist analysis and definition, attempting to destroy any outsiders who do 
not assimilate into their customs and practices, let alone their gender. Much like 
Aristophanes’ assembly, the Bacchante operate “off-grid” but maintain no less influence on 
Theban society for it, as their growing numbers all but grant certainty to Dionysius ascendant 
power. Their actions end in regicide as well, a direct act of power disruption that sends 
destabilizing ripples through the political structure.  Similarly, the Bacchante likewise 
operate through setting examples as pseudo-warnings for outsiders. Like the proposed 
execution of Euripides at the hands of the assembly, the Bacchante signal Pentheus’s demise 
through the slaughter of cattle, something communicated to Pentheus second-hand through 
apparent exaggeration. Together these representations of secret societies form a sort of 
symbolic cluster: they are secretive groups who nonetheless maintain great structural 
influence and deal in fear, ones that are immensely hostile to outsiders and observers, and 
both herald the ushering in of a new order. While the leap may seem extreme, how different 
is this from the depiction of The Circle in Unfriended: Dark Web at a structural level? Akin 
to The Circle, these two groups only attack those who summon them with their actions, and 
while the assembly and the Bacchante lack the apparent nihilism of The Circle, the fact 
remains that both serve to terrify observers via a sense of uncontrollable influence.  
Furthermore, like Ormsby’s dive into the deep web, Pentheus expects to find awful truths 
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about the Bacchante, discovers that no such thing exists and instead locates something far 
worse than he could imagine. My point here is that if one can take the work of Euripides and 
Aristophanes as an origin point for this narrative construct, then it is difficult not to see the 
same kind of cautionary tale across millennia, all three delivered through the agent of a 
shadow network that aims for direct destabilization. This is of course not to say that either of 
these contemporary works cited the former as influences, or even assume that their creators 
had immediate knowledge thereof.  Instead, I attempt to locate here the source of an audience 
affinity for such narratives, one that preconditions a certain receptiveness towards the 
shadow network concept. 
 The secret societies of Aristophanes and Euripides did not emerge from a bubble, of 
course, as secret societies and mystery cults were very real presences in Ancient Greece 
outside of the purely fictional realm.167 From the Eleusinian Mysteries to Orphic cults, to 
even the mythic secret school of Pythagoras, such organizations amongst many others were 
relatively well-known and thus bled into fictional narration at the time, further complicating 
the development of this narrative strand. Leaping forward several centuries, the same lasting 
impact can be seen in the cultural development of the Illuminati, now posited as an 
organization that secretly controls all global events with surgical precision. A significant 
evolution from the group’s historical origins, as the Bavarian Illuminati started as a counter-
Freemason group desiring to spread Enlightenment ideals.168 This parallel history of secret 
societies – their creations and demises, conflict between rival societies, their economic and 
political functions, etc. – served as fertile ground for aestheticization, a response to the 
                                                             
167 Burkert, Walter.  Ancient Mystery Cults.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987. 
168 Stauffer, Vernon.  New England and the Bavarian Illuminati.  New York: Columbia University Press, 1918. 
  105 
gripping fascination that such organizations could foster in the fictional sphere. The 
Illuminati themselves were a favorite subject of the Gothic movement, for instance, wherein 
they began their mutation into the frightening shadow organization they inhabit as a cultural 
symbol to this day.169 This trend no doubt influenced the work of Balzac, who devoted a 
series of novellas to a fictitious Illuminati-esque organization named “The Thirteen” within 
his vast Comédie Humaine. Making the majority of their appearances in Ferragus, The 
Duchesse de Langeais, and The Girl With the Golden Eyes, Balzac amplifies the particular 
fear associated with secret societies, portraying them as a sinister and eternally unknowable 
group of individuals.  In a preface to this series, he writes: 
  In Paris under the Empire thirteen men came together. They were all struck 
  with the same idea and all endowed with sufficient energy to remain faithful 
  to a single purpose. They were all honest enough to be loyal to one another 
  even when their interests were opposed, and sufficiently versed in guile to  
  conceal the inviolable bonds which united them. They were strong enough to 
  put themselves above all law, bold enough to flinch at no undertaking; lucky 
  enough to have almost always succeeded in their designs, having run the  
  greatest hazards, but remaining silent about their defeats; impervious to fear; 
  and never having trembled before public authority, the public hangman, or 
  even innocence itself.  They all had accepted one another, such as they were, 
  without regard to social prejudice: they were undoubtedly criminals, but  
  undeniably remarkable for certain qualities which go to the making of great 
  men, and they recruited their members only from among men of outstanding 
  quality.170  
The Thirteen are a study in paradoxes: honest yet deceptive, honorable yet criminal, brave 
yet hidden. The group stands in for a sort of Übermensch in gestalt form, possessing the 
ability to alter the tide of society through their indomitable will and inherent superiority only 
once brought together. Subject to second-hand rumor and exaggeration, Balzac’s narrator 
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notes that “Dramas dripping with gore, scenes bristling with terror, novels teeming with 
clandestine decapitations have been confided to [the author’s] ears.”171 It is only due to a 
conscious decision to choose “less violent adventures” that Balzac’s novellas omit such 
direct details for the reader, instead waiting to present them to the public at a later time “as a 
supplement to that of the pirate gangs, those special communities which were so amazingly 
enterprising, so captivating in spite of the crimes they committed.”172 Unlike the associated 
humor or despair associated with Aristophanes’ and Euripides’ groups, Balzac’s Thirteen are 
written for maximum excitement, evidence to a shift in audience reception. The Thirteen are 
violent criminals, later described as “living in society but apart from it, accepting none of its 
principles, recognizing no laws or only submitting to them out of sheer necessity…”173 And 
yet is it not this rogue and rebellious nature that shifts their criminal actions into an appealing 
form?  Operating in the dark, the Thirteen only compound darkness’s association with 
violence and uncontrolled danger, but it is a welcome shift for Balzac’s audience, one that 
taps into the very narrative forces that give the anti-hero such repugnant magnetism.  
Comparing this with the former examples, the Thirteen possess similar structural power in 
terms of destabilization, but their alluring dimension is something else entirely, the very kind 
of morbid curiosity that leads one to search for “the darkest web”, perhaps.   
 I do not bring this connection up flippantly, as I locate the answer to a prior question 
of mine in this shift. When asking why organizations such as the IDW would appropriate 
their name from a network associated with truly repugnant content, I located a potential 
answer here in Balzac’s text. Willfully eschewing the material content of the dark web, the 
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IDW instead latches onto the symbol of the dark shadow society as evolved through Balzac’s 
Thirteen, itself a response to growing numbers of secret societies in Paris at the time. The 
thematic connections between the two are more than apparent, most notably the inverted 
connection between greatness and socially deemed criminality. Through whatever cost, and 
to serve only their own agenda above all, the Thirteen resist society and in their wake change 
it into their vision, and this is precisely the same philosophical focus that engenders the 
existence of a group like the IDW. In choosing “dark web” as part of their name, the IDW 
knowingly acknowledge the dark web’s inscription into this narrative history, at the same 
time fortifying its position and obliquely associating it with Balzac’s salacious allure. As he 
suggests, any associated crimes are frequently forgiven in exchange for captivation, no 
matter the horror of the content attached to the IDW’s name.   
 If one were to acknowledge horror in this literary history, one must consider Kafka’s 
The Trial, in which the Law inhabits a similar position as Balzac’s Thirteen, albeit in a period 
after which they had seized control of society. The Law operates with inscrutable logic, 
seemingly making its decisions at random with no binding sense of jurisprudence or due 
process. Josef K. finds himself subjected to a contorted chain of interrogations, rescheduled 
trials, and uncomfortable interactions with bizarre personages all before finally being 
executed without prior warning. Despite K’s astute conclusions with regards to the scope of 
the “extensive organization”,174 the few that acknowledge his claims as true express the 
futility of any attempts to reason with or overturn the Law’s control. The Law is totally 
unknowable outside of its scope and apparent corruption, resisting easy definition on the part 
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of K and offering few answers.  It is also portrayed as total, leading a painter with whom K 
speaks to state, “Everything belongs to the court.”175   
 Kafka stops short of painting a dystopian control society, however, as K seems to be a 
prisoner drawn into a parallel universe, one in which the Law tints every aspect of his newly 
surveilled existence. There is a recurring motif throughout (one signaled in the first chapter) 
wherein K recognizes his own culpability in the proceedings, but this is not to say that he 
finds himself to blame for his unknowable offense. Instead, K blames himself for having 
acknowledged the Law’s network in the first instance. After agents of the Law arrive at K’s 
door to announce his summons, Kafka writes, “Although [K] realized at once that he 
shouldn’t have spoken aloud, and that by doing so he had, in a sense, acknowledged the 
stranger’s right to oversee his actions.”176 This image of acknowledgment develops across 
the entire narrative, with K given advice at one point to not attract attention in order to 
prolong his life.177 While some writers have plumbed this repeated instance for psychological 
value,178 and others have focused on the mystical/spiritual reflexive qualities thereof,179 it is 
revealing to view it in light of the same thematic lineage established by Euripides in 
Bacchae. Like the Bacchante, the Law operate within their own sphere and resist definition 
by responding aggressively to any direct acknowledgement. To be sure, the Law seek and 
find Josef K. first, but nonetheless K continues to ponder what would have happened that day 
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had he not acknowledged their authority and let them inside, in one instant invariably 
dooming him. It is also as if the Law preys on the weakest members of society that it can 
find, those lacking the resources or knowledge to fight back, only wrapping themselves 
deeper into the Law’s traps with each attempt they make. The aforementioned painter further 
bolsters this claim. He continues, “In the Law, which I’ve never read, mind you, it says of 
course on the one hand that an innocent person is to be acquitted; on the other hand it does 
not say that judges can be influenced. My own experience, however, has been precisely the 
opposite.”180 Setting aside the issue of judge bribery here, the painter implies that interaction 
with the Law essentially translates to guilt on the part of its defendants, and once tainted with 
its touch, the only outcome is a guilty sentence, the only escape an execution. 
 This is the pronounced horror of The Trial, a network that devours its prey and 
pronounces them guilty by association before they can even understand their crimes, an 
effect replicated in part in Kafka’s “In the Penal Colony”. While in the latter story the 
condemned apparently have a moment of transcendent revelation, the moment in which their 
crime becomes tactilely legible through the wounds through which it is written, neither K nor 
the reader are given such a release. It is a predatory secret association rendered more 
fearsome through its baroque and inscrutable organization, no huge leap from The Circle as 
seen in Unfriended once again. As always, there are mitigating historical factors at play, with 
Kafka exhibiting a pronounced acrimony towards bureaucracy and a tangible anxiety with 
regards to the organized discrimination festering within European society at the time. What is 
important is that if these factors did indeed play a part, a matter left to interpretive exercises, 
then that they manifested through such a shadow network as the precise expression of horror.  
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For Euripides, Balzac, and Kafka, to weave fear through an unknowable threat is only half of 
the operant force at play: it is also the unknowable logic of such groups that make the terror 
stick. 
 The final selection I offer is the most obvious connective thread, as much a product of 
its temporal proximity to the internet proper as well as its postmodern leanings. Pynchon’s 
The Crying of Lot 49 chooses as one of its central thematic forces a shadow organization 
named Tristero, a group that quite literally is a secretive and antagonistic communication 
network. While Tristero might lack the unsettling horror of the Law or even the Baccahante, 
Pynchon’s aims appear to be set in a different direction. Commenting less on the threat of 
mechanized bureaucracy or destabilizing forces, the world in which Oedipa Maas lives is one 
already destabilized, a morass of potential connections and discursive signs that resists 
internal consistency. Left to piece together an increasingly baroque mystery by way of an 
unexpected inheritance, Oedipa is sent through a hermeneutic hall of mirrors, finding 
recurrent symbols and parallel histories around every corner, pushed to the fringe of her 
psychiatric well-being as she attempts to give order to a world whose own ontology resists 
order as such. Nonetheless, Oedipa stitches together a convincing trail, and this trail seems to 
gleefully return to the Tristero organization whenever possible. A historical rival to the 
Thurm and Taxis postal system, Tristero employs brutal tactics, up to and including 
assassination, to overtake Thurm and Taxis’ communicative hegemony. It is not until 
viewing a play titled The Courier’s Tragedy that Oedipa (and by extension the reader) 
witnesses a visual rendering of Tristero first-hand.  Pynchon writes, “Suddenly, in lithe and 
terrible silence, with dancers’ grace, three figures, long-limbed, effeminate, dressed in black 
tights, leotards and gloves, black silk hose pulled over their faces, come capering on stage 
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and stop, gazing at him.  Their faces behind the stockings are shadowy and deformed.  They 
wait.  The lights all go out.”181 It is implied that they murder their target following this scene, 
and already one can see the aesthetic connective tissue to the dark web at large.  Tristero are 
effectively shadows, distorted creatures that move in silence and strike with deadly force 
those who they have targeted. Rather than a visible challenge to the dominant communication 
system, they operate through fear and calculated strikes, picking off easy targets and those 
who wander into their paths.   
 Tristero cease such activities (if they were ever more than mere legend even within 
the narrative space of the novel) and transform into a symbol, a simple drawing of a muted 
trumpet, itself a play on stopping the clarion sound of Thurm and Taxis’ trumpet imagery.  
This symbol is used to indicate the locations of the W.A.S.T.E. System, an alternative postal 
system using a variety of receptacles as drop-off points around the nation, if not the world.  
Using a relatively similar system but on alternate routes, W.A.S.T.E. is an overlay network, 
one that utilizes the prior built city delivery infrastructure as a means to attach a parallel 
network to the side. Several characters acknowledge W.A.S.T.E. as an explicitly political 
project, a descendant of prior rebellions towards government consolidation of the U.S. Postal 
Service.182 This has more than chance resemblance to the very same arguments expressed by 
the early innovators of Usenet, Freenet, and eventually Tor, all of whom expressed concerns 
with regards to centralized communication platforms in terms of exploitation and control.  
That Pynchon’s novella presages such developments could be seen as coincidence, but this is 
highly unlikely given the manner in which his work echoes cultural attitudes of the time.  
                                                             
181 Pynchon, Thomas.  The Crying of Lot 49.  New York: Harper Perennial, 1999. 57. 
182 Ibid. 39. 
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Much like the former examples in this small study, The Crying of Lot 49 emerges out of a 
historical moment, one on the precipice of an explosion in communication infrastructures, 
and its concomitant anxiety expresses itself through its signature shadow network as with the 
others. In a thematic development that is perhaps more circumstantial but no less fascinating 
for it, the Tristero symbol finds itself exploded across the narrative in seemingly helter-
skelter fashion, serving to represent a wide variety of hidden societies operating off-grid. In 
the clearest case, Oedipa’s investigation leads her to stumble accidentally upon the Inamorati 
Anonymous, a group of individuals who have forsaken love and appropriated the Tristero 
symbol as their calling card.183 Linking to it in spirit more than direct descendance, the IA 
considers themselves an overlay network of their own kind, gathering in areas commonly 
used to meet potential partners and instead turning it into a private zone of rejection.  In a 
novella positively gorged with secret societies and duplicitous agents (even the Cosa Nostra 
branch of the Italian mafia gets involved184), Pynchon develops a perhaps inadvertently 
prophetic diorama of the very kinds of appropriation the dark web faces today. Emerging 
from political circumstances, the dark web as a symbol is appropriated by groups (most 
explicitly the IDW, but its aesthetic import is widespread) as a means to communicate a 
constellation of affects: danger, rebellion, fear, etc. By the end of the novella, the reader is 
left hanging at the moment Oedipa reaches her final epiphany, but even this revelation is by 
no means guaranteed. Tristero, like the dark web, remains ontologically unknowable in a 
peculiar way: peculiar insofar that while its historical origins, material infrastructure, and 
                                                             
183 Pynchon, Thomas.  The Crying of Lot 49.  New York: Harper Perennial, 1999.  91. 
184 Ibid. 45. 
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mechanisms of action are known, a total image of its content remains acutely difficult to 
articulate with any ease. 
 What then to make of this series of examples? Literature holds no quarter as the 
single domain of objective answers, but it is nigh unimpeachable in its position as a reflective 
agent of cultural timbres and expressive forms. Could it be that long before the dark web as 
we know it today came to exist, history shows a close proximity to “dark webs” throughout?  
Each of these texts portrays secret societies and networks in ways that resonate compellingly 
with the narrative portraits of the contemporary dark web, each operating as overlay 
networks in their own right (symbolically or literally), each serving as a mirrored surface that 
reflects political/cultural anxieties and insurgent thought within their moments. The dark web 
of the 21st century may lend itself to the very narratization as seen in the introductory 
examples of this chapter simply due to the fact that “dark webs” have a traceable narrative 
genealogy in and of themselves. Pinned to the fundamental darkness metaphor of dangerous 
activity, untraceable development, unchecked production, etc., “dark web” perhaps lives a 
double life: that of a material network as seen today, and that of a 
hermeneutic/aesthetic/affective complex, birthed out of an absolute metaphor in the 
Blumenbergian sense, and reified into a conceptual trope in the Nietzschean. Taken as a 
trope, the apparent struggle with which Ormsby and Bartlett hedge their illuminating 
arguments becomes clearer, as they fight not just with contemporary assumptions of the 
network, but a hermeneutic lineage spanning across centuries. While anonymity certainly 
breeds criminal activity, and this can be empirically proven as Ormsby and Bartlett both do, 
one is left to wonder if the cultural predestination of the dark web as a “dark” space serves to 
throttle attempts to rehabilitate and re-appropriate the space for more noble ends, the very 
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efforts made on the part of the Tor Project amongst others. If Tor is correct in saying that the 
criminal activity of the dark web could be more easily accomplished on the surface world (an 
admittedly wobbly claim in light of Ormsby’s observations on “hurtcore”), could it be that 
the dark web refuses to shed both its hermeneutic space and affective force because, as a 
historically contingent space, it just must be so? 
5. Conclusion II – To Shine a Light 
 I must admit that I do not have an easy answer to these questions, as few people do.  
Despite my stated goal to interrogate the implications of the word of “dark” in “dark web”, I 
still must admit that this is no less frustrating, as the dark web proves to be an expertly 
slippery foe in the battle of interpretation. This of course is a matter of method as much as 
goals, as an engagement with such a phenomenon means approaching its material dimension 
as well as its symbolic. Partitioning the two for sake of ease proves just as impossible and 
self-defeating as jamming them together. Despite this difficulty, I see the struggles with 
which the Tor Project, Bartlett, Ormsby, and I approach this topic to be productive, as it at 
minimum resists facile crystallizations of the dark web into horror-movie fodder or 
threatening masks worn by moderately contentious intellectuals. In light of this, I wish to 
conclude this chapter with a very short, curated sample of Hidden Services that I located 
while using Tor on my own. This requires several methodological clarifications up front.  
Firstly, I make no claim that this is a random sample. Indeed, this is a selected sample of 
Hidden Services that I saw as resisting the cultural conception of the dark web, the kind that 
is often mentioned as a theoretical counterpoint but rarely examined closely. Secondly, I will 
not be using screen captures or explicitly identifying information here (except for larger, 
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more “public” services), so much of this will be an act of faith on the part of the reader, only 
guided by my assurances.  Hence, this exercise makes its appearance in a coda of sorts, rather 
than within the bulk of the chapter proper.   
 There are several reasons for this choice: 1. The nature of Hidden Service life cycles 
basically means that one has only a fleeting chance to study sites, as it is in no way 
guaranteed that they will be there the next day for further examination.  2. Holding to the 
spirit of anonymity and secrecy, I feel a certain ethical duty to obscure some of these sites, as 
I believe that exposure would harm the continued existence of some of them, sites whose 
aims I support.  3. I also care about my personal safety, and am not as well connected or 
savvy of a scholar as Bartlett or Ormsby. While these sites remain largely hidden, I, as a 
public academic, am not, and for the sake of perhaps overzealous caution, I would like to 
avoid unwarranted risk. Finally, I cannot overstate the miniscule nature of this sample, and 
would highlight here the explicit impact the nature of the dark web places on any content-
based study thereof. Knowing this difficulty from the start, I decided to do an experimental 
and opposite approach: in the span of only a few days, could I find a series of Hidden 
Services with ease that lend themselves to a counter-reading of the current cultural and 
metaphorical position of the dark web? With the aid of Michel Serres, I believe this to be so. 
 Serres concept of the “parasite” is well-trodden territory by this point, having 
emerged from its earlier obscurity to become a vanguard theory for political and 
communication studies. Steeped in allegorical imagery, The Parasite comes as close to a 
solid definition of its central concept in the introduction, in which Serres describes the 
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parasite as “noise”.185 Noise is both distorting and productive within this schema, an 
insurgent force that interrupts relations and injects its own influence into situational 
dynamics. The larger system onto which this noise attaches is comparable to a host, while the 
noise itself is a parasite, feeding off of the host’s situational power and growing in turn.  
Drawing equally from communication theory as much as poststructural philosophy, Serres 
claims “There is no system without parasites. This constant is a law.”186 Further, this 
parasitic relationship creates new power relations and in turn opens itself up for further 
parasitism, thus position noise as an essentially generative aspect of communicative and 
organizational relationships. Serres writes, “The parasite invents something new.  He obtains 
energy and pays for it in information.”187 Where Serres goes great lengths to illustrate his 
concept via a variety of examples both practical and literary, the easiest illustration of his 
concept is that of a grassroots revolution. Revolutionary actions and groups emerge from 
within a larger governmental structure (i.e. the host) and draw from its resources and 
infrastructure as a way to organize and gain force. Using this “energy” to grow in size, the 
revolutionary group gains prominence, and if not eradicated, is able to forcefully establish a 
relationship with its host that positions it as an alternative structure. This draws focus and 
centrality to the revolutionary body, which if left unchecked, can overturn the host and 
assume dominance. Now itself a larger focus, what once was simple “noise” has entered into 
a more dominant position, and thus is susceptible to being “parasited” by a new element of 
noise.   
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 Serres does not limit himself to macro-scale power relations such as this, instead 
claiming that all systems and relationships have elements of parasitism at their organizational 
core. Noise engenders change, and it is the most critical cog in the machinery of progress.  
Even a computer virus or a DDoS attack, malignant in goal but productive for innovation, 
serve in the same manner. To this end, darknets can be seen as parasitic in similar fashion, an 
approach taken by Robert Gehl and Fenwick McKelvey in their article on the subject.188  To 
summarize, Gehl and Fenwick establish a difference between “infrastructure” and 
“platform”, claiming that infrastructures hold affinity with public interactions while 
platforms are privatized spheres.189 Darknets, such as Tor, act as parasites on the general 
public internet infrastructure to create alternative, privatized platforms for anonymous 
browsing and communication.190 This relationship is further reversed and doubled, as the 
writers claim that darknets also parasite private platforms such as personal computers as a 
means to establish their own functionality, i.e. through using chains of personal computers as 
relay stations in the case of Tor.191 Acting as conceptual relays in this sense, darknets serve 
as noise that distorts the common binaries between public and private, infrastructure and 
platform and in turn produce hybrid media spheres that open new productive potentials. 
 This is a stirring application of Serres thought to the darknet phenomenon, and it is 
one within which I hold personal affinity. It does not, however, engage with the content of 
the dark web, likely on account of the difficulties I mentioned prior, coupled with a 
difference in aims. I would like to consider the dark web through Serres lens on these 
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grounds, though, and think here of the space as a kind of parasitic nurturing ground, one that 
resists the exclusively noxious image the dark web has assumed. Aligning with the Tor 
Project, I see in tandem with criminality productive noise and alternative networks that allow 
for disruptive potential, the kind of which strikes against centralized power both minor and 
totalitarian. Ironically, a select few of my examples do fall under the purview of criminal 
activity, opening up an extended debate that I welcome rather than offer solid answers 
instead. What is here is a survey and reprise rather than a focused analysis, a coda in the 
truest sense. 
 After settling on a Hidden Wiki, I began to explore links, eschewing obviously 
criminal and pornographic ones in lieu of apparently benign or beguiling links. Many of 
these were in Russian, putting my linguistic skills to the test prior to direct engagement.  I 
first found a book repository run by a Russian school teacher, one who claimed to love 
reading and books and who felt that literature should be a free gift to the world. They had 
posted all of the books that they could from their collection, scanned and available for 
download to peruse at will. Certainly this would fall under the view of copyright 
infringement, criminal activity to be sure, but one that finds itself still debated in terms of the 
Enlightenment ideal of free information. I located an English language site that had on it the 
translated works of Marx and Engels in total, every word that they had ever published. The 
site host wrote that they felt these writings were of the highest importance, so much so that 
there must remain at least one bastion where they cannot be easily found, and thus removed, 
waiting to be read by future generations. I stumbled upon a Russian language forum that had 
in its main directory a criminal advice forum set directly below a tech advice forum, one of 
several technology and media-based forums that I discovered. The latter of which was not 
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coded language for hacking or seditious activity, but rather was filled with questions for the 
best graphics cards and processors. The former, while bedecked with questions regarding 
identity theft contained a single thread on how to get revenge on a bellicose neighbor.  The 
first response involved defecating on his steps. 
 I once again make no claim or argument towards the objectivity of this select group: I 
admit absolute bias in terms of for what I was looking.  But it is so seldom that one hears 
about such sites in popular depictions of the dark web, ones that seem to hold the aims of 
illumination over shrouded criminality. These sites cannot and will never eclipse the damage 
of the child pornographic trade, for instance, but they still stand out as hopeful beacons, from 
the renegade teacher trying to get people to read to the “last guardian of Marxism”.  In 
attempts to generate education, these sites serve as quiet bits of noise, drawing into the 
shadows in an attempt for disruptive enlightenment. Consider The Torist, created in part by 
Robert Gehl himself along with an anonymous co-creator, a dark web only literary journal 
that was created “to throw a spanner in the works of various attempts to smear anonymity as 
being only desirable for evil people”, a direct quote from the anonymous founder.192 Itself a 
parasite, The Torist latches onto a representative system, that of such negative assumptions, 
and attempts to create a new paradigm through its disruptive faculties. This political 
undertone is rendered explicit in certain cases, wherein entire nations experienced surges in 
dark web use following communication platform shut downs on the part of authoritarian 
governments. China’s reputation for internet control/censorship precedes it, and as such there 
is little surprise that both VPN and Tor use has been on the rise for Chinese national citizens.  
Despite holding a smaller presence on the dark web, trade and social forums exist 
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nonetheless, one such forum announcing itself as “a free Chinese internet world, [in which] 
you can speak whatever is on your mind.”193 Four years since its inception, the likelihood of 
this particular forum still standing is unlikely, but it nonetheless served as a herald for a new 
discursive universe, one that attempted to establish free dialogue under a system that 
restricted it at the core. Similarly, the Russian government’s continued assault on the popular 
messaging platform Telegram has pushed many citizens to using VPN’s (themselves the 
subject of legal scrutiny) and dark web use as a means to uphold free communication.194 The 
dark web does host reprehensible content in part, but as Gehl and his associate argue, evil is 
by no means the sole possessor of evil.  It has just as much to offer to those who seek even 
having such debates in the first place within the political ecology. 
 The point here is that for as slim as this sample may be, these sites and phenomena 
exist nonetheless, something the thick metaphor of darkness as applied to the dark web 
smothers with ease. While researching, I encountered several claims to the existence of 
forums for queer youth to talk with each other in countries that have seemed their existence 
punishable by imprisonment if not worse. I tried to find such forums to the best of my ability, 
and came up with nothing for my efforts. This led to a mix of feelings, on one hand 
disappointment for my lack of results, but on the other a sense of hope that they just may be 
that well-hidden rather than nonexistent. I wonder what could have been had I found the 
ability to find such places protected in the reaches of the dark web, if even that kind of 
secured connection could have changed my relationship to the world and myself. I will never 
know this with certainty, but like Gehl and the Tor Project, that productive potential has left 
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an unshakeable impression on me in terms of my relationship to such anonymity networks.  I 
cannot tolerate the existence of the depravity such as what Ormsby discovered in the final 
instance of her book, but I nonetheless find myself wishing to “parasite” the dark metaphor in 
the way that The Torist does, amongst other similar sites. If absolute metaphor and its 
development into conceptual complexes can be seen as a historical system, one that bridges a 
vast literary history of which my prior sample only scratches the surface, then it becomes the 
job of those small bits of noise to disrupt the chain and allow for a new space to rise.  
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Chapter 2: Unseen Spaces: Light Maps and Cartographic Narrativity 
 As the political conflict between North Korea and the United States waxed and waned 
across the 2010’s, media outlets spent great effort in demystify the country’s nature, 
attempting to find some sort of singular expression of the famously veiled North Korean 
experience.  This approach is another instance of a pattern: the rhetoric of conflict tends to 
reduce the opponent into reductive components, and this strategy is arguably one of the most 
potent propaganda techniques for the symbolic construction of an “other”. One need only 
think of grotesque iconography of World War II posters on the part of both the Allied and 
Axis powers, with enemies reduced to stylized composites of menacing grimaces and 
phenotypic stereotypes: 
195       196 
Of course, propaganda posters are by their very nature extreme, frequently relying on 
targeted blasts of racism so as to trigger deep-seated resentment within the viewer.  
Commonly emblazoned with ethical edicts, such as commands to buy war bonds or raise 
                                                             
195 “General Motors Poster”.  “World War II Propaganda”, Wells.  
http://www.ericrettberg.com/wells/omeka/items/show/97  
196 “Der Ewige Jude Poster”.  Holocaust Education & Archive Research Team.  
http://www.holocaustresearchproject.org/holoprelude/derewigejude.html 
Fig. 1 & 2: Examples of 
American and German 
propaganda from the WWII 
period.  The German poster 
is an advertisement for the 
film The Eternal Jew, a 
notoriously racist 
propaganda piece screened 
in Nazi Germany.  The text 
at the bottom indicates the 
starting date and time for 
the film’s screening in 
Vienna, advertised as a 
“great political showing”. 
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one’s children to love their homeland, these images act as pedagogical or conditioning tools 
as much as they work to inspire fear and loathing in the populace.  Frederic Jameson wrote, 
“…all ethics lives by exclusion and predicates certain types of Otherness or evil…”197.  
These stereotypical images served as referents against which their target audience could 
model their behavior in contrast, conditioning themselves to fight the enemy in spirit if they 
could not be present on the frontlines.  And while the history and continued impact of 
propaganda is an endlessly rich field of inquiry,  I principally introduce these to lead up to 
the following final point on the matter: when examining drawn or painted propaganda, one 
must always be aware of their design, how each exaggerated feature and word is planned and 
created for maximum impact. 
 Of course, graphic propaganda need not always depict the evil other in their content.  
Far from it, the medium is bedecked with positive nationalist imagery, equally as 
exaggerated in tone but instead in the service of an untouchable ideal.  Considering the 
following examples from North Korea itself: 
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 198 199 
 
Rather than the enemy, the perfected citizen takes center stage in these posters: they are a 
study in extremes, welcoming and fearsome, assured and resolved. The left-hand poster 
points to a utopian vision of economic bounty, once again with an ethical invitation to work 
for a better future. The right-hand does contain a reference to the enemy, but it is in an 
abstracted form, rendered as a flag torn to shreds in the hands of an average North Korean 
citizen. Like enemy focused posters, these ones likewise express a conditioned political 
consciousness, and they also function a mimetic engine through which citizens can model 
themselves. Instead of standing against a menacing “other”, these idealized citizens work for 
the unity of the nation and the fulfillment of its goals. I wish to draw attention, though, to the 
left-hand image in particular, as it serves as a forceful example of a propagandist paradigm: 
the idealized space. This particular representation of national space appears with relative 
ubiquity across the breadth of propaganda styles. Whether it is the Heimat of Nazi wartime 
                                                             
198 Artist Unknown. “Propaganda Poster”.  https://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2017/aug/20/north-
koreas-propaganda-art-in-pictures .  
199 Artist Unknown.  “Agriculture Poster”.  The University of Hong Kong.  
https://www.cnn.com/style/article/north-korea-propaganda-posters-design/index.html .  
Fig. 3 & 4: North Korean propaganda posters.  The poster on the left reads: “Repel the 
American invader!”  On the right: “Let us achieve the party’s agriculture revolution 
policy thoroughly and brighten the year with increased grain production.” 
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posters, the fertile farmlands depicted on Soviet posters (similar to the North Korean example 
above), or even the American Heartland serving as the backdrop for a Chevrolet truck 
advertisement, the ideal spaces of propaganda not only frame the political content but 
condition it in the first instance. In representing the idealized homeland or nation, such 
images project not only a cultural consciousness, but also serve as productive configurations, 
in the sense that they actively transform and produce hermeneutic relationships between a 
physical space and conceptual representations thereof. Thus, the ideal space projects not only 
a future goal or ideal realization, but also potentially has a transformative effect on the 
relationship between viewers and the space in which they stand, inhabit, move, or observe 
from distance. In the aforementioned North Korean example, the poster depicts a utopian 
possibility of a bountiful farmland while reflecting it as something of the present, a 
reconfigured lens through which one can view the land’s potential as an extant reality.   
 The pressing question, then, is whether or not this productive capacity of spatial 
representations is unique to ideologically charged illustrations such as these, or if any 
graphical representation of space is in and of itself an ideological engine. A plentitude of 
scholarship from spatial studies, geography, and cultural studies, amongst others, asserts that 
the latter is inarguably true. While this chapter will unpack a selection of these claims with 
more detail in due time, I raise this point here to frame the following image, one that will 
serve as a gateway for this chapter at large:       
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This is a satellite image of the Korean peninsula taken from space by the Nasa Johnson Space 
Center, originally published in a National Geographic article,201  and it was taken in time 
lapse as a means to highlight the amount of light-pollution emitted from the East Asian 
territories. Visible in this picture are North Korea, South Korea, and China. Justified in the 
lower right-hand corner of the image is South Korea, with the city of Seoul easily identifiable 
near the top most border due to its blinding illumination in contrast with the rest of the 
country. In the upper-left of the image is China, itself similarly awash in lights, distributed 
relatively evenly across the country like a nervous system, save the slightly darker portions 
                                                             
200 Byford, Sam.  “North Korea defends blackout satellite photos: ‘the essence of society is not on flashy 
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201 Stone, Daniel.  “New Space Station Photos Show North Korea at Night, Cloaked in Darkness.”  National 
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Fig. 5: Nighttime satellite photograph of East Asia, 
taken by the Nasa Johnson Space Center in 2014 
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near the North Korean border. North Korea is in turn easily identifiable via negation, the jet-
black space lying between the two aforementioned countries, with only a small point of light 
representing Pyongyang, along with a few tiny glimmers surrounding it. Nearly 
indistinguishable from the surrounding bodies of water, namely the Sea of Japan and the 
Yellow Sea, North Korea’s phantom representation in this picture sparked fascination and 
discussion on the global stage, taken to stand as an undeniably potent metaphor for the vast 
economic gulf between North and South Korea. In 2017, Stephanie Pappas of Live Science 
claimed that “if any image can tell the story of North and South Korea in one frame…”202 
that it was this picture, only for this statement to reach even greater audiences after being 
reposted by CBS News203. However, three years earlier in 2014, the Guardian saw progress 
in the photo, noting that there was a noticeable increases in small clusters of lights, indicating 
economic growth204. In the article of its original publication, Daniel Stone writes: 
  The North Korean government has refused offers of food and energy aid in 
  exchange for a commitment to curtailing its nuclear energy ambitions.  
  International inspectors have been denied entry, which has resulted in  
  increasingly harsh sanctions led in large part by the United States and South 
  Korea. China remains the staunchest of the north’s few allies.  In her 2009  
  book Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea, Barbara Demick  
  described the effect darkness has on culture. Streets become too dark for  
  people to walk, limiting social interactions outside of daytime work hours. No 
  one can watch TV or consume the limited amounts of media allowed by the 
  government.205 
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Stone’s observations are indeed historically accurate in terms of assigning the causal chain 
that led to North Korea’s habitual darkness, and Demick’s analytic link between darkness 
and stymied cultural development is compelling in and of itself, especially given the 
philosophical aims of this project as a whole. These I set aside for the time being, if only to 
retain focus on the manner in which this photo is used as an explanatory punctuation mark on 
the discussion, either as inarguable evidence of North Korea’s great loss in the struggle for 
cultural development or, more rarely, a sign of hope. The major takeaway here is that this 
single photo is used generatively to continue the development of the “North Korean 
Narrative”, and it is used metonymically. I am less interested in the verifiability of such 
claims than the indexical and narrative force of the satellite image, as I see in it the very kind 
of representational function found in propaganda images. Consider it an unideal space, a 
spatial representation that captures all too exactly the unflattering reality of the territory,  
challenging and eroding the exaggerated representations of propaganda and promotional 
imagery. Against the radiant images of fertile farmland, beatific mountain ranges, and 
glowing citizens stands this photographic image of the country, as if it has torn down the 
curtain hiding the background machinery. Further, as a photograph, it possesses an assumed 
“truth quality” that lends it a tone of objectivity comparatively absent in propaganda 
illustrations, depending on one’s flexibility of the term “truth”, of course. 
 But is this entirely the case? Does this photograph of North Korea simply lay the facts 
on the table and speak for itself, bypassing any need for interpretive work beyond what it so 
obviously shows? I intend to make no naïve claims here as to the economic and social perils 
of North Korean society here. To be sure, the country’s dictatorship has led to real and 
  129 
terrible consequences on the country’s citizens. Instead, I consider this satellite image as 
something more than a purely neutral piece of photographic evidence, as if it had no inherent 
narrative power. Rather, this image, amongst others of its kind, are deployed with potent 
narrative force with regard to the constitution of national identities, and this applies just as 
just as much to those looking into said nations from the outside. Whether or not the image is 
designed in the sense of a propaganda poster, or designed via the detached placement of a 
camera, such images still play a role in the cognitive production of space via narrative 
representations. One need not look far at all from this example to find this process in action.  
Consider an article by Zack Beauchamp written for Vox, titled “40 maps that explain North 
Korea”. One could frankly stop right there and the point would make itself, but in good faith 
I cite the following: 
  What follows is an attempt, using a lot of maps (and, yes, a few charts), to  
  provide some clarity and context to help better understand both [North Korea] 
  and the conflict. We’ll explore where the North Korean regime came from, 
  how much of a threat it really poses to the United States and its allies, and  
  what life is like in the most totalitarian regime on earth [sic].206 
 
Beauchamp’s article deploys forty charts and maps total, each followed by a small 
explanatory caption as a means to provide context and extrapolate the image’s significance 
for the reader. Historical territory maps, satellite imagery of prison camps, United States 
troop deployment, and refugee paths of escape, amongst several others, are lined up in 
sequence as a means to offer a visual tableau of representational spaces, all coalescing into a 
patchwork narrative portrait of the country across a variety of social, political, and spatial 
strata.  And since no such list would be complete without it, a satellite photograph of the 
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country’s lack of illumination appears tenth in the list, assuming a relatively high priority 
regardless of intended arrangement.  
207 
Titled “The North cannot keep the lights on – literally”, I quote the following explanatory 
note in full: 
  There’s no more dramatic demonstration of North Korea’s deprivation than 
  this map of light emission at night, based on satellite photos NASA captured 
  in 2012. Light emission can be used as proxy for wealth [emphasis added], as 
  wealthier countries have access to better lighting technology and electrical 
  grids. South Korea, as you can see, is lit up – as are Japan and China. North 
  Korea is almost entirely black, except for a small dot of light on the capital 
  city of Pyongyang. It’s an astonishing demonstration of just how poor North 
  Korea is relative to its neighbors.208 
Again, I do not explicitly deny any of Beauchamp’s claims here regarding the material 
import of this picture. More specifically, I do not challenge the claim that the relative 
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darkness of North Korea in this photograph is in fact an accurate indicator of its economic 
status, as there is absolute, empirical merit here. North Korea does face particularly grave 
obstacles in terms of resource availability and economic inequality.   
 However, any empirical and material reality aside, such maps and images convey the 
ideological image of an unideal space nonetheless, and it is this point that must be 
remembered when considering these photographs within the overarching cultural history of 
discussing “dark territories”, from the netherworld spaces of Antiquity, to the “dark 
continents” of the colonial period, and even a satellite image of a darkened country. What 
remains to be said is that at a structural level, maps themselves capture the power relations of 
a given cultural context that not only extend beyond the material reality that they attempt to 
capture, but also directly condition the manner through which such reality is constructed.  
This is a point argued by Bernard Siegert in his article “The map is the territory”, itself 
inspired by William Boelhower’s work on the correlation between mapmaking and the 
formation of meaning, a process to which he refers as “cartographic semiotics”209. Siegert  
develops his argument as a critical response to Alfred Korzybski’s assertion that maps simply 
serve as secondary referent for “an objective ‘reality’ that is prior to all mental 
representations or written marks…”210 It is through this narrative function that one can make 
the conceptual pass from a selection of maps that show North Korea (or any territory for that 
matter), to a selection that explains it. As Siegert develops his argument, he refers to his 
method of analyzing maps as one of “cultural technologies” rather than cultural studies, 
stating that “it considers maps not as representations of space but as spaces of 
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representation.”211 A slightly opaque claim, but no less powerful for it, Siegert’s idea of a 
map as a space of representation acutely identifies the narrative agency of maps insofar that 
they both capture the given power relations of a historical context and further engender them 
at the same time. In other words, maps have a direct and creative effect on the manner 
through which one understands and conceptualizes given spaces. As he elaborates, “The 
marks and signs on a map do not refer to an authorial subject but to epistemic orders and 
their struggles for dominance over other epistemic orders.”212 Beauchamp’s analyses are less 
important in this light than the epistemic order through which his analyses are conditioned, as 
the latter represents the narrative byline he uses to construct his spatial portrait. 
 Consider, for instance, Beauchamp’s claim in emphasis, that light emission is a direct 
correlate to wealth and, in turn, national health and wellness. It is hard to argue against his 
point having been born into and raised within the epistemic order of a capitalist country, a 
culture in which resource accrual and maintenance correlates to overall well-being. In fact, it 
is difficult to think of any economic configuration in which this were not to be the case, 
wherein resources are not in fact associated with the ability to maintain the overall well-being 
of the nation, the state, and its citizens. I bring this up in light of the fact that North Korea, in 
particular, is certainly not a capitalist state by its own design, instead practicing a particularly 
hardline form of communism, and it patently refuses to budge from the mid-20th century 
boom of communist/socialist practices on the world stage. Even within the epistemic 
framework of communism, resource distribution is paramount to national health, perhaps 
even more dramatically given the importance of government regulation to the configuration.  
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Nevertheless, when the NASA photo of North Korea used by National Geographic reached 
the attention of the North Korean political body, the response was voluminous and 
excoriating, as often tends to be the case. Of particular interest, however, are two comments 
regarding the symbolic function of illumination, ones that Alistair Gale likewise isolated in 
his Wall Street Journal article titled “North Korea Downplays Lack of ‘Flashy Lights’”.  
Gale quotes Pyongyang’s response as the following: “They [North Korea’s detractors] clap 
their hands and get loud over a satellite picture of our city with not much light, but the 
essence of society is not on flashy lights. [my emphasis added]”213 While this claim certainly 
falls in line with the propagandist language so heavily associated with the North Korean 
government, and while it could  seem naïve given that Kim Jong Un promised his country 
that he would work to restore electricity around the same time (something Gale likewise 
notes), it would seem as if Siegert’s idea of clashing epistemic orders is abundantly clear in 
this moment. Health versus essence: what role does light play in the game of visual and 
narrative representation here?   
 It is frankly a philosophical question far beyond the limits of what this chapter could 
afford, but it is a crucial point nonetheless. On one hand, NASA’s image does serve to 
passively represent the space of North Korea from afar, but when interpretation naturally 
enters the playing field, it transfers into a space of representation as a matter of course. My 
interest lies here, wherein maps serve as the space for narrative construction, and the manner 
in which this act of construction gives way to spatial narratives. The selection of these 
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particular photos within the scope of this project as a whole is also not arbitrary. Consider in 
this case the second line of note in Gale’s article, in which Kim Jong Un writes, “An old 
superpower that is meeting its sunset may put up a face of arrogance but it can’t avoid its 
dark fate.”214 Ignoring Un’s paradoxical notion, that on one hand light does not indicate a 
failing society while on the other a failing society is characterized by darkness, it is the 
familiar deployment of darkness as a narrative trope that captures my attention here.  
Darkness once again extends beyond the empirical, moving from an indication of failing 
infrastructure to something metaphorical: it is decay or destruction in general. Ethical and 
even potentially moral in scope, this consideration of darkness is likewise no stranger to the 
history of cartography, having been used to damning effect in the colonial illustrations of 
Africa as a “dark continent”, something that certainly conditioned and engendered Western 
conceptualizations of African reality to this very moment.   
 For the remainder of this chapter, I will explore a selection of theoretical positions 
concerning spatial narratives that all work in tandem with Siegert’s concept of maps as 
epistemic representation, and through this will consider the manner in which darkness has 
been wielded as a means to characterize territories (namely the darkened North Korea and 
Africa’s history as being a “dark continent”) as zones of unknowable danger or social 
deficiency. There are of course considerations to be made with regards to the colonial and 
political processes that led directly to the creation of the North Korean state prior to the 
humanitarian disaster its citizens face under the control of its current government and the 
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conceptual configuration of “Dark Africa” is of a markedly different material order than the 
sparse electrical grid of North Korea, or any “dark spot” on the global map for that matter.  
But the reception of and narrative response to such areas holds shape across these material 
conditions, and as such finds a home in this project as a whole. Boelhower sums this point up 
elegantly when he writes the following about maps: “But there will always be blank spaces, 
the virtual space of the menacing image, lurking in the map’s interstices.”215 
 The work of Immanuel Wallerstein, who together with Fernand Braudel helped 
develop world-systems theory with regard to the concept of core and peripheral territories, 
may serve as a foundation here. In short, Wallerstein and Braudel argued that global core 
regions benefit the most from global capitalism and industrialization, operating as centers for 
development and technologies that lead to empires and self-sufficiency. On the opposite end 
of the spectrum, peripheral regions rely on core regions for resources and their own 
development, leading the former to colloquially seen as trailing behind core regions and 
existing quite literally on the periphery. Hand in hand with this reliance is an exploitation of 
peripheral regions by core regions, the latter of whom establish unequal labor and trade 
relationships as a means to bolster their own dominant economies. In between, peripheral 
regions in a state of transition to industrial self-sufficiency or core regions in decline 
represent the amorphous semi-periphery, characterized by either growing or lessening 
instability and a difficulty in pinpointing their position in terms of global impact.216 Under 
Wallerstein’s definition, a country like contemporary North Korea poses certain challenges in 
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its definition: while its self-sufficiency and aims superficially bespeak a semi-peripheral 
region, its failed infrastructure and reliance on imports almost certainly indicate it as a 
peripheral territory.   
 But while this system remains useful in terms of such diagnostic work, it stops short 
of considering the impact of such visual materials as cartography and satellite imagery in 
terms of the cultural reception and development of said images, namely in the way that they 
reinforce or engender colloquial assumptions about the status of their subjects.  In other 
words, the narrative aspect of such applications remains a blind spot for Wallerstein’s early 
world-systems theory, and it is something directly picked up by the work of Étienne Balibar 
in his dialogic work with Wallerstein himself. In his essay “The Nation Form: History and 
Ideology”, Balibar considers the development of national status to be a narrative function, 
one “always already presented to us in the form of a narrative which attributes to [nations] 
the continuity of a subject.”217 As the subject of a narrative, Balibar argues that nations fall 
prey to the false myth of continuous national progression, wherein nations as subjects are 
grafted into the concept of an inherent destiny that obscures the multifarious historical 
processes at play in the development of the term “nation” itself. Refusing to accept that 
“nation” can be extrapolated from mere capitalist relations alone, Balibar aligns with 
Wallerstein and Braudel in their claim that the division of core and periphery predates even 
capitalism, having been set in place through earlier economic configurations and productive 
of not only national formations but competing organizational structures.218 Where Balibar 
stands apart, and in turn presents him as instrumental to this analysis, is his argument 
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concerning what he calls the “nationalization of society”, namely the process through which 
said competing structured eventually relented in their resistance and formed into comparable 
national structures. He argues that the dominant cultural narrative of a national “destiny” 
lends itself to the assumption that certain areas undergo “delayed nationalization”, meaning 
that they simply form into comparable structures at a later historical moment that prior 
regions, more often than not those in the core.219 The idea of a competing structure lagging 
behind in the cultural consciousness not only takes into account the reception of North 
Korea’s emissive darkness, but also older narrative tropes such as Africa existing as a “dark 
continent” prior to colonialization and detailed cartographic efforts.   
 Balibar offers his most stirring claim shortly thereafter, stating:  
  Every social community reproduced by the functioning of institutions is  
  imaginary, that is to say, it is based on the projection of individual existence 
  into the weft of a collective narrative, on the recognition of a common name 
  and on traditions lived as the trace of an immemorial past (even when they 
  have been fabricated and inculcated in the recent past.). But this comes down 
  to accepting that, under certain conditions, only imaginary communities are 
  real.220 
If Balibar’s claim is so, all nations find themselves woven into the collective narrative of 
national development, and as such their entire existence is predicated on narrative artifice.  
He is apt to note that, similar to Siegert’s definition of maps, this virtual origin does not 
preclude real existence, insofar that these narratives have a direct and tactile impact on the 
manner through which such nations are received and experienced in the collective 
consciousness. Balibar argues that the focal subject of this cultural imaginary is that of the 
“people” that constitute a nation, and while this may be so, I argue that the introduction of 
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the cartographic narrative imaginary into this schema reveals a sense of spatial characteristic 
that, while working hand in hand with the image of the “people”, maintains a pseudo-
autonomy of its own.  In other words, while the narrative associated with spaces works 
synergistically with the image of their inhabitants, this does not mean that they necessarily 
evolve or change in tandem. As a direct example of this, the spatial narrative of Afirca as a 
“Dark Continent” can draw force from different circumstances: what once was an association 
with violent danger is now in part one of resource depletion. Furthermore, if the development 
of national narratives is a matter of being woven into an already existing collective narrative, 
then the application of and reception to the tangible darkness of North Korea and figurative 
darkness of pre-colonial Africa draw force from the very same conceptual framework as 
discussed prior. 
 To develop this idea more precisely, I turn to the critical spatial work of Edward Soja, 
who serves as a bridge between the narrative-based theory of Balibar and the more concrete 
spatial dimensions at play when considering cartography proper. To his great credit, Soja 
spares little time in announcing his critical aims in his book Postmodern Geographies: The 
Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory. He remarks, “We must be insistently aware 
of how space can be made to hide consequences from us, how relations of power and 
discipline are inscribed into the apparently innocent spatiality of social life, how human 
geographies become filled with politics and ideology.”221 As Balibar posits in terms of 
existing national narratives, space and spatiality is charged with historical ideology while at 
one and the same time possesses the ability to obscure this very ideological stratum. As with 
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the collective narrative of national development, the distribution of bodies, buildings, 
borders, etc. in space reflect configurations of power and (more often than not) capitalist 
arrangements that serve to administrate the efficiency of the state. Soja himself would likely 
immediately target my earlier acknowledgement that I too consider the darkness of North 
Korea to be an indication of poor infrastructural health, as this very cultural assumption is a 
conditioned one, brought forth by the normative spatiality in which I have been raised. At the 
very least, such a claim would be slightly ignorant of the power relations through which such 
spatial arrangements have been wrought.   
 Nevertheless, Soja offers a history of the transition from standard geography, to 
critical/Marxist geography, and finally critical spatial studies. It is within this development 
that one can see a budding acknowledgement of the impact of cartography in the very 
development of not only spatial understandings, but also the very national narratives Balibar 
finds amongst the collective. Soja, for his part, approaches with a similar concept as 
Balibar’s “delayed nationalization” in that he subscribes to the idea of unequal 
modernization, claiming, “Modernization is, like all social processes, unevenly developed 
across time and space and thus inscribes quite different social geographies across different 
regional social formations.”222 This temporal incongruity of modernization would seemingly 
play a strong hand in the development of delayed national narratives, and these could easily 
be reinforced through applications of new visual and graphic technologies, for instance. I 
make the conceptual jump to cartography here, as it is not long before Soja targets the 
culpability of older geographic disciplines in the calcification of such narratives in the 
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collective consciousness. When discussing Modern Geography (meaning that of the early 
20th century), he argues the following: 
  …Modern Geography was reduced primarily to the accumulation,   
  classification, and theoretically innocent representation of factual material  
  describing the areal differentiation of the Earth’s surface – to the study of  
  outcomes, the end products of dynamic processes best understood by others.  
  Geography thus also treated space as the domain of the dead, the fixed, the 
  undialectical, the immobile – a world of passivity and measurement rather  
  than action or meaning.  Accurate packages of such geographic information 
  continued to be of use to the state, in the East and West, for military  
  intelligence, economic planning, and imperial administration.223  
It is a withering description of early 20th century geography to be sure, but apt as well, as 
Soja notes that in its purported neutrality, Modern Geography lent itself wholly to the 
administration of power and territorial rearrangement. As he puts it, in defining itself as 
concerning only the after-effects of action, Modern Geography blinded itself to its own direct 
effects in the actualization of such actions, akin to Siegert’s maps directly shaping the 
perception of spatial reality. And while Balibar’s insight into the multifarious sources of 
collective national narratives is rich in insight, it is cartography that approaches the center 
stage here, as the map holds force as the central tool of geographic utility and a locus for 
such power relations in the first instance. Soja even notes that during the development of 
Marxist Geography, the first of several critical developments along the route to his own 
discipline, the idea of “cognitive or ‘mental maps’”224 became an object of inquiry, as these 
were taken to offer direct insight into the manner through which subjects understood space in 
accordance with the social and power relations in which they operate.   
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 I will stop here in recounting Soja’s thought save one more instance, as this chapter 
focuses on an object far narrower in scope than his broader theoretical stakes. Instead, I 
simply want to demonstrate the way in which the relationship between nation, narrative, 
maps, and metaphor is approached in an admittedly small selection of largely prominent 
voices on the matter. But before departing to the discussion of cartography and narrative 
proper, I return once again to Soja’s discussion of modernization as a means to draw all 
together with a demonstrative example. He notes that one of the major forces that leads to 
uneven modernization are periods wherein it intensifies greatly for certain regions and not 
others, for a variety of social, economic, and serendipitous circumstances. Citing Marshall 
Berman, Soja notes that one of the most critical factors leading to such a phenomenon is the 
proliferation of mass communication systems on both a national and global scale. This 
development is nearly matched in importance by social upheaval, furious expansion of urban 
growth, and massive upticks in the tempo of modern life by way of technology, amongst 
others. He sees Berman’s catalogue as evidence of the “destructive creativity so closely 
associated with both the modernization and survival of capitalism over the past two 
centuries,”225 and while this provokes a discussion that the space of this chapter can little 
afford, I wish to focus on the mentioning of global communication expansion. What follows 
are three maps, one a global light emission photograph akin to the former of North Korea, 
one a distribution of global industrial control systems, and one a graphical representation of 
global flight connections. The light emission map comes from the Helmholtz Association of 
German Research Centers, using it to advertise a light-pollution visualization map created by 
the GFZ German Research Centre for Geosciences in Potsdam. The industrial control image 
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comes courtesy of Shodan, a search engine that specializes in search the Internet of Things, 
or any internet connected device outside of a computer that cannot be traditionally searched 
via Google. The flight connection map is a tech demo for the data visualization program 
AirFlow Pro by Esri, and it updates in real time to display every known flight path at that 
given moment. 
226 
227 
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Fig. 8: Graphic representation of the distribution of internet accessible industrial 
control systems across the globe, courtesy of Shodan. Industrial control systems are a 
variety of technologies that operate larger industrial processes and objectives. 
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228 
All three of these maps represent the distribution of functionally related technological 
development, that being of light, communication, and transportation. And if one were to ever 
question Soja and Berman’s ideas of delayed modernization as accurate, these three maps 
stand as forceful evidence to their claim. With few variations, these three maps illuminate 
roughly the exact same regions with nearly the exact same intensity of each other, and as 
such can be taken as maps of modernization itself, to a certain degree.  There are, of course, 
several mitigating factors to consider when considering the dark areas on these maps.  For 
one, certain areas lack development due to the relative impossibility of development.  It 
should be taken as a positive sign that the Amazon rainforest region and Australian Outback 
remain relatively free of industrial urbanization, and the lack of light across the Siberian 
region speaks for itself. 
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 But it is perhaps the spaces that do not surprise, the blinding radiance of Europe 
hovering over the comparative paucity of light across the entire African continent that draw 
Wallerstein, Siegert, Balibar, and Soja together into conversation. If these are maps of 
effects, namely the effects of urban modernization, is it possible that on an almost sub-
cognitive level that maps such as these reinforce the very collective cultural narratives that 
led to their existence? In other words, can one locate within cartography the subterranean 
histories that ensured that such maps remain functionally identical across three strata of 
social development? Put as an obvious question, what story do certain dark zones on these 
maps have to tell about the history of power relations and domination that lead to their 
relative darkness? A less obvious question: do these cartographic dark zones aid in producing 
these continued relations? 
 The latter is not an easy question to answer, but it is an important question 
nonetheless, broached first by Siegert and developed in accordance with the narrower aims of 
my analysis, namely examining the metaphorical force of darkness in technological 
narratives. For example, while it follows that the comparatively dark zone of continental 
Africa on a light pollution map would roughly correspond to a social-media connectivity 
map, if for no other reason than as a demonstration of reduced electrical infrastructures, the 
correlating flight map qualifies this correspondence in a bracing fashion. While this could 
(and certainly to a degree does) also indicate a smaller network of commercial airports, the 
lack of development immediately brings to mind the complex web of factors, both 
contemporary and historical, that result in the lack of tourist traffic to the region. Depleted of 
its resources during the colonial period, thrown into political instability following 
decolonization through the financial and political influence of past colonizing powers, victim 
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to a sequence of genocides (some still ongoing): the “dark zone” of Africa betrays a 
historical process of making it so on the part of colonization, and what remains are maps 
such as the ones above, potent in their affective power and capacity to influence aversion to 
the region. The complex work is identifying the line wherein these historical causes are 
reflected in this map and the point where such maps reinforce and perpetuate such historical 
processes on the level of collective perception. The latter is extremely difficult to quantify 
with anything less than a vast map of factors. Furthermore, isolating the narrative component 
of this phenomenon, following the path of this particular project, would be a monolithic task 
of synthesis. But it is a task whose brickwork may have already been laid in large part by 
literary criticism in concert than the social sciences. With the ascent of digital humanities 
methodologies rose a concomitant interest in apply spatial practices to literary narratives 
themselves, mapping out plots, motifs, recurrent phrases, etc. as a means to reshape the 
approach towards the act of reading. With this in mind, there is a compelling link between 
the manner in which a space may develop its narrative, and in turn how a narrative may give 
shape and tone to a space. On top of this, there are many direct instances of the deployment 
of spatial narratives within literary texts themselves, prior to any act of secondary 
interpretation. Such texts have immense impact on the cultural development of spatial 
narratives, as they offer space and narrative tropes in a readymade package. The process is 
recursive as well, wherein works of literature are informed by existing spatial narratives and 
in turn augment and reshape the very narratives out of which they emerged. I will first briefly 
turn to the work of recent literary research that considers cartography as a form of narrative 
text in its own right, all as a means to demonstrate this vert link between the narrative 
functions of such maps and the literary history that served to produce them, at least in the 
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case of the African continent: colonial literature. The “dark continent” mythos concerning 
Africa is a potent and pernicious one, not only promoting harmful views of the continent on a 
global scale, but also serving as an archetype for similar cultural narratives, such as that of 
North Korea. 
 In any case, the inherent connection between cartography and narrative is well-
trodden ground by this point as well, albeit of a comparatively more recent discourse than the 
spatial turn in critical theory. The obvious departure point here would be the work of Franco 
Moretti, who in his book Graphs, Maps, Trees set a new standard for the manner in which 
mapping and cartography could be deployed in the humanist fields. It is a procedure that one 
can trace into his work in digital humanities to this day, and while the act of mapping does 
not speak for this discipline as a whole, far from it, nevertheless the process of spatializing 
and visualizing literary data functions paradigmatically for the field in part. While Graphs, 
Maps, Trees certainly offers several explicit references to the development of this research 
modality, Moretti’s sights capture a far broader scope in terms of the cartographic process as 
a narrative process in general. In a pithy turn of phrase, he states near the beginning of his 
“Maps” chapter the following: “A map of ideology emerging from a map of mentalité, 
emerging from the material substratum of the physical territory. Granted, things are not 
always so neat. But when they are, it’s interesting.”229  It is indeed quite interesting, and with 
a bit of unpacking of Moretti’s terminology, the three maps of Africa above may take on a 
new level of significance. The task of unpacking, however, is a bit complex. Moretti makes 
this comment not with regard to a map of the globe, a country, city, etc., but one offered 
within a village story by British author Mary Mitford. Mitford’s novel discusses life in a 
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village as if it were a set of points on a linear street, with the reader stopping by each one as 
they pass through, but she then offers her map of the village in heavily abstracted form: two 
rings surrounding a central parish, each ring representing certain relationships and sets of 
activities. Moretti argues that such a map rests on the level of ideology, insofar that it 
compels the reader to understand a space through the mental framework of those who have 
inhabited it and developed their own mentalité.230 Mentalité, then, is a system of subjective 
experiences of a space, often shared by the endemic collective, routinely given shape by daily 
routines and manual labor.  He references two maps composed by John Barrel that look like 
relatively traditional maps save the labeling of streets and spaces in terms of where they lead 
and for what they are used. Moretti argues that the standardized cartographic layout of these 
maps represents this mentalité insofar that they catalogue these routines digestibly for an 
outsider. In contrast, Mitford’s abstract circles draw the reader into an ideological space as 
they step directly into the experience of this mentalité.231 
 It is an opaquely argued passage, but it holds practical applicability nonetheless.   
Consider the three maps above, once again: photographed or computer generated, these maps 
meet the viewer firstly as a representation of material physical space, and yet they are 
interested in mapping a series of relations on top of such space. The maps capturing 
industrial control systems and flight connections could easily be viewed through the lens of 
mentalité as Moretti defines it, for what are they if not cartographic representations of a set of 
daily habits and relations that reconfigure the experience of these particular spaces. In his 
introduction an anthology titled Literature and Cartography, Anders Engberg-Pedersen notes 
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that, “often unknowingly we also generate maps and even become maps, as the data of our 
travels, our purchases, our work habits is conglomerated, processed and visualized with the 
aid of GIS.”232 In a sense, these maps are as much visualizations of those who experience 
such spaces as a much as the manner in which they are experienced. To that end, some of the 
dark zones on these maps stand as illusions of unexperienced spaces, ones for which no sort 
of mentalité emerges within the narrative confines of their objects of inquiry. This is not to 
say that the spaces have no one within them nor foster relationships of residents to their 
space, but instead that these maps convey a lack of such relations through their dearth of 
visual data. Where these maps stop short is the conversion into ideology as Moretti frames it, 
an ideology that conditions the experience of such space from the view of those who reside 
within.  Instead, these dark spaces are merely dark, communicating little in terms of what 
enters or emerges, quite literally in terms of flight connection map. But is it so that there is no 
ideological component to this end? Moretti’s definition of ideology is narrow, and this is 
neither a critique nor criticism of his usage, but merely an acknowledgement of the specific 
framework to which he applies it in terms of novelistic mapping. In a broader sense, spatial 
ideology can obviously extend far beyond the known space of one’s residence, as stereotypes 
and assumptions of global regions are direct products of the ideological conditioning of one’s 
place of birth, residence, etc. This falls in line with the work of the spatial theorists discussed 
earlier, and it stands that such maps could reflect or reinforce these ideologically conditioned 
perceptions through a lack of information about a space. Even this is a terminological error in 
itself: the lack of data in these dark spaces is data.  
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 This reading extends to the light-pollution maps in kind, and to supplement this I turn 
to Moretti once again and his approach to diagramming versus geography. Discussing 
another cartographic rendering, he puts forth his distinction in far simpler terms than his 
descriptions of mentalité and ideology, stating, “The epiphany, in other words, was Paris as 
diagram: a matrix of relations, not a cluster of individual locations.”233 Moretti cites Claudio 
Ceretti when developing this distinction, noting that diagrams are superimposed on top of 
maps and rendered in geometric form, revealing agency in terms of the composer.234 He 
adds, “it is because for me geometry ‘signifies’ more than geography. More, in the sense that 
a geometrical pattern is too orderly a shape to be the product of chance. It is a sign that 
something is at work here – that something has made the pattern the way it is.”235 Diagrams 
reveal on top of their analytic visualizations relevant information about the context from 
which such diagrams emerge. In other words, they are produced through a set of codes and 
visualizing strategies that reflect the bias or cultural conditioning of their creators. Consider 
the flight path image once again: while it displays interesting and thorough data concerning 
transit paths, it is essentially an advertisement for the visualization program that produced it.  
Its aesthetic value is placed on equal grounds as its informational value, and one could argue 
that the former even supersedes the latter. The diagrammed information was precisely 
selected and constructed, and it points to a series of historical processes that have led to their 
diagrammatic representations as well as the conditions through which such diagrams could 
be made in the present. The work of history and commerce is diagrammed alongside of 
where flights take off and arrive.   
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 I bring the light-pollution maps into the conversation here to complicate Moretti’s 
clean distinction a bit. I will not argue that photographic maps such as these signify more or 
even as much as their comparable diagrams within the scope of Moretti’s argument.  
However, I do argue that these images signify more than one may think despite the element 
of chance inherent to photography. Space station and satellite photos are dictated largely by 
chance to be sure, but in this specific circumstance are nonetheless charged with a 
“diagrammatic force”. Chance or not, the fact remains that the pattern of lights on these maps 
almost mirror those of the diagrams, and in turn perhaps reinforce the very historical 
narratives that inform the diagrammed connection maps. Furthermore, that these maps are 
photographs and not drawn drags them into a longstanding debate of the truth-element of 
photography on its own. From the work of Susan Sontag and Roland Barthes, from Walter 
Benjamin to Peter Geimer, the status of photographs has never settled into a consistent form 
precisely due to this element of chance, instead roughly congealing into the 
acknowledgement that such chance reflects both a capturing of the “now” in parallel to the 
artificial influence of the photographer’s efforts. The most pressing aspect of this dialogue is 
the assumption of objectivity that photographs lend, despite the fact that all photographs, 
much like maps, are charged with subjectivity and contextual framing (by whom they were 
taken, from where, when, etc.) Consider that the first image of North Korea in this chapter 
was taken from the International Space Station, for instance, a platform on which North 
Korea has no presence, let alone a space program of their own. 
 My point here is that the chance element of geography, and especially photographic 
geography, may be less “artificial” or constructed than diagrams, but in specific cases there 
are “plain maps” that have an unexpectedly potent amount of signifying power. To return to 
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the point with which I began this chapter, light-pollution maps can feed into an array of both 
historically and politically engendered narratives: outcomes of war, “unideal spaces”, 
colonial activity, contemporary geopolitical relations, etc. While a diagram may be more 
readily “readable” for a cartographic and literary analyst, the sense of photographic chance 
that signifies more for the common eye, as photographic chance lends an illusion of 
objectivity. This then can easily reinforce certain perceptions of the globe as naturalistic and 
“true”. This cartographic naturalism is nevertheless itself a falsehood in this particular 
instance, as what these maps above (both diagrammatic and photographic) reveal is a 
narrative history that precedes their construction. It is the darkness narrative in one of its 
myriad forms, importing its ancient metaphorical lineage into a conceptual framework. 
Further, cartography’s truth-content, as contentious as it may be, elevates these metaphorical 
narratives into this sense of illusory objectivity, and photography reinforces this all the more.  
Photographic and data maps can even carry with them cartographic narrative histories that 
precede the invention of photography or data visualization itself, a process illustrated by the 
transfer of the “dark continent” myth by way of colonial maps into the contemporary cultural 
consciousness. 
 The narrative history of Africa as a “dark continent” was the product of a knotted 
combination of cultural factors. Felix Driver writes, “The peculiar power of this myth of the 
“Dark Continent” lay in its fusion of a complex of images of race, science, and religion; the 
iconography of light and darkness thus represented European penetration of Africa as 
simultaneously a process of domination, enlightenment and emancipation,”236 an analysis 
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drawn from Patrick Brantlinger’s enduring work concerning the Victorian influence on this 
mythos. In the introduction to his essay on the subject, Brantlinger states, “Africa grew 
“dark” as Victorian explorers, missionaries, and scientists flooded it with light, because the 
light was refracted through an imperialist ideology that urged the abolition of “savage 
customs in the name of civilization.”237 The attitude of Europeans towards Africa was 
charged from the start with the metaphorical baggage affixed to “light” and “darkness”, and 
the colonialization of Africa became more than just an imperial project: it was a metaphysical 
battle. Brantlinger further notes that this attitude can be traced to a particularly narrow 
shifting point in the cultural consciousness, as Romantic literature frequently eschewed 
rhetoric that portrayed Africa as being enslaved to savagery.238 This shift was likely 
catalyzed by late 19th century writing of Sir Henry Morton Stanley, specifically his books 
Through the Dark Continent and In Darkest Africa which serve as a touchstone for this 
particular cultural image. Lucy Jarosz notes that “the earliest written reference to Africa 
(particularly East Africa) as the Dark Continent was penned by Henry M. Stanley…The 
identification of Africa as Dark and impenetrable was subsequently taken up by missionaries, 
travelers, and literary authors.”239 If, as Driver and Brantlinger claim, the concept of Africa 
as the “dark continent” existed as a kind of conceptual timbre in Victorian times, Stanley 
concretized into a replicable trope. His two travelogues are both exhaustive and exhausting in 
their lengths, each divided into two volumes so as to contain the breadth of Stanley’s 
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meticulous descriptions of events, topography, wildlife, and peoples, amongst others.  
However, this is not to say that his accounts remain on the level of sterile chronicling. On the 
contrary, Stanley liberally applies a literary flair to his writings, inscribing his expeditions 
into the odysseys of the canon much like many of his contemporaries. While he does not 
belabor the symbol of darkness as other writings (one such example I will discuss shortly 
hereafter), darkness hangs overhead across the breadth of both texts, framing the expeditions 
with a sense of palpable dread. The moments in which Stanley addresses Africa in such terms 
are thus made doubly potent, such as the way in which he describes his approach in Through 
the Dark Continent. He writes, “The sun sinks fast to the western horizon, and gloomy is the 
twilight that now deepens and darkens. Thick shadows fall upon the distant land and over the 
silent sea, and oppress out throbbing, regretful hearts, as we glide away through the dying 
light towards The Dark Continent.”240 Stanley places thick layers of symbolic textures within 
this simple passage, establishing a parallel between the fading light of day and the 
expedition’s steady approach towards Africa, here referred to with its titular nomenclature.  
He offers little wiggle room in terms of the passages tone as well: the expedition is a 
regretful one, poised to deliver countless deaths and terrors upon the explorers, and the bulk 
of the narrative falls directly in line. While this is not to directly argue that Stanley’s 
company did not in fact experience such events, Stanley takes special care in relating each 
tragedy with as diligent detail as his topographic descriptions. It is in this regard, though, that 
Stanley falls in line with the bulk of colonial travel literature of this kind, and my interest 
instead turns to the way in which he uses another common convention of the genre in tandem 
with his deployment of his dark metaphor. 
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 In both Through the Dark Continent and In Darkest Africa, Stanley offers ample 
illustrations and maps to supplement his written observations, and they are relatively sterile 
when viewed in concert with his more theatrical moments.  At times, these illustrations even 
seem to be at odds with what he actually writes, tonally speaking.  For example, Stanley pairs 
the above cited passage from Through the Dark Continent with a demonstrative 
illustration241, which I provide here:  
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 Whatever sense of foreboding and dread that Stanley described clashes with even the most 
basic visual signifiers in this image. The image depicts a setting sun, its position behind what 
is ostensibly Africa casts a beatific frame around it, similar to a halo sitting above the region. 
While the physics of this situation would certainly cast Africa into shadow, thus reinforcing 
the dark imagery at play, this is not reinforced by the manner in which this illustration 
depicts the actual moment itself.  Instead, an insidious act of narrative association arises in 
this pairing, attaching Stanley’s feelings of dread to what is otherwise a benign, if not 
outright beautiful image. This superimposition, the inherent danger and dread of darkness 
onto natural beauty, is a recurring trope amongst colonial literature of this type, an inversion 
of untapped splendor into a deceptive hovel for death and corruption, not entirely unlike 
classical descriptions of darkness as both baneful and resplendent in twinned aspect.    
Fig. 10: 
Illustration 
depicting Henry 
Morton Stanley’s 
approach to the 
African continent.  
His two major 
works are 
peppered with 
such illustrations, 
often eclipsed by 
Stanley’s 
meticulously 
detailed use of 
language. 
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 Where Stanley’s development of his dark metaphor does in fact appear is within his 
illustrations of events and people, the expression of which is at times so explicit that he has 
little need to reinforce this metaphoric conceit.  Take for instance the following, chosen 
almost arbitrarily from a selection of remarkably similar depictions across all four volumes: 
242 
 
Titled, “Reception at Bumbireh Island, Victoria Nyanza”, the illustration takes on an 
unfortunately, if not intentionally, ironic tone in light of this.  The “reception” is clearly 
hostile, with native Africans brandishing weapons at the explorers as they are framed within 
an ocean of human bodies, dissolving into abstraction as they fill the frame to the mountain 
line, the tips of spears and bows serving as indexical markers for African people.  It captures 
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more tempered scenes. 
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a moment in which the group suddenly turns on Stanley’s company, leading him to refer to 
the people as “two hundred screaming black demons”243 who are only pacified through the 
gentle approach of his colleague, a contrast to his plan to shoot them with his revolvers.244  It 
is clear at this point what is the “dark continent”: the native people of Africa themselves. 
 Stanley offers an explicit bridge between this narrative history and maps proper, a 
bridge between the benign topography and a fundamentally racist deployment of darkness 
that conditions their function. Indeed, in a manner wholly opposite to Mitford’s abstract map 
of a village, both of Stanley’s works offer maps upon maps of frankly breathtaking detail and 
sophistication. These are not always restricted to the dimensional limitations of the page: 
both books come with large fold out maps as supplementary components, the largest 
depicting the entire region in question, and the smaller demonstrating the specific paths that 
the company took in greater detail. I offer the two larger maps below: 
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Fig. 12: A map of Stanley’s voyage tucked into the front cover of Through the Dark Continent, Vol. 1. 
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These maps are neither stylized nor do they shade in certain areas as “dark” or “darker”, and 
on their own would seem to be didactic, geographic representations of their respective 
regions. This they are, but they possess diagrammatic aspects as well, with both possessing a 
winding line in order to depict the paths of Stanley’s expeditions, cutting through vast swaths 
of comparatively blank space in the center. Stanley becomes the only reference point across 
this line, and as viewers, we are forced into his mentalité, in a loose sense, traversing with 
him his mental mapping of the expedition as it penetrates the unknown. But in drawing the 
viewer in, an ideological aspect appears in tandem, especially given the types of written 
descriptions seen prior. Furthermore, as Driver notes, Stanley’s “mission, as it was described 
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in 1884, was to strike A White Line Across the Dark Continent.”247 Stanley fills in the blank 
spaces with darkness: dark events, dark portents, and dark bodies. And it is these bodies 
which transmit Stanley’s horror to the colonial era reader remaining in Europe, wherein the 
stark white of Africa is rendered dark by association. There is little surprise when Stanley 
marks the end of his voyage in Through the Dark Continent with a celebration of his 
whiteness, at first feeling startled at the sight of new white people, only to then deliver the 
following dose of racist rhetoric: “I looked from them to [the Africans with me], and then I 
fear I felt almost like being grateful to the Creator that I was not as black as they, and that 
these finely dressed, well-spoken whites claimed me as friend and kin.  Yet I did not dare to 
place myself upon an equality with them as yet…”248 Stanley describes himself as some 
missing link between African and European culture, but in doing so places himself as 
beneath the Europeans he encounters, somehow tainted by the darkness of Africa having 
found a home within him. This darkness is viscous and sticks to his body, one more tacit 
reference to darkness and its metaphoric history and now wielded to gravely damaging effect.   
 In his essay “African Cartographies in Motion”, Dominic Thomas aims his sights at 
colonial board games, which he claims to have been used as indoctrinating tools for 
European children in terms of conditioning their attitude towards colonization. He writes, 
“Maps provided people with information about the colonies, including representations of 
colonized peoples (many of which have survived into contemporary French society and are 
reflected in current mindsets), while stimulating the imagination and appeal for remote 
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spaces…”249 While neither games nor even children’s reading, Stanley’s maps and 
illustrations function in lockstep, depicting Africa as both untamed and untamable, the latter 
serving as a challenge for those who would follow in his steps. He fills his geography with 
darkness in such a way that it swallows the continent whole, establishing an affective and 
narrative portrait of death and dread.250 Midway through In Darkest Africa, Stanley actually 
offers a short history of African cartography, offering tracings of maps of the region ranging 
from the time of Homer to his contemporary moment.251 With the early maps expectedly 
lacking significant information, Stanley implicitly positions his versions as the final word on 
the matter at that time, and in doing so in tandem with his invention of the “Dark Continent”, 
he set in motion a narrative lineage that to this day has never truly died out, reified in spite of 
the growing topographic knowledge of the continent itself. 
 But it is certainly not as if he birthed this concept into the world with little further 
interference or influence. Far from it, the “dark continent” metaphor repeated itself time and 
time again throughout geographic, literary, and cultural history, perhaps raised to its zenith in 
a novel that dramatized the colonial project wholesale.252 I speak here of Joseph Conrad’s 
Heart of Darkness, the title of which leaves little to the imagination within the scope of this 
chapter. Conrad’s uses of darkness as a metaphor for primitivity, death, disease, and chaos 
are myriad, and I offer a short selection of them here. Beyond the title, the first instance is of 
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Marlow looking at the various lights around him at port, claiming that it “also[…]has been 
one of the dark places of the earth.”253 Taking illumination to be a process or even a destiny, 
Marlow describes the eventually “enlightening” of the globe as some sort of positive change, 
echoing the very Enlightenment ideals that led to colonialism in the first place. But it is 
where he applies this processual language to Africa shortly after that the direct connection to 
projects such as Stanley’s jumps forth. Discussing his childhood fascination with maps, 
Marlow describes the map of Africa as follows: “It had ceased to be a blank space of 
delightful mystery – a white patch for a boy to dream gloriously over.  It had become a place 
of darkness.254”255 As Stanley fills his cartographic Africa with the “dark” horrors within, so 
does Conrad describe the paradoxical nature of the region, wherein the more it is uncovered, 
the less one can penetrate its dark aspects. It is an area where illumination fails, or even 
more, augments and expands the darkness as if it were a void, swallowing up all light that 
approaches it. As Marlow recounts “[penetrating] deeper and deeper into the heart of 
darkness,”256 he views the land and its inhabitants as “unearthly,”257 defying human logic.  
He echoes Stanley’s description of himself as “darkened” in discussing the manner in which 
the darkness “claims” Kurtz,258 referring to him as a shadow upon meeting,259 consumed by 
an “impenetrable darkness.”260 In short, Conrad assaults the reader with darkness metaphors, 
drawing upon the canon of its associations, from corrupting force, to concealing danger, to 
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unchecked production and inherent evil.  Festooned onto Africa, the continent is darkened 
through Marlow’s illuminations, akin to his cartographic allusion.   
 Of course, while Conrad leaves this darkness ambiguous in terms of Kurtz, whether 
he is tainted by Africa or his own obsessive desire to claim it, Marlow’s description of a call 
for African genocide as a brilliant flash of lightning261 does little to resist the accusations of 
racist imagery in his text. One of the strongest of these comes courtesy of Chinua Achebe, 
who saw little differentiation or critical distance between Conrad and Marlow’s views.  He 
states, with finality: 
  The point of my observations should be quite clear by now, namely that  
  Joseph Conrad was a thoroughgoing racist.  That this simple truth is glossed 
  over in criticisms of his work is due to the fact that white racism against  
  Africa is such a normal way of thinking that its manifestations go completely 
  unremarked…A Conrad student informed me in Scotland that Africa is merely 
  a setting for the disintegration of the mind of Mr. Kurtz.  Which is partly the 
  point. Africa as a setting and backdrop which eliminates the African as a  
  human factor. Africa as a metaphysical battlefield devoid of all recognizable 
  humanity, into which the wandering European enters at his peril.  Can nobody 
  see the preposterous and perverse arrogance in thus reducing Africa to the role 
  of props for the break-up of one petty European mind?  But that is not even 
  the point. The real question is the dehumanization of Africa and Africans  
  which this age-long attitude has fostered and continues to foster in the world.  
  And the question is whether a novel which celebrates this dehumanization, 
  which depersonalizes a portion of the human race, can be called a great work 
  of art. My answer is: no, it cannot.262     
As with Stanley’s cartography, Africa is reduced to a blank spot upon which a European 
drama can play out. Where Conrad depicts the collapse of a European mind, Stanley enacts 
the “enlightenment” of Africa; but both reconstitute Africa as a menacing, monstrous space 
with the capacity to swallow those who fail to combat its penetrating forces. In draining the 
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African continent of its own history and significance, it is forced into the spatial narrative of 
a dark zone, along with the bulk of its nyctophobic history. Cedric Watts rejected Achebe’s 
stance, claiming the following: 
  Far from being a ‘purveyor of comforting myths’, Conrad most deliberately 
  and incisively debunks such myths.  The myth of inevitable progress, for  
  example; the myth that white civilization is necessarily morally superior to 
  ‘savagery’; the myth that imperialism is the altruistic matter of ‘weaning those 
  ignorant millions from their horrid ways’: all these are mocked by the tale”263 
It is true that Conrad’s novel portrays the colonial project in an exceptionally unflattering 
tone, and as such Achebe and Watts represent the extreme ends of the continued debate on 
the text. Patrick Brantlinger also commented on this subject, taking a mediating position 
between the two and referring to Conrad’s writing as a type of “impressionism”. He writes, 
“Whatever the answers, Heart of Darkness, I believe, offers a powerful critique of at least 
certain manifestations of imperialism and racism, at the same time that it presents that 
critique in ways which can only be characterized as both imperialist and racist.”264 
 This almost platonically moderate position returns us to the point at hand: whether or 
not Conrad takes a subversive or critical stance here is almost beside the point. In drawing so 
blatantly from this metaphorical network of darkness, one that stems from the already long-
since established system of metaphor and concept, Heart of Darkness perpetuates this 
constellation of metaphor, cartography, narrative, affect, and racism quite robustly. His 
characters may deflate the image of the noble and virtuous colonizer, but in some senses the 
damage is difficult to undo, largely as it taps into such trenchant conceptual tropes. Critique 
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or not, Conrad becomes one more instance wherein the “monstrous darkness” narrative of 
Africa is spoken into existence. Following Achebe’s line of reasoning, the affective force of 
this narrative vaults over its critical aims and risks cancelling them out through the 
imbrication of image and cultural perception. It is an image with terrible resilience, extending 
from the Victorian era into the contemporary moment by way of a type of transposition. Lucy 
Jarosz’s article goes on to examine this exact phenomenon, and she focuses on the Biblical 
dimensions of the “dark continent” narrative in terms of fighting an ultimate evil. She 
proposes that this early configuration demarcated the African people as intractably “Other”, 
and in turn this identity affixed itself to the region throughout the course of its economic 
development.265 She even draws connections between this narrative and the incipient AIDS 
crisis in Africa at the time, noting how previously held stereotypes and beliefs regarding the 
“savagery” of Africa informed opinions and strategies to combat the disease. She writes, 
“The tenacity of these beliefs of Africans as ‘primitives’ in thrall to an unfettered sexuality 
that is feared, envied, desired, and censured as Other by journalists and academic writers 
attests to the power of the nineteenth century metaphor of darkness associated with Africa 
and Africans.”266 These beliefs, or at least the symbolic vestiges thereof, continue to appear 
rather unexpectedly. Consider a well-intentioned 2007 article by The Economist which 
discusses the need for more power-stations in Africa as well as the necessary humanitarian 
aid to achieve this. It refers to a similar image of Africa to the North Korean satellite photos, 
                                                             
265 Jarosz, Lucy.  “Constructing the Dark Continent: Metaphor as Geographic Representation of Africa”. 
Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography.  Taylor and Francis Ltd: Vol. 74, No. 2. 1992. 108. 
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demonstrating the gulfs of darkness covering the majority of the continent. It is titled “The 
dark continent”.267   
 The fact is that many discussions of such light maps and pictures follow this same 
path, drawing subconsciously or consciously from this metaphoric and cartographic history 
and affix regions like Africa to their colonial histories. While I am not arguing here that any 
person who sees such maps thinks of the geographic contributions of Henry Stanley, I do 
claim that this history informs the affective reaction to such images at an almost pre-
conscious level. Whatever the intention may be, whatever the element of chance, light-
pollution and connection maps always hearken to this colonial lineage and as such are 
charged with its ideological component, one easily traceable through such cartographic and 
literary histories as my examples prior. The spots where these images reveal little are the 
spots in which narrative fills in the gaps with this set historically engendered tools. In support 
of this claim, Tim Edensor’s work on illumination goes great lengths towards explaining this 
rhetorical and conceptual phenomenon, examining the manners in which illumination has 
expressly been associated with power throughout history. He writes, “Illumination always 
materializes power. As is evident in the grand displays organized by monarchs to bedazzle 
subjects, the medieval mobilization of a night watch to survey those out after dark, and the 
unequal distribution of premodern candles, illumination has always been entangled with 
power in numerous ways.”268 After noting that this process only amplified in the 19th and 20th 
century era of industrialization, he remarks that “light is never deployed in passive spaces 
                                                             
267 “The dark continent”.  The Economist. https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-
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that await sudden transformation but reproduces power relations, is resisted, or used in 
alternative ways.”269 These power relations can be reproduced through an inequality of light 
distribution, as he notes, as this inherently demarcates spaces wherein industrialization and 
power, in turn, do not yet have a presence. He sources this pattern from a broad history, 
including the unequal distribution of electric illumination in 19th century Paris, the dimly lit 
spaces of American urban centers that routinely house the impoverished, and colonial Africa 
itself, wherein colonizers set up “dual cities” in which the European sections were brightly lit 
while the native sections remained dark.270 The association of darkness with undesirability 
finds a presence even from the outset of spatial construction, wherein darkened spaces take 
on a reliable narrative pattern: these are the spaces for those left behind. Repeating over the 
course of history, Edensor suggests that this configuration of power relations is an 
identifiable pattern, one ready for destabilization. So too do I argue that the light pollution 
maps of North Korea and Africa, and even the entire globe, fall prey into this preconditioned 
reception.  And if, as Edensor suggests, this narrative reinforces itself over time, then the 
frequent deployment of such images risks stunting any escape from the cultural assumptions 
inherent to the dark spaces within.  
 I conclude this chapter with some brief examples of this effect that hail from sources 
both academic and quotidian, one of which is admittedly relatively obscure. But obscurity 
does not preclude relevance in this case, as these three articles reflect the continued 
deployment of this metaphoric constellation within the framework of progress narratives. I 
start with a NASA-hosted image repository of light maps titled “Earth’s City Lights”, unique 
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in its tonal neutrality, comparatively speaking. The set’s introduction gives a short 
explanation for city growth patterns, noting that certain areas remain unlit due to topographic 
concerns, areas like Antarctica, the Amazon rainforest, and global deserts. Interestingly, 
among these locations they list Africa, stating that “The interior jungles of Africa…are 
mostly dark, but lights are beginning to appear there.”271 The set is admittedly quite old by 
this point, nearly twenty years, but their point stands that the dearth of illumination in Africa 
at that time could simply result from a lack of inhabitable space, reflective of a pattern that 
follows several other similar areas on the planet. But this runs headlong into a compelling 
study carried out by Stanford University in 2016, in which a team of researchers entered 
daytime and nighttime satellite photos of the Earth into a sophisticated machine-learning 
platform programmed to make predictive hypotheses as to which areas are most 
impoverished.272 The program compares the nighttime light maps with daytime photos of 
visible urbanization, ostensibly calculating proportions of urbanization to electrification as a 
metric for poverty. The results were promising for the team, gauged by them as being 
“exceptionally accurate”273 in their acuity. In what should come as little surprise by this 
point, the header image for the article is this:      
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Given NASA’s judgment from sixteen years prior, it stands to reason that the very areas in 
which they saw lights appearing have followed their course, and yet Stanford’s research 
marks this as signs of continued poverty that over-code the elements of progress. To be sure, 
the study acts in the spirit of progress, attempting to identify critical areas in need of 
intervention, but the object of the study nevertheless remains to seek out poverty above all.  
Given the likelihood that the system’s findings were correlated with existing economic 
information, one is left to wonder to what extent the project was designed to test the 
machine-learning platform’s capabilities in sniffing out poverty. In this case, the research 
serves to officially pin light maps to the narrative of destitution that once again finds its 
traces in past centuries. Even the most seemingly neutral of studies are haunted by this 
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aspect, and while this of course stands to confirm a well-known series of historical events, I 
am left thinking of Siegert’s point once again, namely the extent to which such maps 
condition and perpetuate this image at a level beyond that of mere history or progression. 
 To this end, I look to what seems to be a minor source at face value, but one that 
betrays several of the threads running through this chapter. It is an entry from a personal blog 
called White African, run by a man named Erik Hersman, a multi-talented tech professional 
who runs several projects with the goal of expanding Africa’s digital and network 
infrastructures.  One can only imagine that his blog’s name stems from the fact that he 
himself is white, the immediate space for cultural analysis of this point something I must 
forgo to stay on task. Retaining focus on his work, his aims are to provide the same kind of 
open-access technology the developed world takes for granted, and one can easily detect his 
noble aims in even the smallest excerpt of his writings. This is brought immediately to the 
foreground of his entry titled “The Dark Continent: It’s Still Dark”.  Written in 2010, 
Hersman also focuses once again on a satellite image of Africa at night, but rather than 
simply marking the photo as a sign of stunted development alone, he offers his own set of 
causes for the image based on his own personal experiences. Starting with a direct reference 
to the colonial history of the “dark continent”, Hersman compares the light map with what he 
states is a “news attention map”, with color coded global regions indicating the amount of 
mentions in global news media. He neither cites nor attributes this image, making it difficult 
to verify, but he nevertheless uses it to establish a correlation between electrically 
underdeveloped areas and a lack of global attention.275 Taking this conclusion in tandem with 
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what he sees as a blockade of government corruption, Hersman argues that Africa has the 
potential to experience a technological revolution, but is held back by historical structures 
that stymie its growth. 
 The latter of his claims is more or less in line with the common consensus on the still-
noxious effects of colonialism, but I find his acknowledgement of a lack of global attention 
to be the most compelling aspect. Hersman’s individual extrapolation is exactly that: one 
opinion, and one opinion cannot stand in for a systematic or conclusive whole. But if the 
prior maps of social-media shares and connecting flights display anything, it is a lack of 
attention given to the area, quite literally. If Hersman’s insight holds merit, in an almost 
inverse of the North Korean pictures, the dark spaces on such maps appear to create a 
cyclical loop of inattention, wherein such maps produce and condition a sense of emptiness 
that directs interest elsewhere, be it on the level of personal attention of global aid.  In the 
end, however, this conclusion can only remain on the level of speculation if based entirely on 
this particular blog from an obscure corner of the internet. In terms of the broader scope, 
though, looking at the narrative history of darkness in line with the path outlined throughout 
this chapter, one cannot help but see this all as supporting evidence to Siegert’s claim, 
circumstantial or not. If these dark spaces indicate a lack of progress, if they ward off travel 
or interest in the areas through the conditioning effects of maps as cultural technologies, then 
it stands to reason that they would perpetuate their own effects, crystalizing the darkness and 
preserving its metaphorical absoluteness. Even still, should the integrity of Hersman’s claims 
fall short, I must remind that the foci of this project as a whole are the conditions through 
which such claims can even be made. If there exists a universal absolute metaphor of 
darkness; if it is a narrative that can be traced through literary and cultural history at large; if 
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it is a narrative that can be and often is affixed to media-technological advancements and 
phenomena, then the wily and sprawling network of affects produced through these maps 
function as testament to the subterranean reaches of this enduring metaphor itself.  From the 
propaganda aspects of the North Korean pictures, to the traces of colonial exploitation on 
those of Africa, the darkness in these maps show the limits of Enlightenment as a project of 
conquest, monuments to conflict and abandonment in negative. 
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Chapter 3: Turned On, Tuned In, Locked Out: Numbers Stations and Ominous 
Rejection 
1. Radio Interference 
At some point in the early 1970’s, a strange transmission found its way into the 
shortwave sets of amateur HAM enthusiasts around the world. It would come to be known 
colloquially as “The Lincolnshire Poacher”276 due to the fact that each broadcast starts and 
ends with a short sample of a song by the same name.277  Between this musical bracket, a 
human voice synthesis program reads a string of numbers for forty-five minutes at a time.  
While early transmissions utilized a male voice (inflected with a British accent), the 
broadcasts shifted to that of a woman’s in 1988 and used the same one over the course of its 
existence for roughly thirty-five years.278  After this point, “The Lincolnshire Poacher” began 
to exhibit quantifiable patterns and qualities.  The transmissions started to occur daily with 
precise temporal regularity, transmitting exactly eleven times each day across three 
simultaneous frequencies, and they would also shift between apparently pre-selected clusters 
of frequencies throughout each day as well, perhaps as a means to evade easy tracking.279  
This would then mean that a listener could in theory receive seventy-seven messages per 
week, and yet “The Lincolnshire Poacher” only ever transmitted eighteen unique number 
patterns across the course of its existence.  Furthermore, these number patterns transmitted in 
a homogenous pattern, rotating in specific ways so that each month repeated the exact same 
sequence of patterns in the same order, even after considering the differing lengths of each 
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month.280  This pattern would continue just so for over three decades until transmissions 
ceased sometime in 2008. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, there is evidence to 
suggest that these transmissions were not benign test patterns or the work of another amateur 
user. For one, the signals were repeatedly the subject of calculated jamming, with some 
sources claiming that the interference came directly from Iran.  And secondly, tracing 
attempts undertaken in 2000 apparently pinpointed the origin of the frequencies to a British 
Royal Air Force base.281  
This transmission does not stand alone in the history of shortwave radio. To date, 
amateur shortwave users have intercepted hundreds, if not thousands, of such broadcasts, all 
with remarkably similar patterns. The majority of these transmissions begin with a short clip 
of music or repeating tones which then precede a string of vocalized numbers. Once the 
numbers cease, the same music or tone then plays, and the frequency goes silent shortly 
thereafter.282 Hence, in utilitarian fashion, followers of these transmissions refer to them as 
“numbers stations.” Fascination in this phenomenon has experienced steady growth, and 
numbers stations enthusiast groups,283 now composed of both shortwave users and internet-
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for the public, so to speak, not only holding no obligation to their desires, but also actively rejecting them.  
This, to my eyes, complicates the nature of the relationship between enthusiasts and the numbers stations 
themselves to the point that while I can concede that such forums and websites are participatory culture by 
Jenkin’s description, I will with direct intent avoid using the term “fans” throughout the course of this chapter. 
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based analysts/archivists in relatively equal measure, have exhibited a steadfast persistence in 
cataloguing as many incidences of such transmissions as possible. This is in no small part 
due to contemporary advancements in recording technology, which have allowed for these 
transmissions to be carefully traced and archived. While databases and forums concerning 
numbers stations are not prolific in quantity, they make up for their relative scarcity with 
depth of research.  Indeed, websites such as Priyom.org exist as a means of cataloging and 
analyzing these stations with as acute of detail as possible.  In its statement of purpose, 
Priyom explains its origin: 
Priyom.org is an international group of radio enthusiasts who came together 
during 2010 when activity from the station known as "UVB-76" increased. 
The mystery of this station inspired us to seek out other, similarly mysterious 
stations, and thus into the bizarre world of shortwave radio's infamous number 
stations. Greatly inspired by the work of other online groups, Priyom has been 
developed to easily bring both the current and historical information about 
number stations into one comprehensive site, and to make the recording, 
listening and analysis of shortwave radio, number stations, and all related on-
air enigmas accessible to all who are interested.284 
Websites like Priyom function as archival indices insofar that they directly link to numbers 
station samples when available. But there is something lacking in referring to such sites as 
simple data collections, however deep they may be. There is an archaeological thrust to such 
collectives as well, for these sites and forums have just as much of an investment in 
deciphering the content or origin of these transmissions. While it is an accepted given that 
numbers stations are in all likelihood connected to espionage and military operations, there is 
a startling lack of hard evidence for this claim. To clarify, “hard evidence” in this case 
essentially refers to decoded messages. Most numbers station enthusiasts take as a foregone 
conclusion that the number patterns within the transmissions are code, specially a Vernon 
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Cipher, and the assumption is that these are sent over shortwave broadcasts to undercover 
field agents in distant locations.  And yet, to date almost none have been convincingly 
decoded, a product of the Vernam Cipher’s notoriously uncrackable nature, leaving a 
noticeable dark spot at the center of their research.   
 In a way, numbers stations possess an intrigue similar to that of the dark web, a sense 
of fascination fueled by an inherent unintelligibility that evades a firm grasp. However, 
whereas the dark web holds an unsettling force due to its seemingly infinite span of nefarious 
potentiality, numbers stations appear to be singularly focused in their purpose, an effect 
amplified by their uniform pattern of transmission. It is this purpose that functions as their 
“dark zone”, since the total lack of official acknowledgement, save one high profile legal 
incident to be discussed later, makes discussion of numbers remain in a speculative register.  
On top of this, recordings of numbers stations are often described as eerie or disturbing, 
finding themselves placed in articles or lists concerning frightening audio phenomena 
alongside of purported ghost recordings and the like. Given the shift to sound and audio 
formats, this chapter marks a relatively large departure from the two that follow it in this 
project, as it is a slippery set of relations that lead to one referring to a sound object and its 
constituent processes as “dark”. Nevertheless, such nomenclature has a rich and 
unmistakable history of its own, particularly in the musical world in which entire genres and 
even tonal timbres have the word “dark” appended to their names.285 Dark sounds can refer 
to notably rich or deep tones in contrast to reedier or tinnier bright sounds, but the term also 
frequently points to sounds or recordings that are frightening in nature. This frightful aspect 
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is also quite particular, as the visceral shock and fear spurned from a large explosion, for 
instance, rarely colors the sound of the blast itself as “dark”. Rather, dark sounds tend to 
possess an otherworldly or macabre aspect, or in other words, they often operate on an 
affective register of dread.   
 It is from this complex set of factors that I will explore numbers stations as a “dark 
zone” in line with the conceptual abridgment to darkness experienced by the dark web.  
Ultimately, I argue that they provoke similar experiences of both fascination and repulsion on 
account of their “dark” status, and this once again is engendered by a synergy between 
material form and informational content. That said, I am less concerned with the precise texts 
of numbers stations, which is to say the messages contained within, should they even exist.  
As the vast majority of such transmissions have evaded decoding, to claim that their 
translated content provokes unsettled fear is a fallacy. Rather, it is their very unknowability 
and their assumed content by way of a general taxonomy that plays a large hand in their 
reception, both on the part of their obsessive aficionado culture and public reception as a 
whole. To clarify, even if it is all but certain that numbers stations are spy transmissions, the 
lack of knowledge as to from whom, from where, and for what specific end such 
transmissions are sent provokes a specifically coded response, a response that falls in line 
with the others in this project. Principally, it is my contention that numbers stations are so 
unsettling because of a sense of profound rejection that they inspire within those who 
stumble upon them. As if they are transmissions from a spirit world, the transmissions pierce 
the veil of common experience, signaling a network of activity that immediately registers as 
dangerous or ominous. In order to illustrate this claim, I will discuss numbers stations by way 
of Eugene Thacker’s concept of the “World-Without-Us”, a conceptual exercise in imagining 
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a plane of existence that operates with little care for the experiences or safety of human kind.  
Given that numbers stations are in fact created by and sent for other humans, Thacker’s 
concept is not a perfect fit by any means.  It should be noted that he developed this paradigm 
as a means of discussing metaphysical frameworks, sourcing it from horror film and occult 
history in such a way that it could be applied to a wide variety of paths in the realm of 
speculative realism. Oftentimes, for instance, it is invoked as a way to discuss relationships 
between human beings and the natural world as a means of approaching environmental 
concerns.286 Nevertheless, there is a concrete and identifiable history that links 
communication technology, signal, and the spirit world, a history that I believe directly 
informs the affective response to numbers stations. I will examine only one small thread of 
this history, namely the 19th century Modern Spiritualist movement in the United States, 
discussed by way of Jeffrey Sconce’s fascinating work on the subject. Ultimately, my stance 
is that much like the dark web, numbers stations serve as one of the latest bridges between 
mediatechnology and longstanding narrative deployments of darkness, despite the 
transmissions existing outside of the visual spectrum wholesale. As a way of working to this 
point, I will first take the time to briefly outline the position of radio within the cultural 
consciousness today in terms of its narrative deployment as a gateway to the supernatural in 
fictional horror. Following this, I will return to the specific history of amateur shortwave 
radio users, dubbed DXer’s, and how the search for numbers stations situates itself into this 
framework by way of an established history of supernatural hunting by means of 
communication media. 
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2. Dangerous Portals 
Despite the advent of podcasts and other internet-based audio programming such as 
Apple Music and Spotify, it would be premature to argue that the radio has lost all 
significance in the contemporary moment. While the image of a family gathering around the 
radio every evening may no longer speak precisely to the current streaming market, this is 
not to argue that the radio itself has disappeared. In 2014, The Nielsen Company compiled a 
set of statistics regarding radio listenership, noting that “90.3% of all millennials [are] 
reached weekly by radio.”287 This statistic is surprising at first glance given the mP3’s 
continued dominance of the music sharing market, vinyl LP resurgence notwithstanding.  But 
this would perhaps be a slight error in judgment, albeit an understandable one, as Nielsen’s 
summary might be a bit too concise. First and foremost, Nielsen does not distinguish in their 
research between standard shortwave (AM/FM) radio and online radio programming, instead 
combining them into one concept. This of course could inflate such a figure quite 
considerably, as news and talk organizations such as NPR maintain particularly strong online 
presences. However, this does not entirely seem to be the case either, as the Pew Research 
Center found that in 2015, “91% of Am surveyed…”288  It is worth noting that Pew sourced 
this very statistic from an alternative study held by Nielsen289, giving much more credence to 
their earlier claim of 90.3%.290   
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There is one aspect that both Nielsen’s and Pew’s studies fail to address, and that is 
intention. I use intention here in the sense of listeners directly choosing to listen to AM/FM 
radio over any other format. Within these studies, large groups of listeners noted that they 
listened to radio while at work, and this example alone carries major significance with 
regards to the position of AM/FM radio in a general sense. Oftentimes, radio is the default 
option in public or communal spaces such as office workplaces or small businesses, for 
example. Thus, Nielsen’s choice of the words “reached by radio” is telling. Whether or not a 
person is “reached” by radio is independent of their choice to listen to it in certain cases, as 
there are many spaces in which radio is integrated by default. My claim here is not in order to 
argue that no one prefers or chooses the radio, as it is neither possible to demonstrate with 
sufficient evidence nor entirely pertinent to the task at hand. I would, however, still argue 
that AM/FM radio’s ubiquity is at least partially fueled by its capacity to blend into the 
background with relative ease. In other words, the intelligibility of radio’s infrastructure has 
diminished as it has melded into the noise of contemporary life.291 It often is reduced to mere 
incidental soundtracking of mundane daily activities.  As a symbol, however, the radio 
maintains great force, serving to communicate myriad tropes and culturally coded narratives, 
some of which I will offer as examples and can stem anywhere from fiction to cultural 
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memes. From pirate revolutionary radio to hopeful transmissions following an apocalypse, 
radio adopts the image of a unifier of the human spirit, drawing together disparate parties as a 
means to establish a collective resistance to daunting trials. As a locus of nostalgia, radio 
serves as a reprieve from the information overload of the streaming era, returning to curated 
lists of music and the autonomous authority of the DJ. In both of these cases, radio as a 
narrative symbol possesses a restorative function, and it serves as a rectifying medium to 
close the gap between humans separated across distances and spread throughout wires. But 
on the opposite pole, there lies the malfunctioning radio, its connection cutting out or 
receiving signals that it otherwise should not. While this instance is deployed in an equally 
wide variety of instances, my interest lies in how this serves as an ominous symbol within the 
horror genre, as this lays bare the historical path between such communication technology 
and occult metaphysics.       
Indeed, horror (in terms of novels, films, video games, etc.) has found fertile 
inspiration in the image of malfunctioning media as a whole. Oftentimes, broken radios, 
televisions, etc. function both as tangible or symbolic gateways to otherworldly or 
paranormal contact. For instance, the critically lauded video game series Silent Hill 
frequently gives the player character a small AM/FM radio at the start of each playthrough.  
Unlike many of the other items acquired in the game which take active roles in combat and 
solving puzzles, the radio is a passive item in the players inventory insofar that it can merely 
be turned on or off. While activated, the radio emits a baseline level of quiet static that 
increases in volume as the various dangerous creatures populating the game world get closer 
to the player character. Sound is used here as an index, but a stunted one, as it fails to 
  182 
articulate the complete nature of the approaching threat, simply its relative proximity.  In his 
book Silent Hill: The Terror Engine, Bernard Perron describes the experience as follows: 
…the pocket radio of Silent Hill signifies a threat, but does not reveal 
anything regarding what is about to occur. There still remains an uneasiness 
over the uncertainty of the outcome. Thus, not only fright, but anxiety too is 
intensified. Because you feel as if you are in the game world and the threat is 
directed at you, event-induced emotions are felt with even more intensity.292 
The ludic dimension of this choice is doubled over by an aesthetic decision for which the 
series is well-known, namely that it is characterized by its use of fog as a means to obscure 
the player’s vision. As Perron notes, the radio can only do so much to highlight a threat, as its 
static has a relatively limited expressive axis: it can be either quiet or loud, essentially. In 
other words, the radio serves its function as a sort of sonar but does so in intentionally limited 
fashion, and as Perron argues, this in turn heightens the anxiety of the player. It establishes 
connections between the player character and the beings around them, but a menacing and 
faulty manner, serving as much to obscure the being to which the player character is 
connected as much as revealing it. Nevertheless, the radio, in this sense, serves as a gateway 
for the virtual threat to enter into a cognitive and affective register of the player. It offers 
information and connection, but its failures engender dread at a deeper level. I would add 
here that I believe Perron is remiss in eschewing the actual static of the radio itself. The radio 
in Silent Hill functions at its best precisely when it “breaks”, so to speak. For its contextual 
purpose, the radio would in theory be malfunctioning if it were to play music or talk radio. It 
must fail in order to offer the most aid, and this play with expectation amplifies the 
disorientation of the player.        
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In other cases, radio signal itself serves as the threatening agent. The 2007 anthology 
film The Signal explores over the course of three vignettes the idea of a malicious signal as a 
supernatural weapon. The titular signal in amplifies angry and violent tendencies on the part 
of the recipient, causing them to lash out in a violent rage. They transmit via the television, 
telephones, and the radio, capitalizing on the cultural ubiquity of such technologies. In turn, 
the signal bypasses human cognition, entering into and augmenting affect, all as a means to 
convert it into a dangerous and weaponized force. One could argue that the film appears to 
present commentary on the deleterious effects of media saturation on the global scale, but I 
wish to focus on the narrative deployment of said malfunctioning media itself.293 It is not a 
unique narrative either, seen deployed in highly similar fashion in the 2015 video game 
Everybody’s Gone to The Rapture. In this particular instance, the player character is tasked 
with uncovering clues within a desolate, post-apocalyptic world, eventually discovering that 
the eradication of humanity came via a supernatural signal that upon hearing causes 
                                                             
293 This falls in line with a prominent trend in 21st century media theory, that being the post-digital.  Hito 
Steyerl in particular harnesses an anxiety towards oversaturation in her essay “The Spam of the Earth: 
Withdrawal from Representation”.  Her stance is best articulated through her own words: 
   
Dense clusters of radio waves leave our planet every second. Our letters and snapshots, 
intimate and official communications, TV broadcasts and text messages drift away from 
earth in rings, a tectonic architecture of the desires and fears of our times. In a few hundred 
thousand years, extraterrestrial forms of intelligence may incredulously sift through our 
wireless communications. But imagine the perplexity of those creatures when they actually 
look at the material. Because a huge percentage of the pictures inadvertently sent off into 
deep space is actually spam. (161) 
 
I reference Steyerl here not to argue that she makes the same exact point as The Signal.  She offers no 
discussion of violence within her essay.  But the theoretical thrust is indeed similar, insofar that Steyerl fears 
the usurpation of authentic human existence by increasingly artificial and distorted graphic or written 
representations.  While this is a parallel discussion to the idea of media-influenced violence, the threat of 
media’s possibly pernicious influence rings clearly between her article and the film.  Both are charged with a 
fear of a loss of humanity, be it through its reality principle or its emotive/affective capacities. 
 
Steyerl, Hito.  “The Spam of the Earth: Withdrawal From Representation”.  The Wretched of the Screen. 
Sternberg Press, 2013. 160. 
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unstoppable and fatal hemorrhaging. The point here is that in such narratives typically 
passive media objects– which is to say, appliances such as television and radio that are there 
to be watched or to be listened to – take on the status of aggressors or active dangers. Even 
though their function remains the same (transmitting information), the deadly nature of the 
signal charges these physical objects with a threatening and very “present” quality. In other 
words, what once would fade so easily into the background is now made quite prominent 
through its malfunction.   
In terms of film history, David Cronenberg’s Videodrome addressed the concept of 
malicious signals long before The Signal would, and the similarities between the two in terms 
of plot are quite noticeable. Videodrome’s major threat, and the source of its horror, comes 
from a weaponized signal transmitted through televisions which induces frightening and 
violent hallucinations in its viewers/listeners. It is specifically transmitted over a television 
show titled Videodrome, a staged snuff program in which a victim is tortured and murdered 
on live air during each episode. The hallucinations brought on by the signal are revealed to in 
fact be the symptoms of a tumor which the signal creates in the viewer’s brain. While the 
tumor allows for hypnotic suggestion (something used to murderous effect in the film’s 
denouement), its ultimate goal is to kill, wiping out swaths of television viewers who would 
ostensibly find a show like Videodrome entertaining in the first place. It is revealed by the 
end of the film that the organization responsible for the signal is a reactionary group intent on 
wiping out moral decay within North America. Cronenberg’s film is a double-sided critique: 
on one hand it criticizes the degenerative effects of television’s cultural saturation, but on the 
other critiques those who would turn their apprehension towards explicit media content into 
oppressive ideology. What connects the two is a focus on an amplified presence of and 
  185 
anxiety towards media that defies its set design. Indeed, while the physical radio plays little 
part in the film, its theoretical implications do fall in line with the prior examples. The 
television in Videodrome always pushes against the boundaries of its set purpose and nature, 
gaining hallucinatory organic appendages or speaking directly to its viewers as if in 
conversation with them. It asserts its presence through its faulty behavior, and like The Signal 
and Silent Hill, the malfunctioning device becomes a portal for paranormal phenomena or 
threatening forces.294 There is a pattern at hand with such narratives, and it is one that will 
lay the path towards addressing numbers stations in terms of a metaphorical “darkness”.295 
 This very pattern, i.e. the broken/malfunctioning media device as connected to the 
paranormal, forms the basis of a large section of Eugene Thacker’s writings.  He argues in 
                                                             
294 I would like to avoid seeming here as if I am reducing all of Videodrome’s horror down to the image of the 
broken television.  Scholarship on the film has rightfully placed much focus on body, as Videodrome’s 
characters frequently morph into grotesques of human/technological fusion.  In her article “Visual Aesthetics 
and Ways of Seeing: Comparing “Ringu” and “The Ring””, Valerie Wee brings Videodrome into her discussion 
as a means of situating the unique nature of Ringu, an otherwise aesthetically similar film.  She states: 
 
Despite the visual echoes, however, the notions of horror expressed in Ringu and 
Videodrome diverge in distinct ways. Interestingly, where Cronenberg's vision explores a 
paranoid reality of altered states, and situates terror in the collapse of bodily integrity and 
wholeness and in the loss of previously existing boundaries between the self and what lies 
outside the self, Ringu's moment of body horror is predicated less on Sadako's uncanny 
ability to cross the highly permeable boundary between the natural and supernatural world 
than on her destructive and malevolent quest for vengeance. Where Videodrome explores a 
terror founded on the collapse of culturally established boundaries between self and other, 
between biology and technology, the horror in Ringu is differently situated within a 
worldview in which supernatural manifestations of anger and vengeance can invade the 
natural world to wreak destruction. 
 
While I do think Wee is correct in her readings of Videodrome and Ringu, I am hesitant to accept her claim that 
the ability of Ringu’s ghost to enter the natural world through media devices is of lesser importance.  Like 
Videodrome, Ringu places much focus on the uncanny horror of malfunctioning devices.  In fact, both films 
exhibit several close-up shots on television screens and video footage during their tensest moments.  Hence, I 
am left wondering if Wee’s claim is perhaps a reach.  Nevertheless, the comparison is merited, and Ringu 
stands as a complementary example for the argument at hand here. 
 
Wee, Valerie.  “Visual Aesthetics and Ways of Seeing: Comparing “Ringu” and “The Ring”.  Cinema Journal.  
Vol. 50, No. 2 (Winter 2011).  52. 
 
295 For the purposes of concision, I will from here on refer to this style as media-horror. 
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his essay “Dark Media” that the narrative trope of media serving as paranormal gateways is 
quite well established.  While this particular essay forfeits the historical/archeological thrust 
of his other works on horror, it is nonetheless fascinating, particularly because the way that 
he discusses this trope suggests the presence of a deeper form of media-centric anxiety.  
Before engaging with this particular idea, it is worth outlining his general hypothesis.  He 
offers an overview of the relationship between humans and media as follows: 
While we may use media today in an everyday context, it seems that we also 
like to imagine media having the exceptional ability to mediate between a 
world here-and-now and a world that remains mysteriously inaccessible to us 
without the use of media.  In the horror genre, what we witness is an evocative 
concept of the supernatural as itself mediated, often through objects that are at 
once overly familiar and highly technical, objects that are everyday and 
opaque at the same time.296 
 
It would seem as if Thacker’s assertion is in part inspired here by the media phenomenon 
referred to as “black-boxing”. This term has been used semi-critically within the scope of 
media theory to discuss invisible algorithms that guide search-engine results, financial 
transactions, etc.297 298 However, its general use dates back to the writings of early 
cyberneticists such as Nobert Weiner,299 and it refers to hardware or software that obscures 
its technical processes, algorithms, and physical workings beneath a simplified user interface. 
Because of this relative obscurity, users frequently have little concept of how media works 
outside of its simple input and output functions (i.e. Press the power button, the television 
                                                             
296 Thacker, Eugene.  “Dark Media”.  Exocommunication: Three Inquiries in Media and Mediation. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2013. 102. 
297 Goffey, Andrew & Matthew Fuller.  Evil Media.  Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012. 
298 Pasquale, Frank.  The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015 
299 Katherine Hayles has engaged several times with the Macy Conferences of Cybernetics and the history of 
cybernetics in general, offering insight into these early experiments that would lead to what would become 
known as “black-boxing” in science and engineering.  For more see her seminal book How We Became 
Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics.  
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shows images). The mediating processes are obscured, and this sometimes spreads to what 
they mediate as well. For example, as access to the internet becomes more accessible and, in 
effect, “black-boxed” to a larger degree, the internet assumes a distant or abstract quality as it 
can neither be accessed nor conceived without a computer or smartphone.300 
 Thacker thus argues that media-horror is particularly sensitive to this concept.  In a 
certain sense, when abstracted from their technical origins of production, concepts such as 
“the internet” or “radio” take on a supernatural tone.  He states: 
...it appears that the supernatural has returned--not in the guise of answered 
prayers or holy wars, but via the panoply of media objects that satellite us and 
that are embedded into the very material fabric of our bodies, cities, and lives.  
No longer is there a great beyond, be it in the topographies of the afterlife or 
the mythical journey of reincarnation.  Instead, the supernatural is embedded 
in the world here and now, manifest via a paradoxical immediacy that 
constantly withdraws and cloaks itself.  The supernatural seems to be as 
immanent as its media are--distributed, ubiquitous, in the “cloud” and 
enveloping is in its invisible, ethereal bath of information and noise.  The 
function of media is no longer to render the inaccessible accessible, or to 
connect what is separated.  Instead, media reveal inaccessibility in and of 
itself--they make accessible the inaccessible--in its inaccessibility.301 
 
                                                             
300  This phenomenon is not restricted to everyday users of technology.  As the humanities has continued to 
turn to data and informatics as legitimate fields of inquiry, the issue of visually conceiving or representing 
informational structures (such as the internet at large) has proven to be quite difficult.  Alexander Galloway’s 
essay “Are Some Things Unrepresentable?” addresses this issue: 
   
Amid all the talk recently of ‘data’ and ‘information’ it becomes more and more difficult to 
know what these terms mean, or indeed to tell them apart in the first place.  Are the nodes 
meant to represent data, while the links represent information?  Is data meant to be textual 
and static, while information is elastically structured via flows and arrangements? 
 
It may go without saying, but if academic discourse aimed precisely at representing such concepts struggles 
with the task, then the appeal of black-boxing is understandable on the part of the everyday user. 
 
Galloway, Alexander.  “Are Some Things Unrepresentable?”.  Theory, Culture, and Society.  28. 7-8 (2011).  87 
301 Thacker, Eugene.  “Dark Media”.  Exocommunication: Three Inquiries in Media and Mediation. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2013. 95-96. 
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Such information and networks are in themselves intangible, and they are only given 
representation via the physical devices used to access them, corporate or academic graphic 
visualizations notwithstanding. And like certain metaphysical conceptions of the afterlife or 
spiritual realms, these networks are commonly conceived as omnipresent yet somehow 
undetectable to human senses. It is on this basis that Thacker states, “To reveal the 
manifestation of that which does not exist--this is not simply a matter of data visualization or 
the construction of augmented realities.  This is a religious impulse.”302 This is a 
characteristically dramatic statement on his part, but no less insightful for it. Smartphones, 
computers, televisions, radios: these devices all require a certain amount of faith, insofar that 
they are expected to follow certain functional patterns, and they perhaps align with a human 
tendency of trying to represent the un-representable.303 As Thacker notes, what results is 
media simply representing inaccessibility in itself. To offer a practical example, if an iPhone 
user were to access a note or document stored in iCloud, the document would serve as an 
index for the cloud as a whole. This is to say that it verifies the presence of the cloud and its 
continuing function. But at the same time this does nothing towards altering the 
unintelligibility of the cloud in itself.304 Thus, media devices as envisioned by Thacker 
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University of Chicago Press, 2013. 96. 
303 Thacker has devoted an entire book to the often-tangled history of philosophy’s relationship to both life 
and death, titled After Life.  Since his approach there is strictly exegetic of older philosophical texts, I will 
devote no space to it in the body of this chapter.  That said, it is well-worth reading as a means to further 
unpack his opaque claims of such “religious impulses”. 
304 This claim is pointed towards a hypothetical public of casual users rather than academics or designers.  
With regards to the former, Tung-Hui Hu has written a detailed genealogical survey of the material and 
repurposed infrastructures that led to the establishment of today’s cloud networks, fittingly titled A Prehistory 
of the Cloud (2015).  His critical aims diverge from Thacker’s in the sense that he is more interested in how the 
cloud has effectively overlaid past infrastructures of control and surveillance, in turn infusing it with similar 
methods and aims.  That noted, his methodology stands to prove Thacker’s claim here.  Even with his 
commendable concision, Tung-Hui’s analysis spans several decades and material strata, so much so that it 
stands to further complicate the nature of cloud networks themselves.  As Thacker argues, the closer one 
moves to the network, the more it expands beyond simple boundaries and delineations. 
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contain within them elements similar to the supernatural experience and the perception 
thereof, and as such are metaphorically suited for horror narratives involving paranormal 
activity. The logical extension of this claim is that the image of a spirit or entity passing 
through a television or radio resonates with the fundamental nature of contemporary 
media.305 Hence, Thacker offers a potential reason for the continued popularity of such a 
metaphor within horror fiction. 
    To recapitulate, Thacker argues that media-based societies are in some ways 
conditioned to accept the inaccessibility of information networks, and so the introduction of a 
supernatural threat via media directly interacts with this naivety. These invasions are also 
frequently framed as malfunctions or breakdowns, as evidenced by Silent Hill, Videodrome, 
etc., and this brings into sharp focus the normally invisible “black-box” of the device itself. 
This results in a coupling of defamiliarization and the aforementioned sense of rejection. In 
media-horror, the failure of the device brings not only the device into clearer view, but also 
the user/victim’s fundamental lack of understanding of said object. Further, its failure is a 
direct rejection of the user/victim’s desires or expectations, and this serves to alienate them 
even more. Here, like the dark web, Thacker looks at technology in general as inhabiting a 
dark space of intelligibility, and through this is fosters a similar sense of anxiety or dread.   
 The supernatural exchange (the metaphorically supernatural network for the 
traditionally supernatural spirit, entity, etc.) adds a second layer. In his book The Dust of This 
Planet, Thacker develops one of his major philosophical principles, the World-Without-Us, 
an idea that finds partial resonance with the phenomenon of numbers stations. Essentially, 
                                                             
305 While Thacker focuses on the contemporary moment for this particular passage, his further work on horror 
philosophy branches into earlier forms such as magic circles and tomes, for example.  For more, see his book 
In the Dust of This Planet (2011), a work I will return to in due time.   
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horror films find general force in their use of a realm, creature, or spirit that fundamentally 
rejects human cognition or representation. In other words, these entities serve as a limit of 
human understanding, and their dangerous aspects are sourced as much from this function as 
their physical capabilities. Thacker frequently refers to Lovecraft’s “Old Ones” to articulate 
his claim, noting that Lovecraft’s uncanny horror is largely found in his characters’ inability 
to describe what they have seen.306 He describes this process as the unveiling of a “World-
Without-Us”, which is to say a space or realm that holds no quarter for human thought or the 
sanctity of human life. In addition to this, it not only functions wholly without human beings 
but also opposes (violently, in the case of many horror narratives) any attempt to harness or 
understand it. Indeed, the more one tries to interact with or describe beings from this space, 
the more these entities recoil into obscurity. 
 As a whole, Thacker posits the “World-Without-Us” by way of sources that involve 
quantifiable objects of fear. Creatures that enter through television sets, ghosts detected 
through radios or other media objects, etc.: these form the conceptual thoroughfare for his 
philosophy. But it is important to note that in almost every instance, his examples form a 
media-supernatural dyad of sorts, wherein the summoned or invading being reformats the 
specified use of the media portal. Once these objects reveal themselves as paranormal 
gateways, they are reconfigured and attached to the “World-Without-Us” and must be 
globally reconsidered. Now removed from its previously benign existence, the television or 
radio is permanently affixed to an emergent narrative of dangerous otherness, and this 
narrative is made doubly frightening due to the sense of our rejection from cognitively 
grasping what lies beyond. I note here once again that while this type of narrative has 
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crystallized into a trope within fictional horror, it finds direct corollaries in real-life cultural 
phenomena as well, a subject that I will cover later on. There are, for that matter, inflections 
of Thacker’s World-Without-Us paradigm within his previously articulated discussion of 
“dark media”. In similar fashion, an increased dependence on distributed networks and black-
box based technology has created a quasi-“World-Without-Us” in the form of cloud 
computing, algorithms, and networks. Certainly, these systems and networks are by no means 
supernatural, having taken shape from human ingenuity and labor. Nevertheless, Thacker 
posits these phenomena as if they were supernatural in a phenomenological sense, which is to 
say on the part of everyday human interaction with these systems and perception thereof. If 
such technology is perceived as operating invisibly in metaphysical terms, as Thacker argues, 
then it stands to reason that such human-made systems can import an affective portion of the 
World-Without-Us, and as such induce similar fearful, anxious, or dreadful reactions. This 
conclusion need not remain aloft on a theoretical plateau, to be sure, for what is the culturally 
inscribed narrative of the AI takeover if not concrete evidence of this claim? A human made 
system eclipsing its boundaries and fundamentally redefining the human relationship to the 
world, now placed in relief against a world that offers neither primacy of nor concern for 
human existence: we construct a world that rejects us. While this is an extreme example, to 
be sure, the main takeaway here is that Thacker develops his concepts of “dark media” and 
the “World-Without-Us” as a means to illustrate a particular sense of human fear in the face 
of the unknown, one augmented by the increasingly opaque boundaries of communication 
media. It is this particular brand of fear and fascination that I argue informs the cultural 
response to numbers stations, and one can locate its genesis in the first years of shortwave 
radio use, and even to one of its progenitors: the telegraph. 
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3. Ghostland 
 In the advent of commercially available shortwave radio kits, amateur users were 
enamored by its far-reaching communicative potential. Amateur shortwave use increased in 
the United States from the 1920’s onward, largely from the use of early crystal radios, a 
phenomenon covered by Susan Douglas in her expansive book, Listening In: Radio and the 
American Imagination.307 During this incipient moment for regulated mass-broadcasting, 
amateur users—or DXer’s—experimented with shortwave radio as a means to contact 
foreign countries across the sea. This activity, while increasingly popular, was by no means 
the dominant form of listening at the time.  But, for those who indulged in DXing, there was 
a certain sense of revelation that appeared with each transmission.  Douglas argues:    
Certainly there were many radio fans who simply found a local station they 
could tune in and reliably stuck with that.  But discursively and imaginatively, 
DXing was the practice that infused radio with its sense of romance, magic, 
and potential for nation building.308 
As she notes, for a large majority of listeners, the radio largely was approached as a passive 
experience. Families would gather around the unit and listen to what was being broadcasted 
at the time, and input was generally restricted to changing the dial and finding another show.  
This is not quite the same experience as that of DXer’s, as one of their principle early goals 
was to establish contact with shortwave users in other parts of the globe. Douglas’s remark 
about a “potential for nation building” is a grand statement, but rightfully so. In a sense, 
amateur shortwave use upheaved prior-held notions of distances and borders. It was not an 
                                                             
307 Douglas offers a bracingly deep historiography of American radio between this text and her book Inventing 
American Broadcasting, 1899-1922.  While my analysis will focus more directly on Douglas’s theoretical and 
categorical points, I have gleaned my historical remarks from her research as well. 
 
Douglas, Susan.  Inventing American Broadcasting, 1899-1922.  Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1988. 
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act of simply listening, but rather one of building community, fueled by an imaginative drive.  
Shortwave could be used to reach out, rather than solely receive, and a type of sonic 
cartographic imaginary swiftly took hold.  
 Douglas argues that this particular induction to the imaginary manifests itself in a 
form unique to radio listening in general. Since the content of radio has no visual component 
in the way that a novel, television, or computer would, it necessitates a certain adaptation 
with regards to listening. Douglas refers to this as “dimensional listening”, defining it as 
follows:             
Dimensional listening is another matter and is activated by a range of genres.  
Here, whether we were listening to Fibber McGee and Molly, Edward R. 
Murrow on a London rooftop during the blitz, Jean Shepherd, or the Chicago 
Cubs, we created in our mind’s eye three-dimensional locales; saw living 
rooms, cityscapes, battlefields, ballparks; watched the cascading contents of a 
closet, or distant flares, or a bat cracking a ball.  This listening is work—you 
have to keep track of people and locations—but it is also highly gratifying 
because it is your own invention.309   
 
In other words, the radio listener is invited to imagine a space in which the auditory content 
is set. Douglas uses “dimensional” with specific intent: this cognitive process gives 
dimension and depth to what is heard, and this allows radio to play on the entire sensorium 
rather than just hearing alone. While she discusses the process in terms of radio shows and 
sports matches above, there is little reason why this could not apply to DXing wholesale.  In 
contacting other DXer’s from around the globe, these users created a new dimensional space 
via sound and communication, a reconfiguration of boundaries and the outlining of a new 
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radio-nation. In other words, DXer’s create a cognitive map through these connections, and 
this imaginary space coalesces into a world. It could be built from a variety of constituent 
parts: successful communiques with foreign citizens, fragments of voices or music floating 
through the ether, a multitude of languages and incidental sound. Douglas’ example of a 
baseball game is so evocative and rich due to its focused nature, but this does not preclude 
the more amorphous sonic components of DXing from holding such creative potential. 
 The “active” aspect of this cognitive effect is clear, insofar that the DXer actively 
builds a nation, or world, or realm out of the fragments of sound that they receive. But the 
term “active” invites further unpacking though, and this hones in on the active/passive 
dichotomy Douglas’ invokes as a means to distinguish DXing from listening to the radio as a 
source of entertainment. If it could be taken to mean using the radio to seek out or contact 
outer realms, “active” listening would then incorporate not only the process through which 
numbers stations enthusiasts have built their subculture, but at least one compelling historical 
precedent set before their time. In his book Haunted Media, a compelling study of the 
historically contingent conceptual connection between communication media and the 
spiritual “other”, Jeffrey Sconce devotes the second chapter to discussing a fringe religious 
group called Modern Spiritualism that developed into a peculiar sect in mid-19th century.  
Spiritualism, in a broad sense, believed in the ability for mediums to contact the spirit realm 
in order to communicate with departed loved ones, evidence for an afterlife and confirmation 
of religious testaments to that fact. Modern American Spiritualism in particular incorporated 
the telegraph into this practice, drawing on a constellation of contemporary beliefs 
concerning the electric composition of the human soul and its ability to wander the ether. As 
Sconce notes, this came about simply as a natural development of widely held beliefs 
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concerning communication media at the time, both religious and secular in nature.  He 
writes: 
  In the age of telegraphy and wireless, in other words, many believed  
  telegraphs and crystal sets could be used to contact incredible and unseen yet 
  equally “real” worlds, be they extrasensory or extraterrestrial. The ethereal 
  “presence” of communications without bodies suggested the possibility of  
  other similar preternatural interlocutors, invisible entities who, like distant  
  telegraph and wireless operators, could be reached through a most utilitarian 
  application of the technology.310 
Unlike the passive interception or invasion by otherworldly beings, the type of interaction 
characterized by the paranormal malfunctioning of a device, the active dimension of this 
impulse set about the creation of an exploratory “telegraphic imagination”, as Sconce dubs it.  
He cites an account from 1874 in which a medium accessed a spirit through a telegraph, and 
upon its contact announced that Morse’s invention of the device was entirely contingent on 
help from the spirit realm in its creation.311 It is a fascinating and watershed moment, one that 
Sconce argues acts as a sort of ground zero (along with Modern Spiritualism as a whole) for 
the loosely connected group of paranormal electronic media narratives such as the selection I 
cited, a group that persists in largely similar fashion to the contemporary moment.312 This is a 
bold claim with certain challenges in its maintenance. For instance, one can locate the first 
instance of a “spiritually” powered machine in the form of Hephaestus’s automata in 
Homer’s Odyssey, a small army of machines he employs in the creation of Achilles’ shield.  
But an automaton is of a different conceptual format than the telegraph or radio, and there is 
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weight to Sconce’s argument, certainly insofar that the Modern Spiritualist narrative can in 
fact be seen in so many traces in contemporary horror fiction at minimum. 
 Whatever the case may be, this telegraphic approach to contacting the spirit realm 
opened up a realm of possibilities for those so inclined in the 19th century. Sconce clarifies 
that the question of whether or not an individual believed in the telegraph’s power is less 
significant than the discursive and narrative forces that its possibility opened up in the first 
place.  He notes that Spiritualist mediums were almost exclusively women, as the ability to 
tap into the spirit realm wholesale was viewed as a feminized or “hysterical” attunement to 
otherworldly energies.313 An unforeseen result of this gendered partitioning was the 
endowment of full discursive authority onto the part of the medium, if only for the moment 
of the séance itself. It is of little surprise then, as Sconce notes, that several mediums claimed 
that the spirits who they contacted would frequently demand advances in women’s rights and 
protection against violence, these appeals charged with the authority of a higher existence.314  
What this reveals is that, in part, the “spiritual telegraph” was still viewed as a way to 
manipulate the spirit realm (or the idea thereof) in the service of human kind and its 
particular needs. Despite accessing the irrational, the telegraphic approach shackled the 
paranormal to rational ends, and this is the effect of the prevailing scientific environment of 
the time as a whole. Sconce notes, “More than an arbitrary, fanciful, and wholly bizarre 
response to the innovation of a technological marvel, the spiritual telegraph’s contact with 
the dead represented, at least initially, a strangely “logical” application of telegraphy 
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consistent with period knowledges of electromagnetic science…”315 In other words, the 
spiritual telegraph and Modern American Spiritualism harness the concept of a World-
Without-Us (this being the spirit realm as a whole) and affixed it to a World-For-Us, created 
by “us” as humans. It aligned snugly with scientific ideas of the time and was used in part to 
either reinforce or alter cultural and political mores, but never truly negate them.  But even 
though this would not align entirely with Thacker’s idea, it nevertheless serves as a 
foundation for the evolution of this paranormal connection with media and the World-
Without-Us at large. 
 It is a foundation that would take little time to fall apart, though, with Spiritualism as 
a whole considered defunct and losing much of its public stock by the end of the 19th 
century.316 The next innovation in line, that being Marconi’s development of wireless 
transmission, would reignite the public association of media with the supernatural, but in a 
distinctly different tone. Perhaps a result from its wider applicability, or of its less restricted 
nature, or even the symbolic loss of wires, wireless communication inspired a type of 
apprehension and fear that sharply contrasted with the wide-eyed optimism with which 
telegraphy was met after its invention. This is of course not to say that such apprehension 
was universal, nor is it a claim that telegraphy did not have its abundant share of skeptics.  
Wireless transmission did, however, appear to open the gates to the ether far wider than the 
public once thought possible, and the subsequent loss of perceived control inspired a palpable 
sense of concern. Sconce writes: 
  Although no less awestruck than the speculative narratives and supernatural 
  theories that greeted telegraphy, fantastic accounts of wireless technology  
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  were decidedly more anxious, pessimistic, and melancholy. In the first three 
  decades of the new century, a variety of paranormal theories, technologies, 
  and fictions challenged the otherwise wholly enthusiastic celebration of the 
  emerging medium by suggesting an eerie and even sinister undercurrent to the 
  new electronic worlds forged by wireless.317     
One such conception was of wireless transmissions travelling across an ethereal radio 
“ghostland”, a term coined by P. T. McGrath, in which the reduced volume of a person’s 
voice in response portrayed them as pushing through a dense void, the act of signing off 
leaving them dead.318 The invocation of wireless space as “ethereal” became almost 
omnipresent, generally conceived as a vast and often dangerous space, largely an effect of its 
mysteriously extrasensory nature. Sconce explains:  
  Fantastic accounts of wireless suggested hazards of disembodiment and  
  dissipation lurking in these mysterious atmospheric oceans.  Not only did the 
  metaphor of the “etheric ocean” encourage the idea that one could become 
  “lost at sea”, but it also implied that, as with the oceans of the earth, unknown 
  creatures might stalk this electronic sea’s invisible depths.319 
Through the lens of this narrative, the human voice becomes representative of the human 
body as a whole, or perhaps its soul, placed at great risk when sent out into the void of radio 
waves. Sconce is apt to note the connotation of otherworldly beings lurking in this space, as 
this would stand to inform the plethora of examples in fiction wherein ghosts, creatures, or 
spirits lash out through the newly opened gateway of communication.   
 In other words, wireless radio conceptually opened a World-Without-Us, in a sense, 
as this “etheric sea” treated us as the intrepid invaders, and with the loss of all senses but 
hearing, humans found themselves diminished in terms of their defenses. Within this 
framework, the earlier Spiritualist beliefs regarding the ether as the realm of the dead gained 
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greater force due to factors both historical and fictive. Wireless communication arrived at 
nearly the same time as World War I would ravage the globe, and as a result of this, families 
found themselves having to contact their loved ones deployed on the frontlines through a 
medium that reduced their present to quiet and broken transmissions. Before their probable 
deaths would even occur, it was as if they were speaking from the netherworld in real time, 
wireless devices bridging the gap in an unnerving spectacle.320 And of course, it would be 
wireless transmission that would lead to the contemporary practice of ghost hunting. While 
the practice has evolved to the point of using a remarkably vast array of detection 
technologies (infrared scanning, motion detection, electromagnetic frequency arrays, 
sophisticated thermometer systems etc.), one of the principle devices of ghost hunting 
remains the simple audio recorder. Used to capture vocal sounds from spirits (referred to as 
Electronic Voice Phenomena, or EVP, by ghost hunters), ghost recordings are frequently 
considered to be paramount evidence by believers, second only perhaps to video or 
photography. Audio recording is, of course, not the same format or procedure as wireless 
communication proper, but the concept of capturing the sound of spirits does in fact find its 
nascent moment with wireless technologies. Sconce cites several incidents wherein early 
adopters of wireless sets heard voices of deceased relations announcing themselves through 
transmissions, thereupon captured in recordings and used as testament to the existence of an 
afterlife of some kind.321 The point here is that from its invention, DXing and wireless 
exploration was colored with the tint of a world beyond our senses, and with this came a 
sense of humans overstepping into frightening and dangerous realms. Douglas’ account of 
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exploratory listening and world-building forms the surface layer of the cultural effects and 
opportunities afforded by wireless, a bright new frontier ripe for adventure. The secondary 
history explored by Sconce, however, outlines the world beneath the surface, steeped in 
shadow and a dark alternative. 
4. Letting the Devil Through the Doorstep 
 With this history established, my aim is to draw the cultural narrative of numbers 
stations into dialogue with the paranormal foundations of wireless and Thacker’s conceptual 
framework. Much like the vocal fragments of spirits entering through a set from another 
realm, numbers station transmissions disrupt the “radio-world” in such a particular way that 
it invokes a sense of the “World-Without-Us”. While they do not do so by explicitly evoking 
the supernatural or paranormal, they nevertheless resist easy codification into clear identities 
or source locations. They are paradoxically hidden, but universally accessible to anyone with 
a shortwave radio set and time. They either await interception, or are sent with little concern 
as to whether or not they ever found. With the latter aspect in mind, it would appear as if they 
spawn from a world that can neither be affected by our interactions nor take into 
consideration our presence at all. But if they are in fact spy transmissions, as conjecture and 
one high profile arrest indicates, they do promote harm even in the most benign of cases, 
save those sent as a lark by individual shortwave users. This final point offers the most 
pronounced complication of discussing numbers stations, as in the absence of voiced national 
or governmental responsibility, there is no assured way to conclude whether or not they are 
in fact genuine or come from another enthusiast. Furthermore, the baseline for “genuine” 
dissolves on contact in the face of this problem, given that there exists no functional metric 
against which a transmission may be tested, instead only circumstantial evidence and 
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inference. Finally, numbers stations are rarely, if ever, believed to arise from supernatural 
sources or realms, instead assumed to be human generated. The question, then, is why these 
transmissions incite a markedly similar set of responses to those of the early days of wireless 
communication. To claim that it is simply an effect of the unknown would seem too facile in 
approach.        
 There is a network of qualities operating within numbers stations, and they work 
together to evoke an affect of anxiety and dread on the parts of listeners. By analyzing a few 
representative examples of numbers stations, one can see this effect with more detail and 
clarity. “The Lincolnshire Poacher” in a certain sense stands as a model for the 
overwhelming majority of numbers stations. As a rule, numbers station transmissions begin 
with a set of repeating tones or short loops of music. These tones and loops are often 
composed with rudimentary synthesizers, a scant few exceptions using direct samples of 
orchestral scores. In certain cases, a synthesized or sampled voice first reads a test pattern of 
numbers, counting from zero to a selected limit number in ordinal succession. Following this 
preliminary section, believed to be a test pattern for listeners, these particular broadcasts 
enter a sequence common to almost all numbers stations with remarkably few exceptions.  
The voice reads a string of seemingly random numbers (dictated within the limited set 
established at the start when present) for anywhere from roughly thirty seconds to several 
minutes. Some broadcasts will repeat this pattern a second time, and following this repetition 
the same loop of tones or music that marked the beginning of the broadcast will repeat again, 
forming a closed bracket. The station will return to dead air in most cases until it activates 
again, some on the same frequency while others jump to a different one. In the case of 
frequency jumps, archival sites such as Priyom have noticed that they often rotate in a set 
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pattern that can be traced with relative ease. Broadcasts of this type are thus identified by 
similarity in composition (i.e. the same voice, same tone/music bracketing, etc.) until they 
can be verified as following a chartable rotation of frequencies. Critically, numbers stations 
are routinely un-obscured, meaning that the broadcasts are not jammed or scrambled, and 
they are easily accessible to anyone who possesses a shortwave radio set. In other words, 
numbers stations are public broadcasts.   
 However, this does not by any means diminish their inscrutability. The standing 
consensus is that numbers stations are broadcasts of coded messages. Given that each station 
tends to use the same format while broadcasting different strings of numbers, aficionados 
conclude that each broadcast is a single message delivered to a field agent or spy in an 
undisclosed global location. There are some exceptions to this rule: A station colloquially 
referred to as either “UVB-70” or “The Buzzer” emits a continuous buzzing tone on repeat, 
but scattered recordings of alleged Russian military commands have appeared on it. This has 
led some to conclude that it serves as an alert system for a Russian military base with the 
buzzing tone serving as a signaling mechanism.322 However, “UVB-70” is a distinct minority 
amongst number stations, and there has even been one high profile case that has lent 
credence to the theory that these broadcasts are indeed used for global espionage.   
 In 2002, Ana Montes, an analyst for the US Defense Intelligence Agency, was 
arrested and convicted of espionage for the Cuban government. FBI agents discovered that a 
partial method through which she was receiving orders and directions was a shortwave radio 
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station sending strings of code. Montes would then use a “one-time pad”323 to decrypt the 
messages and plan her actions accordingly. It is a short logical step to conclude that these 
shortwave broadcasts were formally similar, if not right identical, to numbers stations, 
heavily suggesting that numbers stations are fundamentally tools for spy communications.  
Despite this blunder, no government has either formally discussed their use of number 
stations or disclosed their origins, leading to a noticeable blank space in their definitive 
identification. This is coupled with the aforementioned point that very few number stations 
transmissions have been convincingly “decoded” in any fashion. If in fact numbers stations 
are one piece of a complete Vernam cipher, and if the cipher system is working as intended, 
ant attempt at decryption would be entirely fruitless. Given such a lack of conclusive 
information combined with the ludic allure of puzzle solving, each broadcast becomes a 
mystery with aspects both obvious and subtle for examination. Hence, these factors sow the 
seeds of obsession and fear in equal measure: an endless puzzle to be solved with assumedly 
nefarious secrets hiding beneath. As Priyom displays, these examinations can be of great 
depth indeed, but they rarely settle into a verified and solid conclusion.  In metaphoric terms, 
at the core of numbers stations lies an informational dark zone, a point wherein all efforts at 
examination eventually fail. 
 This “dark zone” in terms of quantitative opacity only gains force when coupled with 
the qualitative “darkness” of numbers stations, through which one can establish a link to the 
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“dark world” of spirit mediums. The aesthetic qualities of each broadcast, while ostensibly 
designed for the sake of uniform reproduction and functionality, nevertheless impart a 
distinctly disturbing tone, a tone reflected in the popular response to their recordings. These 
recordings appear from time to time on trivia or list-based websites, and they are frequently 
described as being “creepy” or “disturbing”, in one case placed side by side with significant 
airwave hijackings and the (in)famous “WOW” signal, a transmission associated with 
potential alien life.324 This may seem a bit excessive, given that a recorded voice reading 
numbers might not seem particularly noteworthy on its own. Nevertheless, there is something 
anomalously affecting about these stations, an ineffable quality that taps into a sense of 
mystery and eerie distance. In a 2014 interview with the BBC, archivist Akin Fernandez 
remarked, “Once you hear them, it has an effect on you…it is a dry subject until you listen to 
them.”325 This comment is particularly significant given its source, as Fernandez is 
responsible for The Conet Project, an audio archive of numbers station recordings sold as a 
three CD set. One of the most extensive compilations of its time (until the advent of websites 
like Priyom), it transcended its niche appeal and was sampled in more mainstream music, 
most notably Wilco’s Yankee Hotel Foxtrot, whose very title hails from one of the numbers 
station broadcasts captured in Fernandez’s archive. That ineffability, that “changing” effect, 
was transformed via such samples into an alien otherness that did not even need to put forth 
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its historical baggage, that being its ties to espionage. Instead, these samples, and The Conet 
Project as a whole, can be taken as a selection of transmissions from some unknown world, 
announced through these distant and uncannily inhuman voices. Like the quiet voices 
battered across the “etheric sea”, they open a conceptual plane that, as Fernandez puts it, 
alters the global perception of the listener, carried into a “world-without-them”.  In this light, 
the placement of a numbers station in the same rhetorical space as conjectural evidence for 
alien life seems less capricious.   
 What is even more fascinating is the “taxonomy” of numbers station voices, of which 
there are two principle “types”. Each produces a unique affect or sense of otherness, and it is 
worth describing each in greater detail.  One type of numbers station tends to use 
rudimentary vocal synthesizing programs or applies basic effects such as ring modulation to 
short recordings of a human voice. An example of this type would be the station colloquially 
referred to as “Chinese Robot”, in which: 
  [The broadcast] is started up on usually two randomly chosen frequencies,  
  which are not simultaneous emissions. Each broadcast may use a different  
  sideband, and each usually a different speed, but both may be using the same 
  speed. The transmissions consist of long, 20- to 36-digit strings, recited in fast 
  Mandarin Chinese.326 
As a technical note, “In an AM-modulated radio signal, a base signal, called the carrier, is 
continuously broadcast. The two modulating signals are called the sidebands. Any audio that 
you hear on an AM broadcast station is from the two sidebands.”327 In other words, the base 
frequency can be heard as static or a low hum on AM frequencies with no ongoing broadcast, 
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whereas the sidebands function as the channels through which auditory information is 
transmitted.   
 What is notable here is that “Chinese Robot” is particularly elusive, as it truly jumps 
to random frequencies as opposed to locking into a set pattern like “The Lincolnshire 
Poacher”. To complicate matters more, the transmission sometimes appears in divided form 
across two randomly chosen frequencies, perhaps allowing for additional security. What this 
means is that “Chinese Robot” can only be tracked by pattern with regards to its 
aesthetic/auditory qualities, but due to its highly distinctive nature, this is an easier task than 
it would seem. “Chinese Robot” uses one of the most obviously synthetic vocal patterns, 
eschewing the uncanny realism of the majority of broadcasts. The numbers themselves are 
read in very rapid succession, appearing to oscillate between three to four tones. Given that 
the broadcasts are assumed to emerge from China, (hence the station’s bluntly explanatory 
nickname) this is likely an attempt to replicate the tonal patterns of Mandarin Chinese. It is 
difficult to tell if a ring modulation effect has been applied to the voice or if it is distorted by 
auditory artifacts from the broadcasting process, but in either case, the voice has a distinctly 
tinny quality, with each number resonating at a high frequency and sounding entirely 
artificial. The recordings of “Chinese Room” (perhaps also in part due to the faint hiss picked 
up on reception) are in fact quite unsettling. The numbers are clipped tightly so that each 
takes less than a second of vocalization, and coupled with the undulating tones, they are more 
evocative of malfunctioning machinery than a human voice. Despite this distortion, one can 
still pick out hints of formed words even if one does not speak Mandarin Chinese, but this 
only adds to the dissonance for an outside listener rather than clarification. “Chinese Robot” 
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is distinctly “inhuman”, so to speak, as if it were a voice permanently altered on the “etheric 
sea”, scrambled beyond repair.328    
 One would think that the second type would rectify this unsettling nature, but often 
ends up doing nothing of the sort. These types of numbers stations use either direct samples 
of human voices or more advanced speech synthesis programs which are then spliced and 
rearranged into the number sequences.329 There is a large variety in such samples, from adult 
men and women to young children depending on the particular broadcast. One such example, 
and a particularly famous one at that is a broadcast known as “The Swedish Rhapsody”. It 
apocryphally takes its name from the repeating loops of music that bookend the 
transmissions, which appear to be recorded from a music box.330 The musical tones are high-
pitched and harsh, enough to cause large amounts of distortion in certain broadcast 
recordings. The music loops for around two minutes, followed by samples of either a 
woman’s or young girl’s voice reciting strings of numbers in German. Compared to “Chinese 
Robot” the voice in “The Swedish Rhapsody” sounds much more identifiably human, but it 
is no less uncanny for it. It  speaks in a hushed tone throughout, but due to either the nature 
of the broadcasting or recording equipment, certain syllables (specifically the word “acht”) 
are much more pronounced to an almost startling degree. This results in a sequence of words 
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that fall out of a natural flow or syntax, immediately betraying the artificial nature of the 
source. Further, the entire broadcast (or at least the existent recordings thereof) are particular 
laden with auditory static, causing each hard syllable to cut through with an uncomfortable 
harshness. It is quite possibly the most well-known example of a numbers station next to 
“The Lincolnshire Poacher”, with YouTube videos of its recordings amassing upwards of 
500,000 views. On one such video, the description reads: “One of the better-known numbers 
stations -- and fittingly so. Its haunting, intermittent jingle is the stuff of nightmares, to be 
certain.”331   
 This description indicates the broadcast’s music as its locus of dread, but I would 
argue that the particular way in which numbers stations employ synthetic voices plays as 
large a part. Essentially, there is something internally discordant about these voices, insofar 
that they superficially carry the trappings of humanity but could never be mistaken as such.  
In cases such as the “Chinese Room”, the outright shattering of this illusion compounds this 
effect even more so. They are uncanny the sense of the original German term, unheimlich, an 
“unhomely” feeling that rises from encountering something once familiar but somehow alien 
due to the subtlest of changes. 
 While there are many theories of the uncanny, Sigmund Freud’s landmark work being 
the most obvious choice, I instead find resonance with the work of Roland Barthes on the 
intangible qualities of the human voice, namely in the medium of sound recording.  In his 
article “The Grain of the Voice”, he analyses what he considers to be fundamental element of 
the voice, something that he calls, unsurprisingly, the “grain”. This “grain” is a type of vocal 
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signature, unique to each vocalization and a vector for subconscious processes of 
identification. Barthes focuses almost exclusively on singing in his essay, but his categorical 
points are more universally applicable.  In particular, he draws a distinction between two 
types of singing that he refers to as the “pheno-song” and the “geno-song”.  He explains:  
The pheno-song (if the transposition be allowed) covers all the phenomena, all 
the features which belong to the structure of the language being sung, the rules 
of the genre, the coded form of the melisma, the composer’s idiolect, the style 
of the interpretation: in short, everything in the performance which is in the 
service of communication, representation, expression […] The geno-song is 
the volume of the singing and speaking voice, the space where significations 
germinate ‘from within language and its very materiality’; it forms a 
signifying play having nothing to do with communication, representation (of 
feelings), expression; it is that apex (or that depth) of production where the 
melody really works at the language—not at what it says, but the 
voluptuousness of its sound-signifiers, of its letters…332 
In short, the pheno-song is responsible for communicating information and expressing 
emotion, but it lies within the realm of technique. Hence, Barthes notes that style is an 
expression of pheno-song, however this style is formed, as it is a complex of techniques and 
approaches that directly work at the informational level. For example, the phrase “I love 
you,” can be spoken or sung in a multitude of ways, with each intonation or utterance altering 
the impact of the phrase. Where a flat delivery could call into question the sincerity of the 
sentiment, an emotional or dramatic delivery could offer a sense of veracity.  On the other 
hand, the geno-song is something much deeper. Barthes depicts it as something approaching 
a “pure voice”, in that it is not touched yet by emotion, information, or communication.  
Essentially, geno-song is a marker of human voice by way of fundamental aspects such as the 
volume, pitch, and tone that colors a vocalization before technique is applied. In a way, it is 
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the affective voice, operating at a level prior to cognitive applications of signification or 
“meaning” and instead communicating fundamental “humanness”. 
Perhaps numbers stations receives their eerie quality in part from an imbalance 
between these two “voices”. The mechanical delivery of the numbers in “The Swedish 
Rhapsody”, for instance, appears to deprive the voice of geno-song. Given that the voice is a 
spliced set of samples, the natural variation of tone in a human voice is removed, and the 
inhuman quality of such repetition is amplified. Further, this effect is bolstered precisely due 
to the fact that the samples are sourced from an actual human voice, and this works only to 
draw the listener’s attention to this error. It is here, I argue, in which a sense of the uncanny 
enters from the start. On top of this, the auditory artifacts and modulation effects applied to 
the voice only separate it from a sense of humanity even further. Interestingly, this effect 
does not often seem to be expressed to popular songs that make heavy use of vocoders and 
effects such as auto-tune, elements which quite explicitly align the voice into the category of 
pheno-song while erasing geno-song components. By this measure, it would follow that a 
broadcast such as “Chinese Robot” would have less of an ability to induce the same unsettled 
reactions as “The Swedish Rhapsody” because it sounds expressly more artificial.  If the 
uncanny valley could be applied to sound, it may find its proof in the latter of the two 
stations. 
What to make of this in light of the technical history of spirit mediums and 
communication technology? As Sconce puts forth, much of the eeriness inherent to 
shortwave communication during its inception was due to the cultural narrative of radio 
tapping into an etheric dimension. As a result, the tinny and quiet voices on the other side 
appeared to be adrift on its waves, lost somewhere in an uninviting, astral dimension.  
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Following Barthe’s line of reasoning, the transposition of the voice into the medium of 
electronic communication would deprive these voices of their tangible human qualities, ones 
only possible to experience when in close proximity to the human source. Perhaps this is a 
significant factor in what lent these transmissions their “otherworldly” or spiritual qualities, 
in the occult sense.  While these transmissions were verifiably “human” in the sense that they 
could respond to conversation, replied in real time, etc., something was lost along the “etheric 
sea”, allowing this technology to fit snugly into the established narrative connection between 
radio and the spirit realm. Numbers stations, then, send this disconnect into overdrive, as they 
add to the process a very noticeable artificiality via the use of sampling. That these 
recordings attempt to mask said automation with vocal samples only amplifies it all the more, 
with no noticeable trace of living humanity present. In splicing and reforming these bits of 
human voice, numbers stations emerge not as some poor soul lost at sea, but a recombinant 
creature born of a parallel world, “the creepiest thing you could hear.” 
In the absence of public acknowledgement of these stations on the part of global 
governments, numbers stations at the core remain unknowable, relegated to conjecture and 
speculation.  But this unknowability extends beyond the informational content therein, 
augmented by the aforementioned vocal uncanniness at play. If shortwave radio was invented 
to bridge the gap between countries, cultures, and peoples, numbers stations persist as an 
artifact of this cultural history of the occult, as if through the means to connect and render the 
world more transparent, they steadfastly hold a portion of the veil in place. Like an entity 
slipping in from a “world-without-us”, they defy understanding but also reject knowability 
on a deeper, affective sense, insofar that these recordings refuse basic vocal connection. As 
mentioned earlier, that these recordings are, of course, made by human beings, Thacker’s 
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paranormally charged framework can only go so far, but his idea is not predicated on the 
acceptance of the paranormal itself. Instead, it speaks to a certain sense of anxiety, a certain 
sense of dread that arrives part and parcel with the fundamentally inexplicable and 
unrelatable. That the “creepiness” of numbers stations persists in the cultural consciousness 
despite the relative conclusiveness of the espionage theory is more testament to Thacker’s 
claim than a rebuttal thereof. Even in the face of a perfectly logical conclusion, numbers 
stations are approached as if they are one more chapter in the occult narrative of radio 
transmission. While their nature can be rationally explained, the associated fear is remarkably 
similar in tone to the early days of shortwave. Numbers stations are more than likely the 
work of spies, but they are also relics of a past age, serving as linger heralds of a time when 
the span between shortwave sets was a “dark zone” of frightening potential.  As public 
listeners, we cannot decipher the instructions of these chopped up, distorted voices. Instead, 
we are left to wonder, “If not for us, then for whom?” 
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Chapter 4: Death by Disconnection: EMP Attacks and Existential Terror 
 
1. A New and Ancient Threat 
 On September 7th, 2017, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
officially announced the successful test of a hydrogen bomb.333 Details about the precise 
measurements and yield of the bomb were scant in the official announcement, and it was in 
fact the second claim on the part of the DPRK that they had successfully detonated a 
hydrogen-based weapon, following one from nearly two years prior on January 6th, 2016.  
While this earlier claim was met with scientific skepticism based on available seismic data 
from the region coinciding with the time of the announcement334, the latter event created an 
earthquake ten times as powerful as the test from 2016335, lending credence to the validity of 
the DPRK’s announcement. The international response was one of expected condemnation 
and fear, especially given that this test punctuated a rapidly increasing exchange of bellicose 
rhetoric and threats between the DPRK and the United States. Should the DPRK truly have 
crossed the technological threshold into the production of hydrogen weaponry, a dormant 
strain of anxiety from the Cold War threatens to reemerge into the world, long since muted 
by the global termination of public nuclear tests that once dominated the physical and 
cultural landscape of the 1950’s and 1960’s. Unlike the overwhelming spectacles of Bikini 
Atoll and the Tsar Bomba, however, this test (like all of the DPRK’s prior nuclear tests) 
                                                             
333 Kemp, Ted.  “North Korea hydrogen bomb: Read the full announcement from Pyongyang”.  CNBC News.  
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occurred underground, leaving analysts to work with only secondary traces of the explosion 
as a means to determine the nature of the weaponry involved, traces such as the 
aforementioned seismic data. While the Cold War-era nuclear tests between the United States 
and the USSR assumed a quasi-Bataillian tone, vast and sublimely visible expenditures of 
energy (quite literally) as a means to reconstitute vectors of power336, the DPRK’s tests enter 
a far more complex space of deployment. As globally invisible events marked only by 
proximal phenomena, the tests assume a sense of the virtual that appears to galvanize fearful 
responses in a more insidious manner. While the nuclear displays of the Cold War visually 
left absolutely nothing to the imagination of the viewer, the DPRK’s subterranean explosions 
trigger the virtual potential of an unknown space and an unknown event, only accessible 
through sequelae.  
 It is one these secondary effects that will be the focus of this chapter: EMPs. “EMP” 
is shorthand for an electromagnetic pulse, a burst of electromagnetic radiation that is formed 
by and follows from a large surge of energy, scaling from local disturbances such as large 
short circuits or lightning strikes, to galactic scale events such as a solar flare. EMPs pose an 
increasingly pressing danger for developed areas, especially those that rely on a densely 
interconnected electronic grid. This is due to the face that an EMP possesses the ability to 
overload power grids and networks due to the sheer magnitude of its energy expenditure, 
causing effects that range from temporary disruptions to electrical service to irreversible 
physical damage to wires and electronic systems. Should an EMP of sufficient power and 
range be released over a country, it contains the potential to permanently damage its entire 
electronic infrastructure, and at worst cause a deeply catastrophic and widespread blackout.  
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Given the fact that an EMP causes a blackout through a pulse of radiation rather than a 
locally manifested event (i.e. a downed power line, damage to a power plant, etc.), very few 
areas would be spared its effects, limited to cases such as fiber optic cables, fuel-powered 
generators, or areas enclosed within EMP-shielding materials or structures (such as Faraday 
cages). Unfortunately, EMPs can in fact be weaponized, and are always a byproduct of 
nuclear explosions. 
 Indeed, the threat of an EMP burst arrived part and parcel with the news of North 
Korea’s hydrogen bomb test, inciting a wave of discussion, both anxious and skeptical, 
concerning the potential of an EMP attack carried out by the DPRK on the United States, 
Japan, or South Korea: all countries heavily reliant on disbursed electronic networks. And 
while disbursed networks are commonly seen as protective measures towards large-scale 
explosions or disasters337, a resultant EMP would render such protection moot, potentially 
crippling any widespread network as a whole. The effects of EMPs are not purely theoretical, 
to be sure, as there are several historical instances of EMP bursts causing unpredictable and 
destructive effects on power grids. As one of the more prominent examples thereof, in 1962 
the United States detonated a high-altitude nuclear weapon as a means to study the effects of 
nuclear explosions in space, resulting in unforeseen consequencea. Dubbed “Project 
Starfish”, the explosion created a massive and unpredicted EMP burst, resulting in the 
distortion of measuring devices and (far more dramatically) the near-instantaneous blackout 
of nearly three-hundred streetlights in Hawaii.338 On a greater scale, a solar storm339 that took 
                                                             
337 Perhaps erroneously so.  See: Hui Hui, Tung.  A Prehistory of the Cloud.  Cambridge: MIT Press, 2016. 
338 Vittitoe, Charles N.  “Did High-Altitude EMP Cause the Hawaiian Streetlight Incident?”.  Sandia National 
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place in 1859 (dubbed the Carrington Event) caused a variety of strange effects to occur 
along global telegraph networks, due principally to a surge of induced current created by 
resultant EMPs from the flares. Said effects ranged from telegraph operators successfully 
sending messages without batteries due to the level of induced current, to destructive fires 
caused by telegraph devices that emitted sparks after having overloaded.340 
 Alarming as such phenomena may be for those in range, these incidents share in 
common a demonstrative significance at a reduced scale in terms of the total destructive 
potential of EMPs, especially those that have been weaponized for the express purpose of 
blacking out entire electric grids. In other words, the damage or disruption of such events 
was localized or temporary in nature: streetlights were repaired, telegraph offices 
reconstructed. Luckily, a full-scale permanent blackout, the type that is almost universally 
implicit within discussions of EMP warfare, has never been seen within recorded history.  
This serves, however, as one of the prominent factors that imbue EMPs with a sense of 
virtual terror. Much like the nuclear tests of the DPRK, EMPs have only been witnessed or 
recorded in diminished capacities, vestiges of the full potentiality of its effects.  
Compounding this issue is the fact that EMPs themselves are invisible processes, insofar that 
the wave of electromagnetic energy is invisible to the human eye. The only way to 
“experience” an EMP is through its resultant aftereffects, all phenomena predicated on a 
sudden and disruptive darkness, and even this scenario lies largely within the realm of the 
virtual. 
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 It is through this very point that I wish to make an intervention, examining the way in 
which the EMP serves as a type of terminal symbol of fear by way of darkness. I use terminal 
here in the sense that in a metonymic or indexical sense, an EMP burst stands in for a total 
existential crisis. However, the task is significantly more complex in this particular case, as 
unlike the prior three subjects of the preceding chapters, this phenomenon does pose a 
significant threat to human life. Consequently, EMPs mark a complex liminal space for what 
has been discussed up to this point, as the posited resultant space of darkness produces deep 
existential dangers past a certain threshold of severity, thus breaching the metaphorical 
register and moving into a material stratum of actual physical death. Following this, EMPs 
stand in many ways as a total concretization of the metaphorical bridging of darkness with 
death and fear within media/communication technology as examined thus far. At a certain 
point, when discussing the destructive effects of nationwide blackout, as hospitals lose 
power, food spoils, communication is severely disrupted, transportation halts, engaging such 
an event in terms of its metaphorical or affective content lapses into hollow discourse.  
 What is important to remember, though, is that an EMP of such magnitude (i.e. 
apocalyptic on a global or national scale), despite any and all evidence or debate as to its 
inevitability, still remains a product of narrative creation, as one has still not yet happened.  
One can see remarkable similarities between current surge of anxious pieces concerning 
EMPs and the nuclear panic of the Cold War, namely the increase in speculative fiction that 
outlined post-nuclear holocaust landscapes.  Much as the nuclear bomb became a 
metaphorical symbol for the Cold War, EMPs function similarly for the contemporary 
moment, responding to inherent dangers and weaknesses of an increasingly large global 
electronic and communication infrastructure. As the nuclear bomb promised to obliterate the 
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world in a lake of fire, EMP’s serve as an updated force of erasure: a Nyx of the information 
age. While this chapter will commence with a more detailed explanation of the physical 
processes at play within EMPs (as well as the particular reasons why the United States and 
Japanese electric grids in particular are susceptible to attack), its principal object of analysis 
will be the growing narrative discourses concerning EMPs, namely the manner in which they 
assumed a greater and more threatening space over the course of the past five decades.  
Within this set of media (taken to mean newspaper articles, US EMP Commission joint 
hearings, government announcements, interviews, popular literature, etc.), there exists a 
tightly wound discursive system at play, one hearkening back to deeper cultural narrative or 
mythos of darkness as a primeval void, or an ultimate end. What these statements and write-
ups also reveal is a societal contingence on electricity as a means to define itself: where the 
lights go out, society ceases to exist. In other words, EMPs introduce an interesting polemic, 
namely as to how society (including not just physical and spatial characteristics but also 
ethical and behavioral aspects) is predicated on an aegis of electric power just as significantly 
as territorial delineations or cultural assemblages. While EMPs possess all of the 
metaphorical dimensions explored in the prior chapters (darkness as a symbol of death, 
unchecked/unregulated growth, unknown threats, etc.), they are unique insofar that they also 
invoke a deep-rooted fear concerning cultural and societal fragility. Through the rapid, 
violent severance of technology, humans face an existence laid bare, an unwelcomed 
deterritoralization, all while a deadly darkness crashes through the gates.  How this specific 
kind of darkness is characterized in terms of narrative is nothing short of mythic or religious 
in scope, and this lends EMPs a sort of absolute grandeur, virtual apocalypses in each burst.  
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Before illustrating these particular narrative bylines, discussing the mechanical and scientific 
aspects is a critical step towards understanding this metaphorical shift. 
2. Overload 
 EMP bursts are in actuality quite common phenomena when discussed in terms of the 
total scope of their manifestations and occurrences. Given that the term “EMP” simply refers 
to an electromagnetic pulse of energy, any phenomenon that produces an unrestricted burst of 
energy (be it thermal or electric) concomitantly releases a burst of electromagnetic energy to 
a certain degree. Generally, in order to produce a visible effect (taken in this case to mean 
interference with electronic systems or atmospheric flashes), such bursts of energy would 
nonetheless have to be of a relatively significant scale, but this very relativity is proportionate 
to both the source of the energy burst and the system with which it interferes. As a shorthand 
rule, the burst must be larger than a receptive electrical system to cause destructive effects.  
Furthermore, nuclear explosions and specialized EMP weaponry mark the high upper end of 
this distribution in terms of both size and rarity (save, of course, events of a galactic nature 
such as a meteorite impact or solar flare). Lightning, for instance, a globally ubiquitous 
meteorological phenomenon, is an EMP producing process and considered to be a major 
manifestation thereof. The electrostatic discharge of a lightning strike is so immense and 
concentrated that it creates a localized burst of electromagnetic energy that possesses the 
ability to cause indirect damage to electronic systems in the immediate area. Interestingly, it 
is one of the few cases in which the resultant EMP itself produces visible flashes and 
distortions in the upper atmosphere.341 Still, lightning-induced EMPs (damaging as they may 
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be to proximal electrical grids and appliances) effectively remain contained to the immediate 
area of each strike, thus losing the long-reaching and comparatively dramatic effects of 
nuclear-based EMPS (Starfish Prime, for instance). At the smaller end of this scale, the 
ignition of car or motorcycle engines can cause visible picture interference in certain (usually 
older) television sets. While minor, such occurrences are theoretically caused by small pulses 
of electromagnetic energy that follow the initial burst of thermal energy when starting a 
vehicle.  Hence, EMPs can in fact occur on the level of annoyance or inconvenience, rather 
than apocalypse, and are far more present within the scope of electronic ecosystems than the 
panicked zeitgeist may have one believe. As previously stated, small as these EMPs may be, 
the pulse nonetheless is able to overload a proximal electronic system, causing interference 
within devices proportionate to the size of the EMP itself as well as those that do not contain 
adequate protections such as shielding, sufficient capacitors, etc.342 In the case of a nuclear 
bomb generated EMP, the sheer magnitude of potential electromagnetic radiation 
(determinant on the size of the bomb) would easily overload any circuitry or wiring in its 
path, such systems lacking the safety systems to handle such an event.  
 Nevertheless, the physical processes through which EMPs form remain the same 
across this scale of magnitude, as do the means through which they cause direct damage.  
While the sequence of events behind large-scale, nuclear-based EMPs are quite complex, the 
basic concept can be articulated as matter of elementary physics, insofar that an EMP is 
simply a surge in electromagnetic radiation, and this radiation is a force given off by all 
physical bodies in the universe. As all matter is composed of charged particles (atoms, of 
course, whose charge arises from electrons), all matter too possesses a magnetic field of 
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some degree.343 Given that charged particles oscillate at varying frequencies, their motion 
emits electromagnetic waves through said fields, and these waves emit as thermal radiation 
as long as the radiating matter has a core temperature above absolute zero, which is to say all 
matter on Earth344. Since thermal radiation is in and of itself a form of electromagnetic 
radiation, it can be charted along the same electromagnetic frequency, with the frequency of 
said waves proportionate to the temperature of the matter (i.e. the faster the oscillation of 
charged particles, the more overall heat that they generate.). The following figure offers a 
schematic distribution of electromagnetic wavelengths and frequencies:    
                        
345  
 
Humans, for example, emit the majority of their electromagnetic radiation at the infrared 
level, and as the above chart indicates, this radiation exists just outside of the visible 
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345 “Electromagnetic Spectrum”.  Sapling Learning: Chempendix.  Macmillan.   
Fig. 15: A graphic representation of the electromagnetic spectrum.  Nuclear weapons produce gamma rays amongst other types 
of high-frequency radiation.  It is this short wavelength in particular that serves as the catalyst for large-scale EMP bursts. 
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spectrum of light.346 This leads to the observation that light itself falls within the 
electromagnetic spectrum as well (an important issue with regards to fiber optic protections 
against EMPs, one of the most effective, if underused, strategies).  The fundamental process 
here, that being the oscillation of particles producing waves and heat by extension, operates 
in both directions as well, in that matter can be heated by certain electromagnetic waves if 
subjected to ones of enough intensity (such as a microwave cooking food, or an induction 
stove). 
 The point of this is to demonstrate a direct correlation between the relative 
temperature of an object and the frequency of the electromagnetic radiation that it emits.  
Taking the above examples into consideration, the basic takeaway is that matter of lower 
temperatures will emit longer wavelength electromagnetic waves, while hotter matter will 
radiate increasingly short-wavelength radiation. This is to say that if an event were to occur 
in which an object or space were to rapidly reach high temperatures (such as an explosion), a 
sharp increase in short-wavelength electromagnetic radiation would occur simultaneously. In 
such a case, if within proximity there were a susceptible piece of equipment such as a closed-
circuit electronic device, or one with inadequate shielding, this burst of energy could 
manifest as electrical current within the system and overload the wiring of said device, thus 
resulting in the stereotypical effects of an EMP event. This goes to explain the 
aforementioned incidents of car ignitions affecting older television sets as well as the way 
through which lightning induces the same effects at a far more drastic scale. However, when 
discussing existentially threatening EMPS, specifically taken in this case to refer to those 
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following nuclear blasts, the explanation becomes significantly more complex. To be sure, 
while nuclear blasts are absolutely massive explosions, the principle threat of a nuclear EMP 
is that it contains the potential to affect an entire country if exploded at the correct altitude, 
whereas the blast itself would not equate to the size of the country itself. No longer need the 
Cold War image of a nuclear holocaust apply: the true destruction may hail from a blast that 
does not even touch the ground.  How this process of amplification occurs is partially 
engendered by the sheer volume of electromagnetic radiation emitted from a nuclear blast.   
To discuss this effect requires introducing the concept of blackbody radiation here, as 
while the physical concept of a blackbody only truly exists in the theoretical realm, nuclear 
explosions approach levels of energy that can be measured in such terms. The term 
blackbody was coined in 1859 by physicist Gustav Kirchoff, and it refers to something that is 
both emits and absorbs radiation at perfect efficiency.347 To elaborate, a blackbody would 
absorb one hundred percent of the radiation directed towards it, and in turn would be able to 
emit an equitable one hundred percent of the absorbed radiation with no disruption by its 
form or the material out of which it is made. Due to this perfect absorption, the object would 
in turn be purely black (unless greatly heated), as it would neither reflect or allow any light to 
escape.  The method through which the spectral density348 of this emitted radiation could be 
calculated was the great discovery of Max Planck, who proposed what would come to be 
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known as the titular Planck’s law in 1900.349 Essentially, Planck’s Law dictates that if an 
object reaches thermodynamic equilibrium, which is to say that it operates as its own 
enclosed system with no interference from outside operations (a crude example of this 
interference would be opening the door of a hot oven, thus releasing heat out into a now 
larger thermodynamic system, in this case the kitchen), then through a specific calculation 
the range of emitted radiative frequencies can be determined with almost exact specificity.  I 
offer the equation for Planck’s Law below:  
350 
 
Under such ideal circumstances (i.e. total thermodynamic equilibrium), an object or system’s 
temperature directly correlates to the type and density of radiation that it releases. Given that 
Kirchoff’s theoretical concept of a blackbody posits an object at perfect thermodynamic 
equilibrium, this specific type of radiation was dubbed blackbody radiation, as it would 
theoretically demonstrate the quality of radiation released by such a stable object. Further, 
this particular spectrum of radiation is characteristic to the theoretical blackbody model, 
appearing to follow a strict pattern of correlation between radiation and temperature.351 
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 Of course, blackbodies do not exist outside of theory as far as the limits of known 
physics are concerned. All objects or systems are in some (even infinitesimal) way affected 
by outside thermodynamic operations.352 As such, Planck’s Law is often used to approximate 
the maximum amount of radiation that any body or object can emit when it is at a state of 
theoretical thermodynamic equilibrium, and this emission is coupled with the way in which 
an object changes color as it increases in temperature. Stars, for instance, despite not being 
true blackbodies themselves, do approach a relatively close level of equilibrium, which then 
allows them to have the spectral density of their radiation calculated through Planck’s Law.  
Since stars tend to have more photons interact with electrons within their cores rather than 
escape (the process that generates the visible starlight we see at night), the internal 
temperature tends to remain at a stable and immense level over time, thus producing a 
spectrum of radiation that closely adheres to the characteristic blackbody spectrum as 
verified by Planck’s Law.353 An interesting side effect of this is that the total spectral density 
of emitted radiation and the temperature of a star can be estimated by its color (crucially, 
though, this temperature estimation only applies to the visible outer layer of a star, where 
temperatures are comparatively cooler than their cores by orders of magnitude). 
 Why talk about stars, though, when a nuclear bomb related EMP remains a terrestrial 
and local phenomenon in comparison? Simply answered, the sheer energy of a nuclear blast 
produces temperatures that for a brief moment approach the estimated core temperatures of 
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many stars, including that of our own sun. Within the first brief moments, the core of a 
nuclear explosion has been cited as reaching temperatures of minimum 10,000,000 K354, with 
further estimations of contemporary hydrogen weapons reaching ranges between 50,000,000 
K to 150,000,000 K.  Given that the estimated surface temperature of the sun is around 5,500 
K with its core reaching temperatures of 15,000,000 K355, one can with little exaggeration 
claim that the opening millionths of a second of a nuclear bomb are equitable to the birth of a 
star on terrestrial land. Since contemporary nuclear weaponry (or, to be more precise, 
thermonuclear) utilizes fusion as its principle catalyst, the resultant explosion creates a core 
so dense, with such immense temperatures, that the initial reaction would create a moment of 
thermodynamic equilibrium, meaning that the majority of molecules react within the core of 
the explosion before escaping. Due to this very phenomenon, nuclear explosions operate 
within the range of the blackbody spectrum, as they essentially produce stellar conditions.  
Considered alongside of the basic electromagnetic spectrum, if nuclear weapons do indeed 
achieve pseudo-blackbody conditions, the temperature of the blast would correlate precisely 
to an increase in emitted wavelengths, something demonstrated by the fact that a large 
portion of energy emitted by a nuclear blast takes the form of x-rays and gamma rays, the 
very same classes of waves emitted by stars, incidentally.356  
 Gamma rays are at the heart of what gives rise to nuclear EMPs, as these rays cause 
an immense electromagnetic field due to a process known as the Compton effect, in which 
gamma rays tear electrons away from atmospheric molecules and allow them to travel freely.  
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These electrons accumulate and produce an electromagnetic field that is pushed away from 
the explosion, a result of the field’s negative charge repulsing the positive charge of the 
explosion itself.357 In terrestrial conditions, this blast would be confined to a relatively short 
radius, somewhere within the range of two to five miles358. Under high-altitude conditions, 
the exact threat fueling the anxieties concerning North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, the 
radius of a resultant EMP magnifies exponentially. Since a high altitude explosion would 
involve a far larger amount of energy directing downwards (as the explosion itself would not 
be blunted by the actual terrestrial ground), the resultant gamma rays effectively strip more 
electrons as they pass through denser areas of the atmosphere, creating a huge area of 
negatively charged particles, estimated at being up to fifty miles thick.359 These particles are 
then forced back towards the earth in a conic shape due to interactions with the Earth’s 
electromagnetic field, raining down towards the planet with vastly accelerated speed and area 
of effect.360 This process is the dreaded high altitude nuclear EMP itself, and its effects are 
posited as being exponentially devastating in proportion to its increased range. What poetic 
irony in this process: the birth of a star on Earth gives way to a planet plunged into darkness. 
   This particular type of EMP tends to present itself in three stages, or pulses, named 
E1, E2, and E3 respectively. E1 is the primary pulse that causes the most immediate and 
direct damage, and this is the stage that most closely corresponds with the cultural perception 
of EMP events (i.e. a sudden, wide-reaching and total blackout). Its range is wide and its 
onset is the fastest of the three, with effects, according to an independent report by the 
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Congressional Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic 
Pulse Attack, that “[disrupt] or [damage] electronics-based control systems, sensors, 
communication systems, protective systems, computers, and similar devices.”361  
Theoretically, the overwhelming surge of current from E1 would accumulate within wiring 
and cables of sufficient length and cause them to serve as antennas of sorts, building up 
voltages that exceeded capacity and causing severe, often permanent structural damage to 
unprotected systems. E2, by contrast, tends to cover the same area as E1 but is of lower 
amplitude, causing it, once again, theoretically, to pose a lesser threat to protected critical 
systems.362 Unfortunately, if one looks at the types of systems and components susceptible to 
the damage of E1, they include the very types of control and regulatory mechanisms that 
would serve to normally protect infrastructural systems from a pulse of E2’s strength. Thus, 
the rapid onset of E2 following E1 allows E2 to do severe damage of a far greater scale in 
terms of widespread infrastructural effects.363 Whereas E1 would short out protective 
measures across its area of effect, E2 would damage the larger communication, 
transportation, medical, and electronic systems across this area. In quotidian terms, if E1 is 
what turns the lights off, E2 keeps them off, and it prevents any unified response to the event.  
E3 then serves as a sort of final blow, consisting of a “slower-rising, longer-duration pulse 
that creates disruptive currents in long electricity transmission lines, resulting in damage to 
electrical supply and distribution connected to such lines.”364 In sequence, E1, E2, and E3 
create a procession of events that not only destroy electrical equipment but also remove from 
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the table the systems necessary to even approach restoring damaged mechanisms and 
systems. This cascade of effects is what lends high-altitude nuclear EMPs of this nature their 
apocalyptic tenor, as the sheer magnitude of protective or recovery efforts seems impossible 
to achieve in both directions, leading to a doomsday scenario for an affected nation. So much 
of a country’s infrastructure that is taken for granted as being accessible and present 
(communication, food supply, medical services, police and protective systems, etc.) would be 
taken down simultaneously, each possessing synergistic relationships with one another that 
only are revealed in the moment they fall apart, a broken tool in the Heideggerian sense 
expanded to nightmarish scales. 
 It is this “EMP eschatology” on which this chapter will focus, but I do not intend to 
fully write it away as hyperbolic, despite very clear exaggerations. These responses rise as a 
product of perceived infrastructural weaknesses, and in some cases, the weaknesses extend 
beyond the common knowledge of the populace. The next section will briefly discuss these 
particular infrastructural qualities of the United States and Japan, as they are two countries 
most directly involved in recent discussions and anxieties towards EMPs. 
 3A. The Snowball Effect – Infrastructural Vulnerabilities of the United States 
 An updated version of the “Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the 
United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack” from 2008 takes a far more 
exhaustive analytic approach in terms of charting the specific infrastructural vulnerabilities 
endemic to the United States. In it, dire scenarios are multifarious and surprisingly unique in 
their damaging effects. Given the sheer length of the report, my aim here is to select the 
events with either the widest ranging or most intractable effects as a means to illustrate a 
“worst case scenario”, as it is from this extreme that popular narratives of EMPs draw 
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inspiration. Of course, this begins with an EMP’s effect on the electrical grid, and while these 
effects would not be unique to the United States necessarily, the report still sheds light on the 
particular dangers for the sheer size of the country. To summarize, a nuclear EMP would 
theoretically initiate a catastrophic domino effect starting at the level of power generation 
and continuing along to transmission infrastructures. Regarding power generation, the major 
danger hails from the E1 pulse, in that its distorting effects would in most cases trigger 
inappropriate emergency shutdown procedures within plants in the affected area.365 In a 
moment of unfortunate irony, the report notes that the sophisticated control and 
computational systems of newer plants actually makes them susceptible to damage from the 
rapid emergency shutdown procedures themselves, leading to repair needs that would take far 
longer than afforded in such a scenario. This situation would be compounded by the fact that 
the E3 pulse, due to its genesis from atmospheric distortions of a far longer duration and 
scope, would have an affinity for power lines, charging them with large amounts of electrical 
current and compounded to their sheer length (i.e. their capacity to store this current). This 
would in turn lead to direct damage to power substations and transformers along power 
routes, hence blocking the ability to divert power from a less affected area to those that are in 
critical situations, such as those in proximity of a power plant that has been damaged or shut 
down.366 Furthermore, the report notes that the high power requirements of the United States, 
typical of a highly industrialized country, have already placed many transformers within 
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close proximity to their loadbearing limits, thus causing them to be only a small push away 
from irreparable damage due to a system overload.367   
 Such a synergistic collapse, even short-lived, would then begin to apply the same 
snowballing momentum to a succession of critical infrastructures throughout the country, a 
selection from which I will sample below. Telecommunication networks would remain 
remarkably unscathed in comparison to the vast damage to electrical grids. The report notes 
that this is due to a harmonic set of circumstances that have created a semi-inadvertent shield 
to EMP effects. For instance, the report refers to the central infrastructure that connects 
various communication nodes (i.e. cell towers, routers, servers, etc.) as the “backbone” of a 
communication network.368 This “backbone” would be composed of central servers, 
telecommunication headquarters, etc. Given that many of these central locations utilize fiber 
optic cables for peak efficiency, they are largely shielded from EMP effects as such cables 
transmit light rather than conduct electricity.369 Furthermore, these buildings are often 
constructed from the start in ways that would shield them from unwanted electrical 
interference.370 Personal devices such as cell phones and laptops, while susceptible, contain 
circuitry and wiring of comparatively shorter lengths, hence preventing them from absorbing 
large amounts of current from pulses. Despite this relative shielding, however, the report 
posits that the sheer amount of attempted calls during such a widespread blackout would 
threaten to tax the telecommunications system to the point of degradation and potential 
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collapse, a situation that would likewise increase exponentially.371 Whether or not one could 
attribute this issue to the EMP itself is debatable, but it stands that such an event would 
dramatically compound recovery effects. 
 Existential risks would follow shortly thereafter. The damaging effects on electrical 
grids would have an immediate and dramatic impact on food production. The report notes 
that over the past century, the percentage of farmers in the United States dropped from 39 
percent of the population to 2 percent, shifting the balance of food production to a machinic 
and automation-based infrastructure.372 Because of this, a wide-scale blackout of nuclear 
EMP proportions would have an inordinately profound impact not only on food production, 
but also factory processing and distribution. The report, one that is remarkably slim on 
hyperbolic language, refers to the distribution system in particular as a “choke-point”, an area 
that with only a limited amount of pressure would have devastating impacts on the country as 
a whole.373 The availability of food would swiftly drop due to critical failures at all levels of 
production, thus leading to rapid depletion of food stores both within directly affected areas 
as well as external areas due to attempts to redistribute food from other locations. Likewise, 
water production would also be dramatically impacted by widespread electrical failure, as 
urban centers, large building complexes, and even smaller towns routinely rely on electrical 
pumps for distribution.374 The true danger here, though, would be resultant shutdown of 
water purification plants and systems, something that the report posits would promptly lead 
to widespread public health crises due to contamination.375 Emergency services, while 
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relatively more protected than other systems, would be “degraded to the extent that they are 
dependent on other infrastructures that are themselves damaged by the EMP attack.”376  
While vehicles would be largely unscathed due to the same inherent protections of computers 
and cellphones, (and this rule extends to many non-emergency vehicles as well) and while 
many medical buildings are already shielded from electromagnetic interference due to the 
nature of operations contained within, radio communication would be adversely affected by a 
nuclear EMP, causing disarray and disorganization amongst necessary responses to 
compounding emergencies.377 Given the nature of the prior dangers regarding food and 
water, an EMP would cause an unpredictable amount of taxation on emergency and health 
services, potentially contributing to rapidly deteriorating public health scenarios. 
 While all of these scenarios tend to capture the most immediate attention with regards 
to EMP fears (and for good reason, as they pose the most direct dangers to physical life), the 
commission reserves its most alarming language for an oft overlooked but no less susceptible 
system: the financial infrastructure.The report notes that the financial system has proven to 
be quite resilient in the past, surviving past disasters (including the 9/11 World Trade Center 
attacks) and emerging all the stronger for it in terms of bolstered protection.378 That said, it 
also notes that these cases were highly localized in effect, and the tests and procedures 
deployed by financial organizations so as to gauge susceptibility often is directed towards 
cyberterrorism and hacking.379 In the case of a nuclear EMP, the simultaneous and 
widespread disruption and destruction would overload any existing protections and cause 
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irreparable damage to the financial system as a whole. It is worth examining the 
particularities of the report’s language in this section, as it makes abundantly clear that this 
level of devastation is not a matter of theoretical possibility, as with every other 
infrastructure, but of inevitability. The report refers to the effects as “fatal”, describing the 
resultant situation as a “financial infrastructure catastrophe.”380 This is a result due in large 
part to negligence, it would appear.  For instance, the report directly states: 
The vast majority of electronic systems supporting the financial infrastructure 
have never been tested, let alone hardened, against EMP.  Yet the enormous 
volume, speed, and accuracy required of the electronic infrastructure 
supporting the financial services industry allow little or no room for error.  
Financial operations could not tolerate the kind of disruptions or mass 
systemic destruction likely to follow an EMP attack.381 
The report treats the financial infrastructure as a nearly irreparable aspect of an EMP 
catastrophe, one that would result in a full stoppage of the United States economy.382 Given 
the prolific use of virtual or electronic currency in proportion to hard currency in circulation, 
there runs a larger than acceptable risk of accumulated wealth not only being blocked, but 
potentially vanishing within an instant. The report suggests, alarmingly, that the only 
protected information or funds outside of hard currency would be records kept on magnetic 
tape, a vast minority within the system as a whole.383 This claim is also made conditional by 
the suggestion that said magnetic tape “probably” would not be in immediate danger. 
 Beyond the rippling effects of food and water infrastructural collapses into the realm 
of international trade and commerce, a financial collapse of this magnitude, from one of the 
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major global economic powers, would have devastating effects on the international scale.  
For all intents and purposes, in this capacity above all others, the “local” event of a nuclear 
EMP on the United States (when observed on a global scale) would replicate the snowball 
effect within the country’s borders to an as yet unforeseen degree across the world. With this 
in mind, it is apparent that the destruction of an EMP does not limit itself to particular 
infrastructures, but instead wreaks the most havoc against infrastructure itself. In other 
words, the level of resultant damage is immediately proportionate to the level of 
infrastructural connectivity of the targeted country, something that makes the United States, 
with its vast arrays of networks crossing great distances, a particularly vulnerable target. The 
commission’s report offers at the start a graphic representation of this interconnectedness, 
displayed in the figure below: 
   384 
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As is made clear here, there exists no discrete infrastructure that possesses no critical 
connections the others. The very systems that give strength and efficiency to the United 
States in terms of accessible services and availability of information almost perversely opens 
it up to greater levels of destruction. This very point will serve later as a bridge regarding the 
transfer of this very material situation into the metaphorical and narrative sphere. With this in 
mind, it would be prudent to first turn to the second country in question, that being Japan. 
3B. A Country Divided—Infrastructural Vulnerabilities of Japan 
 Given the highly industrialized nature of Japan, it serves in many ways as a parallel 
case to the United States in terms of is susceptibilities to an EMP attack, with all of the 
preceding discussion applying to it to a comparable degree. That noted, there are specific 
considerations to take into mind concerning the country, not least of which the physical 
layout of its power network. Japan’s electrical grid is effectively divided into two major 
parts, positioned respectively in the eastern and western halves of the island. This would 
normally be of little note, at least in terms of the way that electric grids tend to be situated in 
terms of topography, that being that they are often divided into large sectors within countries 
of sufficient land area.  What is noteworthy, however, is that Japan’s grid is subject to a 
pronounced bottleneck across this division. Due to a combination of historical conditions and 
seeming complacence, these two regions have grids that generate power at both 50 Hz and 60 
Hz frequencies, with the eastern region utilizing 50 Hz generators and the west using 60 
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Hz.385  To elaborate, this nearly even split is a direct result of governmental decisions 
reaching back to centuries, as in 1883, Japan’s electrification began in earnest with the 
founding of the Tokyo Electric Light Company, which chose the 50 Hz frequency as its 
baseline.  As electric requirements and needs increased with greater rapidity, the Japanese 
government purchased electric equipment from the German company AEG in 1895. As was 
the standard in Germany, this equipment functioned at the 60 Hz frequency.386 Over time, the 
deployment of these incompatible systems became highly regionalized, leading to the divided 
country as it remains today. This is in no way a typical infrastructural scenario: on the 
contrary, it is wholly unique, as Japan remains the only existing country in the world that 
operates with two conflicting electrical frequencies.387 
 In order for the country to adequately transfer electricity across this divide, it requires 
the use of specialized facilities that can convert the frequency of the input electricity to the 
frequency of the destination area. Japan does possess such facilities, but only three, 
positioned almost directly on the border region that separates the two grids.388 While this 
surprisingly small amount of stations is adequate during ideal conditions, the inherent 
instability of such a setup was placed into stark relief following the catastrophic Tohoku 
earthquake of 2011. This was the very earthquake (and subsequent tsunami) that decimated 
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the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, catalyzing both a national and global crisis in 
terms of potential fallout and containment failures. Lesser known on the global scale, 
however, was that the same earthquake knocked eleven reactors offline in total, resulting in a 
net loss of 9.7 GW of electricity within the eastern region of Japan.389 As standard procedure, 
this would lead to any unaffected areas rerouting electricity to the disaster zone as a crutch 
until native systems are restored. The critical issue here is that this response in any other 
case, save that of Japan, would operate within an electric grid of unified frequency, a luxury 
Japan’s grid does not afford. The result was the three border conversion stations being 
overtaxed almost immediately due to such high electricity demands, with their combined 
functions only able to convert a fraction of the net loss from 60 Hz to 50 Hz in time. What 
followed was a protracted period of rolling blackouts that plagued not only the eastern region 
of Japan, but also made appearances in the western region due to a rebound effect from the 
imbalanced system. In short, Japan serves in some sense as a case study for the very dangers 
of a nuclear EMP blackout as articulated by the US Commission report, specifically its 
concern about the efficacy of supplementary power transmission following blackouts of 
sufficient size. Given the inherent imbalance of Japan’s grid structure, all of the 
infrastructural vulnerabilities detailed in the US Commission report not only apply to Japan, 
but also, depending on the context of an EMP strike, could very well be doubled. This is to 
say that only one side of the country could be targeted, and yet the other could in turn be 
brought to the brink of collapse due to this imbalance, if not pushed over the line completely.  
Combined with Japan’s moderate land size as well as it being an island (and thus made more 
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difficult to immediately reach in terms of aid even by a small margin), it finds itself in a very 
precarious position indeed in the face of EMP threats. 
4. The End of Days – Government and Official Responses 
 Having illustrated the infrastructural and systemic vulnerabilities as well as the 
theoretical results of their failures, my aim is to now guide this topic back into the realm of 
narrative analysis, in this case looking  to the tropes at play within governmental and popular 
cultural responses to this particular danger. While the approach will be familiar, comparing 
these cultural narratives to longstanding literary or mythic metaphorical systems concerning 
darkness, EMPs nevertheless bear special consideration. Whereas phenomena such as the 
deep web and numbers stations are charged with a sense of dread or inherent potential for 
harm, this is in part the result of a lack of understanding amongst the general public of the 
intent or material processes behind such structures. In other words, while one can directly 
encounter the deep web or numbers stations (i.e. anyone can download Tor or find numbers 
stations recordings online), the capacity for any resultant danger tends to be portioned off to 
highly contingent circumstances. For instance, if conjecture that numbers stations do in fact 
serve to facilitate espionage  were to be true, then any potential harm could come to the 
listener in only a few extreme cases. Either they themselves are a target of these 
transmissions, and thus are more intimately woven into this network than most from the start, 
or the resultant action of such spy activity results in an act of mass military or terrorist action 
within a country. In this latter case, while the results could be quite deadly, the numbers 
station functions as a signal and not the event itself. Similarly, given that the deep web is 
more often than not associated with thievery, crowdfunded assassinations, and child 
pornography rings, amongst others, it too only serves (correctly or not) as a staging ground 
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for such activity to cross into the physical world. As articulated in the first chapter, while 
criminal activity does indeed play out on the dark web to a degree, criminality cannot be held 
to compose the entirety of the dark web, popular assumptions aside. As such, the dark web 
maintains its status as a neutral medium “darkened” by associated narratives.   
 This is not the case at all when it comes to EMPs, as they are the only phenomena 
examined here that could lead to mass casualties in a significantly more immediate fashion.  
While the argument could certainly be made that an EMP merely catalyzes precarious events 
(i.e. infrastructural degradation and failure), and as such it too is a sort of signal for following 
dangers, the potential scale of an EMP’s blackout is something quite unique to its capacities.  
Whereas numbers stations did not create espionage, and the deep web did not spirit into 
existence the formation of shadow organizations and crime, the type of destruction associated 
with EMPs really does stand alone in its scope and reach, save a natural disaster of a galactic 
scale. Compounding this issue is the fact that phenomena like numbers stations and the dark 
web assume their unnerving or frightening “darkness” from associations with relatively 
familiar realities.  Spies and organized crime exist; pedophilia exists; cyberattacks exist.  
Hence, the ease with which one can tap into deep cultural narratives as a means to process 
the perceived dangers of these phenomena is clear, as I have demonstrated so far. 
 With EMPs, it is difficult to draw these kinds of associations, as a projected EMP 
attack on the United States or Japan would initiate an event that has only been seen quite 
rarely over the course of history. There have indeed been instances of country-wide (or 
nearly so) blackouts, most recently in India in 2012, in Argentina and Uruguay in June of this 
year, and a few months later in Java. Notably, the recent blackout in Uruguay was 
particularly intense, affecting the country in its entirety. What links the three of these 
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examples together, though, is the fact that they were all rectified within the span of a few 
days.  And while this is not to downplay the serious and deleterious effects such widespread 
blackouts can have, even for a short period, they were not (thankfully) the result of 
permanent, system wide destruction of the grid. A total and consuming, near permanent 
darkness swallowing up a country all at once: this is a liminal event in terms of 
comprehension, and as such discussion of EMPs tends to default to the most fundamental 
narratives concerning darkness as a force of purgation, as I will discuss in due time. 
Moreover, to be susceptible to this darkness is less a matter of contingent or selective 
relationships (i.e. listening to numbers stations or seeking out disturbing content on the deep 
web) than unavoidable proximity. All one has to do in order to be threatened by an EMP is 
rely on electricity, and this inherent precarity is amplified by the lack of direct reference 
points other than the similar blackouts mentioned prior.   
 This particular purgative narrative is multifaceted, such to the degree that one might 
be inclined to conceive of them as a tripartite set of eschatological narratives: narratives of 
erasure, narratives of invasion, and narratives of violent renewal. To begin, I draw sources 
for this not from speculative fictions of the event, but instead back to government and official 
discussions of EMPs, as they tend to assume a baseline platform from which subsequent 
perceptions grow. Taking stock of the United States first, there have been several joint 
committee hearings regarding the growing threat of EMPs to the country, with several 
transcribed into written reports and made freely available to the public. I offer here five of 
them, spanning a timeframe from 1997 to 2015 as a means to chart any evolution in tone 
across the hearings over time.  Firstly, the report from 1997 is particularly remarkable, as it 
proceeds overall with a tone of unsettling revelation. The overwhelming majority of the 
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hearing concerns itself with scientific testimony, all towards the apparent purpose of 
establishing EMPs as a significant threat to be considered. Within a few pages, a 
representative Owen Pickett refers to the study as “EMP phenomenology”390, an assuredly 
coincidental adoption of the philosophical term, but no less productive for such a 
coincidence. For the report does in fact read as a tentative step towards capturing the 
catastrophic essence of an EMP event, despite it claiming multiple times that such an event 
would have no direct point of comparison. It is Dr. Gary L. Smith of John Hopkins 
University’s Applied Physics Laboratory who makes an attempt to draw an analogue, 
referring to solar flare activity such as the aforementioned Carrington Event. That he refers to 
this event as “God’s EMP”391 is of particular note, especially given the apocalyptic, 
bordering on religious framework into which EMPs are often placed within public discourse.  
The testimonies and prepared statements of the 1997 hearing are colored with a tone of 
justification, meaning that the aim appears to be an assertion of the valid existence of EMPs 
as a national existential threat, as well as developing methods of protection. This goal is 
plagued by an apparently formidable obstacle, however, that being proving the existence of a 
heretofore virtual possibility. In his prepared statement, Dr. Gary Smith takes special note to 
assure at the hearing that the EMP phenomenon is “very real”392, perhaps necessitating after 
all the need for a phenomenology, as at best the committee can only piece together a 
functional idea from projected and prior experiences of a lower magnitude.   
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 Moving ahead nearly a decade to 2005, the speculative tone of 1997 is markedly 
diminished in the later report. The hearing took place in the aftermath of the September 11th 
attacks, with tensions and fears regarding terrorism still running high in the American 
cultural consciousness. Specters of the then recent attacks permeate the report from 
beginning to end. However, any discussion of EMPs must remain speculative and focused on 
potential, so a diminishing of such a tone does not equate to full abandonment.  The major 
difference in the opening statement is Senator Jon Kyl’s direct assertion that EMP dangers 
are too often overlooked and that both “the public and Congress need to pay more attention 
to that danger.”393 Taking this statement in concert with the formal title of the hearing, that 
being Terrorism and the EMP Threat to Homeland Security, at this point EMPs have 
transcended from being a nebulous potential from a post-Cold War period to an urgent (and 
much closer) threat. With the cultural dynamics and logistics of military defense having 
changed dramatically following the devastating terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, 
the increased acuity towards infrastructural weakness can be seen even in this small 
utterance. Whereas the 1997 report seemed satisfied to keep the discussion largely within the 
sphere of governance (despite the myriad mentions of public devastation), that the 2005 
hearing’s opening purpose includes greater public awareness speaks volumes. Stunningly, on 
the next page, the report reveals that Sen. Kyl feels a sense of resentment towards the timing 
of the 9/11 Commission Report’s release the year prior, claiming that it overshadowed 
2004’s EMP hearing and pushed it irresponsibly towards the background, thus implying its 
increasing sense of dire urgency.394 While the same fears of infrastructural collapse and 
related defense measures appear again, one section in particular stands out, that being Peter 
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Pry’s concern over what appears to be a growing global justification of legitimacy towards 
EMP warfare. He claims that, based on his research, many countries, despite being concerned 
with EMP strikes, see EMPs as electronic warfare over nuclear, considering it to be a 
legitimate use of nuclear weaponry as it does not cause any direct casualties. Most notably, 
he makes reference to an (uncited and untitled, unfortunately) scholarly article from Japan 
that voices this very logic, claiming incredulity that a country so historically averse to 
nuclear warfare as a result of its first-hand experience would support such a method.395 Pry’s 
concerns point towards an increased fear of “EMP Culture”, in a sense, a situation similar to 
the Cold War’s nuclear ubiquity, in which a growing permissiveness towards a falsely 
“clean” weapon of war will unlock the door for apocalyptic events. It is difficult to imagine 
from the vantage point of the present an attitude that would see a national blackout to be 
more humane alternative in war, and Pry’s statement projects a quasi-dystopian world state 
over a frightening technology, a result of permissiveness or a false faith in technology upon 
which this chapter will expand later on. 
 Another significant takeaway from the 2005 report likewise relates to its historical 
moment, as there is a marked shift in concerns regarding access to EMPs. Rather than large 
state actors, the discussion of potential attacks largely focuses on access to EMP technology 
on the part of stateless terrorist cells396. This expands the reach of EMP strikes considerably, 
removing them from an easily quantified list of national actors and into a distributed network 
of untraceable agents who could be anywhere at any time. The conversation routinely makes 
claims of the ease with which any motivated group of people could construct EMP 
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generating devices of considerable force. Rather than an EMP strike presaging or heralding a 
subsequent invasion, it is as if EMPs give credence to an invasion already in progress.  
Interestingly, while the report spends much time discussing the material ramifications of an 
EMP strike, well-trodden territory by this point, one paragraph stands out insofar that it shifts 
the target of an EMP from physical structures (indicative of earlier discussions) to one of will 
and spirit. When discussing the difference between an EMP attack versus a standard nuclear 
strike, Pry remarks: 
  Moreover, whereas the attack on a city could backfire in the sense of instead 
  of breaking the will of the American people in the war on terrorism, it could 
  just further enrage us and steal out resolve to project our military forces and 
  use our strength to prosecute that war, when you think of, well, how could the 
  terrorists possibly win the war on terrorism, this is one of the few options that 
  is available for them to actually win the war on terrorism.397 
As terrorism preys on the collective emotions of its enemy in tandem with its material assets, 
so too would EMPs strike at the emotional core of its targets. Beyond the mass destruction of 
infrastructure and concomitant loss of life, the killing blow of an EMP here is its ability to 
dismantle the resolve and character of the American people. It would seem obvious that 
within such a widespread zone of negation, deletion even, there would be an equitable sense 
of despair and panic, and this would threaten to collapse the spirits of those affected. What is 
unique here is that Pry’s comment implies that an EMP strike would also negate the sense of 
rage that would spawn a counterattack, a rage seen following past attacks on American soil 
such as Pearl Harbor or 9/11, incidentally. It is as if in tandem with a material blackout, an 
EMP would do the same to the American people on an affective scale. This begs an 
interesting question: is this “American” resolve inherent to each American citizen, or does it 
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only operate as a unified spirit, or both? If unified, does the shutdown of communication 
technology correspond to a waning of this spirit, or a complacency in the face of doom?  
While an EMP would certainly scuttle the ability to organize a coherent counterattack, Pry’s 
claim to American resolve offer more curious questions than convincing answers. For now, 
what is important is that the narrative thread concerning EMPs has moved from a speculative 
anxiety to one of explicit cultural erasure and subsequent invasion. 
 Nevertheless, by the end of the report, the same assurances of adequate protections 
under development are made, and the overall tone is one of growing, yet tempered, fear. The 
same cannot be said for the report made in 2012. The introductory remarks make reference to 
a study carried out by Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 2010, one that showed that the 
United States is in no way functionally prepared to resist an EMP strike.398 Notably, the 
report reveals that the Department of Homeland Security at that time had yet to identify EMP 
strikes as a high-risk threat, and as such had not yet implemented it into a standardized set of 
planning-scenarios.399 While the report as a whole oscillates between detailed outlines of 
projected defensive measures and reiterated claims of potential danger, one testimony stands 
out due in part to its unique speaker. Amongst a plethora of scientists and government 
officials seen the prior reports, an amateur radio aficionado by the name of Nickolaus 
Leggett submitted a written testimony, claiming that his own private studies of EMPs have 
been ignored on the part of the FCC despite his earnest pleas. The end of his testimony 
discloses what appears to be an ulterior motive, as he frames the looming EMP threat as a 
reason to allow for free construction of amateur radio antennae “despite opposition of 
                                                             
398 The EMP Threat: Examining the Consequences.  112th Congress.  9 Sep. 2012. 1. 
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homeowner associations, condominium managements, and rental landlords”400, his reasoning 
of course being that amateur radio would serve as a vital communication network following 
such an event, a not altogether incorrect claim in theory, but difficult to quantify in practice.  
It is a brief section in the middle of his testimony, however, that is the most eye-opening.  
Titled “Hostile Nations”, the section appeals to the “easily imaginable” thought that there 
exist several countries who would delight in the United States being struck by an EMP, an 
expected claim given that this very idea is the framework of the entire set of reports in the 
first instance. It is the following claim that is startling: “Also, the structure of the United 
States may become so shattered by an attack that other nations could actually colonize parts 
of the former United States.”401 What could be easily written off as the uninformed 
projections of an amateur technician before the government fall resonate quite forcefully with 
the eschatological EMP narrative as a whole. The concern with this statement is thus twofold.  
First, the idea of EMPs opening the door for not just an invasion, but colonization of the 
United States scans as a direct evolution of the transition to the hypothetical invasion of 
terrorism as seen in the report from 2005. More than just paralyzing the infrastructure of the 
United States, Leggett sees EMPs as a door through which the country could be forcefully 
transformed, a violent renewal precipitated on death and emerging from quite literal 
darkness. This leads to the second point of note, that being that Leggett refers to the United 
States as the “former” United States here. Once again, like the will and spirit of the people, 
EMPs evolve from a material spectrum to a level of destruction that targets the conceptual 
boundary of the nation itself. This is not a unique claim either, in and of itself, as will be seen 
in EMP references from popular culture. What is significant here is that it appears within the 
                                                             
400 The EMP Threat: Examining the Consequences.  112th Congress.  9 Sep. 2012. 11. 
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scope of official governance, essentially inscribing it into the narrative development of EMPs 
at a genetic level, so to speak. 
 While a report from 2015 follows largely the same patterns of the prior ones, there are 
a few noteworthy aspects to mention before shifting focus. More than any other report, the 
2015 report assumes an accusatory tone, taking aim at the perceived failures of the 
government at a bureaucratic scale as reason for so little progress having been made in terms 
of protections. After explaining the mechanical processes behind EMPs, Professor George 
Baker of James Madison University claims that absence of appropriate protections having 
been developed largely falls under the blame of hesitant financial stakeholders and a general 
lack of anyone willing to take charge.402 Regarding stakeholders, Baker claims that an overall 
sense of incredulity has led potential investors to balk at the need for applying new 
provisions to EMP defenses, instead incorporating existing measures for large scale (but 
contained) blackouts at a projected scale. He argues that these isolated events cannot be seen 
as diminished EMP-like events on a geometric scale, referring to a process through which 
EMPs would cause a cascading and catastrophic series of failures that dwarf smaller-scale 
blackouts. Due to the lack of any organizational spearhead, he further claims that EMP 
defense is passed around in an attempt to avoid responsibility, thus ensuring that no strong 
case could ever be made to convince financial stakeholders that a solid plan is in place rather 
than its “random, disoriented and uncoordinated”403 present state. Essentially, Baker’s 
written testimony can be read within the context of a long line of “media-anxiety” here, 
specifically in that he expresses concern that the threat of technological collapse erodes a 
                                                             
402 The EMP Threat: The State of Preparedness Against the Threat of an Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) Event.  
114th Congress.  13 May 2015. 19. 
403 Ibid. 19. 
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veneer that obscures a level of decay and disorganization operating at a societal level. From 
Plato’s cautionary tale of Theuth to Virilio’s apocalyptic screeds about the terminal velocity 
of technology, Baker’s claim finds a home amongst these fears, all related to the idea that an 
overconfidence in the solidity of electronic infrastructures presages a great fall. 
  Finally, the 2015 report makes several references to past large-scale blackout events 
(despite Baker’s claims of false equivalence) in what appears to be an attempt to give the 
virtual threat of EMPs a greater sense of presence. The opening remarks refer to the infamous 
1977 blackouts of New York City, an event the quickly devolved into a full-scale riot under 
the protection of a failed electrical grid. That these riots were largely catalyzed by eroding 
race relations as a result of increasing disenfranchisement of and racism towards African-
Americans in New York City largely escapes the speaker404. Nonetheless, this comparison 
sets the stage for the return of Dr. Peter Pry, who within his extended written testimony 
deploys a veritable fusillade of attempted and/or successful global terror attacks that 
specifically targeted power grids.405 In his spoken introduction, Pry also reveals that the EMP 
Commission of past reports had disbanded in the past, leaving a crucial void in terms of 
governance and preparedness. What is striking about Baker’s and Pry’s testimonies is their 
representative shift from certainty to doubt, not with regards to the exigency of EMPs, but 
instead towards an appropriate amount of attention given their way. While this entire 
selection of reports displays a consistently apocalyptic tone, the 2015 report’s pleas are truly 
unsettling, insofar that they display a sense of desperation akin to the panic of one whose 
                                                             
404 As it also mysteriously does in David Nye’s admittedly stirring book on major American blackouts, outside 
of a few cursory sentences. 
 
Nye, David E. When the Lights Went Out: A History of Blackouts in America.   
405 The EMP Threat: The State of Preparedness Against the Threat of an Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) Event.  
114th Congress.  13 May 2015. 30-33. 
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terrible fate has long since been sealed. In their narrative development, EMPs shift from an 
alarming but theoretical possibility to a casually ignored inevitability. Indeed, the trajectory 
of the United States Joint Commission reports do resemble a consistent narratological 
framework, one that aligns them squarely within a long-standing tradition that fastens 
darkness to destruction, or even the land of the dead. So much of the space within the reports 
concerns itself with what EMPs “mean” for the country, as if they are charged with far more 
than simply their material effects, instead signifying the end of days itself and listing a litany 
of sins by which this apocalypse was beckoned. They function as much as metaphors as 
material events. 
 Unfortunately, to analyze similar government responses from Japan is not quite as 
simple of a task, as very little exists in the way of publicly available documentation regarding 
discussion of EMP threats and proposed protections. This is perhaps somewhat unsurprising 
given Japan’s recently demonstrated approach to disaster response. After all, one of the 
greatest global controversies of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster arose from what was 
considered an inappropriately protracted response on the part of both the Tokyo Electric 
Power Company (TEPCO) and the government itself, leading to accusations of governmental 
cover-ups and intense criticism on the geopolitical scale406. That said, there is a wide gulf 
between an actual disaster and the virtual possibility thereof (a tension underlying the 
cultural position of EMPs at large, admittedly), so while transparency may be desirable in 
this regard, the ethical nature of this apparent obscurity is not so easy to assign. In any case, 
what information that can be gleaned about this topic largely stems from newspaper reports 
                                                             
406 For more on the historical precedent for this veiled approach as well as its connections to the Soviet cover-
up of the Chernobyl disaster, see Olga Kuchinskaya’s book The Politics of Invisibility. 
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or interviews,  a selection of which I have taken akin to my approach with the United States 
Joint Commission Reports. For obvious reasons of proximity alone, North Korea’s opaque 
EMP threats at the end of 2017 ignited a flurry of reporting and discussion of EMP 
provisions in news media, but I will narrow my focus to two accessible reports concerning 
these relatively recent developments, hailing from one of Japan’s major news publications.   
 An Asahi Shinbun article from September 9th, 2017, titled 北朝鮮言及の電磁パルス
兵器、防御策を検討 菅官房長官407 includes a rare, direct statement on the part of the 
Japanese government regarding EMPs as an emergent threat. Delivered before a press 
conference, Kannoe Uni states, “ 菅氏は「ＥＭＰ攻撃が行われるといった万が一の事態
の備えとして、国民生活の影響を最小限にするためにも、必要な対策について検討
していきたい”408  While the U.S. reports (which are public documents) assume an 
increasingly apocalyptic tone throughout their course, Kan’s statement could not be more 
banal and optimistic, assuring the public that the chances of such a strike occurring are 
virtually nonexistent (the idiomatic expression  万が一 translating directly to “one in ten 
thousand”). Granted, this type of rhetoric is commonly used so as to avoid stirring panic 
within the general populace, but it nonetheless provides a stark contrast to the expressive 
anxiety of the U.S. reports. While this might invite contingent discussion regarding the 
                                                             
407 “Chief Cabinet Secretary Kannoe Uni on defense measures against the EMP weapons referred to by North 
Korea” 
408 “Kan stated, “Concerning the preparations for the highly unlikely chance of an EMP strike, we would like to 
consider necessary measures to minimize the impact on citizen’s lives.”  
 
北朝鮮言及の電磁パルス兵器、防御策を検討 菅官房長官.Asahi Shinbun.  The Asahi Shinbun Company.  
9 Sep. 2017. 
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discursive functions of news media within various sociopolitical and national contexts, the 
difference here is absolutely remarkable.     
 But this is more clearly illustrated in another Asahi Shinbun article in which Takashi 
Onizuka, former director of the GSDF School of Chemistry, discusses the potential 
aftereffects of an EMP with surprising composure and resignation. He states: 
何がどれぐらい被害を受けるのかではなく、全部やられてしまうので
すから、復旧を最優先ですべき重点インフラから書き出せばいい。個
人レベルでは、常々懐中電灯を携帯するのは大事ですね。それと、移
動手段として自転車は役に立ちます。EMPで壊れませんから。食料も
1週間分確保していれば、3週間ぐらい食いつなげます。水だっていた
るところに井戸がある409  
 
Onizuka’s advice regarding flashlights and bicycles is almost charming in its small-scale  
practicality, especially when compared to reports that illustrate the threat of mass scale death 
and subsequent colonization. In this light, one could easily read this as more palliative 
rhetoric as a means to stymie panic. That would entail, however, ignoring the first sentence 
of his remark, in which he calmly acknowledges the inevitability of complete national 
destruction. The contrast here is bracing: whereas the U.S. joint commissions were replete 
with proposed methods for preventing damage and upbraiding remarks concerning a lack of 
action in equal measure, the Asahi Shinbun articles indicate not only a patient approach to 
                                                             
409 “It is not really a matter of how much damage will be done, since everything will unfortunately be 
destroyed, so one can mark out the infrastructure whose restoration should take top priority.  At the 
individual level, it is important to keep a flashlight handy in general.  Also, bicycles are effective for 
transportation.  They will not break due to an EMP.  If one secures one week’s worth of food, it can be 
extended to three weeks of eating.  There are wells from which to draw water everywhere.” 
 
インフラ停止させる「電磁パルス攻撃」の対処法 専門家の見解は？ Asahi Shinbun.  The Asahi 
Shinbun Company.  10 Dec. 2017. 1. 
 
  253 
such development, but also a tacit resignation to the inevitability of dismantlement in the face 
of an EMP. This latter effect is not restricted to this single instance in Onizuka’s interview.  
A few paragraphs in, he states, “  日本がやられたら世界の経済もしばらくはガタガタに
なります。そこから復旧を図るのに、電子部品の供給をタイなど東南アジアの先進
国と融通し合える関係性を構築するのが大事です。”410  Onizuka’s long-term planning 
takes destruction as a given, instead looking productively towards restoration efforts by way 
of international relationships, again a marked difference from largely preparatory measures 
articulated by the United States.  It bears mentioning that while there are a multitude of 
reasons behind this shift in tone, even taking into account a simple difference in personality, 
one cannot help but keep in mind the history of Japan regarding crises of this scale, 
specifically those of mass destruction. While the United States has never experienced the 
direct effects of nuclear warfare of events of its scale on its own soil, Japan has, at the hands 
of the United States, no less. Taking the U.S. Joint Commission reports as representative of 
government response, there is within them a distinct focus on preventative measures, almost 
isolating in effect, forsaking a focus on restorative measures on the citizen level.  Invisible 
enemies, domino effect disasters: the American rhetoric is hermetic in tone, doomsaying for 
the unconverted. While this is not to claim that a focus on prevention or protection is 
misguided, the U.S. reports radiate a tangible fear of the unknown, the particular terror 
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endemic to envisioning a level of destruction as yet unseen. Whether or not the obverse plays 
into the Japanese response must remain speculative, but that both Onizuka’s and the Japanese 
government’s responses approach the matter with a sense of deference is difficult to ignore, 
especially within the context of both the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima/Nagasaki as well as 
the recent nuclear disaster at Fukushima.   
5. Virtual Reality – EMP References and Narratives in Popular Culture 
 In any case, for the purpose of tracing narrative representation of EMPs, popular 
culture offers perhaps a greater level of insight in terms of its ability to incorporate such 
phenomena into established tropes and fictional structures. While government reports and 
official responses work to reveal the faint narrative threads to the darkness “mythos”, so to 
speak, sources such as television, film, and video games can make these implicit connections 
explicit. Whereas the Joint Commission Hearings require no small amount of effort to 
uncover its narrative patterns, the following examples quite readily inscribe themselves into a 
narrative history that traces back to Antiquity, the most pronounced of any of the connections 
discussed so far. Returning to select points from the introduction of this dissertation, the 
earliest of creation myths established a cycle of death and renewal as personified by “dark” 
gods, ones who emerged from chaos and gave rise to the creation of light. Despite this, gods 
and goddesses such as Nyx were baneful beings, heralding destruction despite their 
association with renewal.  Moving to biblical times, the cycle of purgation and renewal is 
well known in the stories of Moses’ plagues (more on this shortly) and Noah, who survives 
the total destruction of the world as a punishment for rampant sin. My gambit here is that the 
following examples of EMP narratives resonate with this lineage, placing EMPs as one more 
apocalyptic example in the history of purging darkness. As with the dark web and electrical 
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maps of Africa, the stakes here are as follows: in identifying this narrative history, one can 
perhaps locate in this lineage a source of fear, and in turn a means to temper it. From this one 
may be able to approach the issue with a more productive perspective, one liberated from 
pernicious cultural anxieties.  One cannot will away the destructive force of an EMP, but one 
can perhaps defang its image as a perverse divine punishment. I will outline these three 
examples first, and then draw them in to conversation with the narrative history I consider to 
be their primary source of inspiration, subconscious or otherwise.    
 Certainly, EMPs cannot be considered especially common flashpoints in 
contemporary media, but they nevertheless emerge dramatically when deployed for this end.  
One of the earliest appearances thereof occurs in the 1983 television film The Day After, 
which debuted on United States television to a massive viewing audience.411 Chronicling the 
days leading up to and through a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States, the film serves a 
triple purpose as a thriller, an anti-nuclear statement, and a less than subtle piece of anti-
Soviet propaganda. It withholds the nuclear strike itself until roughly a third of the way 
through its running length, instead taking the first portion to establish pathos by chronicling 
the mundane lives of its characters living under the shadow of nuclear terror. The attack itself 
is brief but overwhelming, ostensibly in an attempt to replicate the immediacy of the actual 
destruction itself.  Following this, the remainder of the film chronicles a country in rapid 
decline, displaying structural damage and human death in equal measure, from either the 
blast itself or the toxic effects of nuclear fallout. 
                                                             
411 Nielsen reports estimate that 62% of the US viewing public watched at least a portion of the movie on its 
debut. 
 
“Top 100 Rated TV Shows Of All Time”.  Screener.  Tribune Media Services.  21 Mar. 2009 
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 What is significant about The Day After is that it briefly includes an EMP strike that 
precedes the targeted nuclear attacks themselves. Taking place while the populace rushes to 
leave the city following a warning, this strike is made with the explicit purpose of creating an 
EMP pulse, as the film depicts it exploding off-screen in the sky above a city, depicted only 
through its intense glow. Notably, the strike takes place in the middle of the day, causing the 
film to rely on a series of “tells” to demonstrate the EMP effects that thus require more 
specificity than if the scene were to take place at night. In the latter situation, as is the case 
with so many films that include blackouts, the simple image of lights simultaneously shutting 
off is enough to communicate a sense of urgency or terror. In a remarkable shift, The Day 
After attempts to transmit a fear of darkness in the middle of broad daylight, relying on 
enclosed rooms losing light as well as various electronic devices shutting down in equal 
measure. It displays a sequence of shots that show one device powering down after the next, 
and its specific choices are notable in their precision. In order of appearance, the film shows 
the following in rapid succession: the tachometer on a man’s car dropping to zero while in 
motion, three public clocks stopping (the third of which is a digital display going black), the 
lights going off in an office building (cutting away before any reaction shots), fountains in 
front of an office building shutting off, a movie theater going dark, an elevator stopping, a 
surgical ward losing power mid-procedure, a motorcycle stopping dead in the road, a 
panicked man exiting his now dead vehicle and running away from the camera towards the 
forest, and finally, a major traffic jam caused by the simultaneous malfunctioning of every 
car on the highway. 
 What is compelling is how much space in this sequence is devoted to the failure of 
transportation. Given the context that the citizens are already attempting to evacuate, the 
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EMP closes off all possibility via its wide-reaching effects, trapping people in place and 
immediately signaling the inherent precarity of technical reliance. From the first instance to 
the traffic jam at the end, it is as if the drivers are punished specifically for this reliance, 
unwittingly rushing to vulnerable positions for lack of a stronger survival plan. This point is 
driven home by the actual nuclear strike that immediately follows, blasting the drivers stuck 
in place with heat and killing them on the spot. While the proximal blast is the fatal stroke, 
the EMP and its concomitant “darkness” serves as the herald for destruction. Truly, there is 
something poetically resonant about the man who rushes from his car towards the forest, a 
metaphorical “return to nature” in the face of the technology’s veil of protection having been 
pierced. Besides the transportation failure scenes, the rest capture a wide spread of the 
infrastructural vulnerabilities detailed in the aforementioned government reports. Each short 
clip appears to correlate with a related structure: the office building representing commerce 
and finance, the clocks signaling a loss of sensible time, the fountain capturing the loss of 
water transportation, and the surgical ward representing the destabilization of medical 
services. In an instant the pillars of society crumble, and the encroaching darkness of the 
EMP opens the gates for the subsequent purge. 
 The Day After concludes with society after complete decimation, focusing on one of 
the few remaining characters vainly attempting to contact any other survivors following the 
nuclear holocaust. After having been crippled by the initial EMP, the infrastructural network 
of the country completely dissolves, in turn allowing the subsequent strikes to destroy society 
beyond any apparent hope of repair. However, in filtering this narrative through individual 
character stories, the film sets its sights principally on establishing an empathetic register, 
something all too typical for films with such a heavy pedagogical slant.  The Day After 
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maintains its propaganda tone by attempting to strike fear into its viewers by way of such 
empathetic connection, transposing its chosen setting of Kansas and its inhabitants into a 
functional any-space-whatever/any-persons-whoever in the Deleuzian sense. The events of 
the film are thus easy to transpose onto the immediate surroundings of the viewer, in turn 
disturbing and alarming them in terms of bringing to light their own vulnerability.  One 
would be hard pressed to claim that the film offers any sense of preparatory lessons, given 
that ostensibly the entire country lays in ruins by its finale. Instead, it emanates an almost 
nihilistic tone, one that lays bare the futility of all human achievement and relationships in 
the face of nuclear warfare. In this light, the EMP strike functions as a sort of stage-setting 
mechanism, producing a tableau that signals not just the diegetic events to follow within the 
film, but also the inevitable destruction and erasure of humankind in the nuclear age. It is 
darkness as the horrible purifier, descending on the world before the cleansing fires follow, 
and it is utterly inescapable. While one could perhaps read the film as attempting to compel 
the viewer to reject nuclear weaponry as a concept, that the film displays a Soviet strike 
during the Cold War complicates this admittedly seductive approach. Through the lens of 
Cold War nuclear panic, disarmament would protect the American populace as much as the 
cars in which the victims of the second bomb strike sit: not at all. And the realism of this 
depiction aside, the eschatological tone of this film, almost theological in scope, is no 
accident in its delivery. Returning to the man who flees his car for the forest, a knowing look 
of fear in his eyes, it is if his reliance on technology as some sort of grand mistake, some 
fatal sin made immediately apparent, sending him sprinting towards nature itself. Human 
technological progress is purged and revealed in one instant to have been utterly futile, and 
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the world is then violently reconstituted.  As with Nyx, Chaos, etc.: disorder and darkness 
gives way to new creation. 
 Equally dramatic in scope, but deployed for different narrative effect, is the EMP 
strike that occurs at the climax of Inifnity Ward’s first-person shooter game Call of Duty: 
Modern Warfare 2. Much like The Day After’s wide reach in viewership, the popularity of 
the entire Call of Duty franchise bears significance here. Modern Warfare 2 found the series 
at its arguable zenith in terms of cultural significance, arriving as the second in a meta-series 
trilogy within the franchise as a whole. Within the first twenty-four hours of its release on 
November 10, 2009, the game reportedly sold around 4.7 million in the United States and 
United Kingdom alone, cementing it at the time as the largest debut in the history of video 
games as a medium.412 The first entry, Modern Warfare, was considered a revolution in 
terms of design and cinematic narration, gaining great notoriety and significance for its 
showpiece level titled “Shock and Awe”, in which the player character experiences a nuclear 
blast within the immediate range of the explosion, then forcing the player to crawl along the 
ground in the death throes of heat and radiation exposure. The scene was met with suitable 
controversy and acclaim in equal measure, perhaps what led the team at Infinity Ward to 
double down on its effects in Modern Warfare’s sequel.   
 A mission titled “Second Sun” serves as the narrative climax of Modern Warfare 2, 
starting by placing the player behind the visor of an International Space Station crew member 
on spacewalk. After relaying a series of strange findings, a distant but massive explosion 
erupts in the upper layers of the Earth’s atmosphere, sending a shockwave that obliterates the 
                                                             
412 Johnson, Robert.  “Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 destroys records in first day sales rampage, pulls in $310 
million”.  nydailynews.com. https://www.nydailynews.com/news/money/call-duty-modern-warfare-2-
destroys-records-day-sales-rampage-article-1.417049   27. Nov. 2009. 
  260 
space station itself and blows the player character into space. The scene admittedly plays as 
an almost cynically hyperbolic reimagining of the nuclear blast from the game’s predecessor, 
a disturbing and empathetically charged loss of life replaced by the wholly unrelatable first-
hand experience of a dying to a nuclear bomb while floating in space. Criticism aside, the 
blast itself merely serves as staging for the events to follow, as it is shortly thereafter 
revealed that the explosion was a calculated strike by Russia (yet again) as a means to create 
an EMP pulse over the United States. The game descends into the view of a soldier on the 
ground, thrust suddenly into blanketing darkness with only the fires created by warfare to 
serve as sources of light. Modern Warfare 2’s gameplay is positively drenched in electronics, 
serving as much as a military tech exposition as video game. The player is routinely reliant 
on a multitude of media-technologies, such as camera systems, communication platforms, 
and a night vision visor for dark environments. In “Second Sun”, the comfort and reliability 
of all of these devices is immediately dismantled, as the EMP causes all electronic equipment 
and systems to promptly malfunction, including the very night vision visor the player until 
this point has likely used in order to illuminate dark areas for more effective play. There is a 
neutering effect to the event, coupling the inherent tension of the dark environments with the 
shocking revelation of just how much one relies on these systems to succeed within the scope 
of the game’s combat. In this sense it finds some conceptual camaraderie with The Day 
After’s EMP scene, a string of electrical failures that cause instantaneous frailty on the part of 
its victims.   
 The level itself is structured in suitably tense form given its contextual setting.  
Where once enemy soldiers were relatively easy to spot amongst their spatial settings, they 
now emerge from shadows, forcing the player to readjust to a newfound lack of visual 
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clarity.  As fire becomes the principle source of illumination, enemies are revealed only in 
flickering light, melting into backgrounds and instilling greater intimidation with their newly 
predatory status. Granted, the game appears to adjust the enemy AI to this setting as well, 
making them relatively more inaccurate than usual and creating an overall sense of hysteria 
to the ordeal, even amongst the opposing soldiers who were ostensibly well aware of the 
EMP blast to come. Where The Day After attempts to convey its message through a sense of 
empathetic terror, a carefully selected string of images that ask the viewer what they would 
feel in the face of losing all power, Modern Warfare 2 makes the player deal with it directly, 
forcing them to readjust their perception and tactics within the newly dark environment.  
Furthermore, its comparatively more frightening set of enemy soldiers is conditioned by this 
darkness as well. Moreover, this entire scene takes place in Washington D.C., an assuredly 
conscious design choice that effectively deploys an EMP to shut down the nerve center of the 
United States (a contrast to the strike on the American heartland in The Day After). In 
Modern Warfare 2, darkness veils the successful Russian invasion of the United States, 
signaling the actuation of a Cold War fear come to pass years after it should have been long 
since buried by the fall of the Soviet Union. If The Day After deploys an EMP as a 
metaphorical bridge to a narrative of destruction and erasure, the narrative of invasion is all 
too apparent in Modern Warfare 2, adhering to the well-trodden (and pernicious) trope of a 
creeping darkness obscuring a threatening multiplicity, notably that which informs the 
history of “Darkest Africa” as discussed in Chapter 2. As the shield of light collapses, the 
Russian soldiers swarm under the veil of darkness, newly threatening despite the player’s 
eventual (and required) victory.   
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 In terms of a sense of renewal following a purge, a Japanese source perhaps expresses 
this with more force than any other.  The anime series Terror In Resonance ends with a 
terrorist created EMP strike on Tokyo, and the entire series builds up to that point with 
allusions both subtle and direct. The narrative twist of the series is that it selects the terrorists 
as the sympathetic protagonists of the story, creating a truly disarming inversion to standard 
narratives of its type. For a series that ended with only eleven episodes, its plot is remarkably 
complex and entangled but its fundamental thrust can be summarized with some simplicity.  
While the show contains several major characters, its arguable focal point (taken to mean the 
characters who set the attack in motion) are two young men who go by the names Nine and 
Twelve, both of whom are embittered escapees of a government medical operation dubbed 
the “Athena Project”. An attempt to artificially induce savant-level skills in orphaned 
children, the process proved fatal to the overwhelming majority of the children, save one 
survivor and two children who escaped, Nine and Twelve respectively. The two develop a 
plan to set off multiple nuclear bombs in Tokyo, disguising themselves as a terrorist 
organization named Sphinx and communicating to authorities with cryptic videos online.  
While they do not achieve the goal of directly bombing Tokyo by the series’ end, they are in 
fact essentially successful, insofar that they manage to set off a nuclear bomb in the sky and 
destroy Tokyo’s electronic infrastructure via an EMP. Sphinx serves as a figure of revenge, 
to be sure, but their stated goals in their videos allude to an attempt to cause Japan to “wake 
up” to some sort of new consciousness or order, ostensibly to face the social configurations 
that would lead to such a brutal program of child experimentation as the Athena Project in 
the first place. 
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 Before discussing the show’s artistic depiction of the EMP, it is worth noting that the 
series is bookended by blackouts, as in the first episode, Nine and Twelve set off a small 
bomb that causes a temporary blackout throughout Tokyo. After announcing that the city will 
be “enveloped in darkness” as if it were a weather report, the episode shows several quick 
scenes in line with The Day After’s model: lights in rooms going dark, traffic lights going off, 
crowds of people stopping in their tracks collectively. This blackout, however, is never 
treated as anything other than a minor nuisance, and it is remedied as quickly as it sets in.  
While the show does depict characters as surprised and slightly unnerved, it establishes a 
dichotomy between this blackout in question and the EMP that goes off in the  final episode.  
What is notable is the manner in which the first even serves not only as a bit of 
foreshadowing, but also establishes a sense of scale for the climactic EMP strike. In the first 
instance, despite its disruptive presence, the blackout serves to reinforce the dominance and 
protective function of light and electricity: at no point do the characters fear that the lights 
will not in fact come back on.    
 The EMP-generating nuclear strike in the final episode offers no sense of security.  
There is little ability to overstate just how much Terror In Resonance indulges in sublimity 
during this scene, portraying the blast as both overwhelmingly horrifying as well as 
disarming in its beauty, appearing to focus more on the latter aesthetic dimension. After a 
frantic (and ultimately failed) attempt to stop the bomb’s detonation on the part of the 
Japanese Self-Defense Forces, the bomb erupts into a golden glow in the night sky above 
Tokyo. Sound-tracked by a hymnal choir, onlookers stare up at the glow in fear, but are 
placed in such a way that alludes to images of devotion. There is nothing in the way of 
panicked behavior or action, a stark contrast to both The Day After and Modern Warfare 2.  
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Instead, Terror In Resonance places its citizens beneath the glow of a sublime force, 
paralyzing them under its radiant beauty to the religious music. As the general populace 
stares at the explosion in rapture, Twelve and Lisa (a love interest and recruit into Sphinx’s 
plans) clasp hands as tears stream down the young girl’s face, overwhelmed by both the 
intensity of the explosion as well as the dawning of a new order in its wake. Indeed, the show 
shifts to the following morning, wherein the streets of Tokyo are all but deserted, abandoned 
buildings and dead electronics framing the empty streets. Nine, Twelve, and Lisa are then 
seen kicking a soccer ball with joyful abandon, finally free of the societal structure that once 
oppressed them, or at the very least, Nine and Twelve. It is as if a new world has opened up 
for them, and they have their long-sought freedom due to the EMP’s slate-wiping effects.  
The contrast in images is quite striking, as the soccer scene, with all of its levity and idyllic 
nature, nearly erases the memory of the barren city from a few seconds prior. And yet the 
ruined city persists, a shocking reminder of the terrible price of freedom from the former 
order.   
 Whether or not Terror In Resonance expects the viewer to remain wholly sympathetic 
to Nine and Twelve despite their plainly terroristic actions is at best perplexing, but this is 
perhaps the intention. By framing the liberation of Nine and Twelve within the context of 
nuclear weaponry and infrastructural collapse, the show appears to call into question the 
drastic lengths to which humans collectively must go to undo the oppressive inclinations and 
trappings of the established order. Through this lens, it is more condemning of the debased 
morality of the world than the actions of Nine and Twelve themselves, effectively proposing 
an apocalyptic scenario as a reliable catalyst for the awakening its main characters seek, if 
not the only reliable scenario. Herein lies the doubled terror: where the EMP event and 
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subsequent destruction of Tokyo is the principally terrifying incident, its aesthetic depiction 
as a revelatory and cleansing event attempts to bring forth the inherently terrifying 
hopelessness with regards to any sort of redemption outside of such a disaster. In other 
words, the EMP serves as the just payment, the divine retribution for unforgivable sins and a 
chance to start anew. As such, Terror In Resonance traces an archetypal eschatological 
framework onto the EMP, articulating it as not just an erasing or invasive force, but also one 
that is earned.   
6. Analyzing the Invisible 
 Of course, the prior examples cannot be taken as exhaustive, as EMPs do appear in 
other media, and references to them grow with each passing year in proportion to their 
growing danger. Of particular note is the growing use of EMPs in video games as positive 
user abilities or attacks. Ranging from racing games to first-person shooters such as 
Overwatch, EMPs are often associated with the technological elite, and they are deployed for 
disruption and immediate player gain. While the lack of these is in part a consideration of 
sample selection and curation, I attest that the aforementioned examples are representative of 
the most archetypal narrative and through which EMP’s are filtered in almost every instance: 
erasure, invasion, and renewal. As I have suggested at times throughout this chapter, these 
three narrative thrusts carry a particularly resonant relationship with apocalypse narratives at 
large, but I will propose that the specific nature of EMPs inscribe them into a highly specific 
mode of narrative and metaphorical deployment. In the first part of this chapter, my summary 
and outline showed the very material ways in which an EMP could initiate massive collapse, 
bolstered from scientific primary sources amongst. Within this field of knowledge, to fear 
EMPs would be a responsible attitude to a certain degree of attention. Nevertheless, even 
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amongst the plethora of predictive reports and historical data (the latter of which can only 
truly claim the Carrington Event and the Starfish Prime tests to its name), this “certain data” 
simply does not exist.  In other words, as information about EMPs grows, the lack of 
experiential and direct data, the mystery at the core of the event, becomes equally more 
pronounced.  
To elaborate, beyond the apocryphal data of the Carrington Event and the single 
recorded high-altitude nuclear test on the part of the United States, there exists no first-hand 
data of what an EMP strike would entail, and the two aforementioned incidents are 
particularly dated in terms of the progression of technological development. While the 
handful of US Joint Commission reports discussed testing and experiment data, they were 
restricted to single electronic systems at a time by nature of practicality and accessibility, 
only then expanded to larger scales based on modeled data. The actual scope of an EMP 
strike on a country, one that strikes multiple systems in simultaneity under the myriad 
mitigating conditions of everyday life (position of blast, altitude, topography of affected area, 
density of electronic systems, proportionate ownership of handheld versus larger electronic 
devices, devices being turned on or off, etc.) is difficult to accurately capture within a 
predictive simulation. Nuclear blasts, for instance, are subject to the same type of predictive 
modeling. But in the history of the nuclear bomb, there have been two direct applications of 
the device towards their intended use, to horrifying results. On top of this, nuclear tests on 
the field were once quite common, and they offered direct visualized data of blast effects, 
maximum heat, luminosity, etc. As a functionally inverted effect of all of this, an EMP 
cannot truly be modeled outside of setting off an EMP of sufficient size over an 
electronically dense area, something that Starfish Prime did inadvertently in part, and yet 
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offered little in the way of tangible or permanent effects. The point remains that all 
discussion of EMP disasters in the first instance must remain speculative. We can assume 
with relative confidence what it would be like to experience such an event, but total national 
or global apocalypse remain inherently distant concepts in terms of relatability. Where 
speculation reigns, especially in terms of frightening scenarios or possibilities, metaphor and 
even mythologization can easily take hold, thus giving the inexplicable a relatable narrative 
form.  Hence, you end up with a cartoon that attaches an EMP burst to symbols of the 
Rapture, creating a new kingdom on Earth.413 An added risk of this process is the 
development of panic and hysteria, something the Asahi Shinbun attempted to assuage.   
 In fact, there actually have been several instances wherein United States government 
organizations have directed research towards nullifying the growing hyperbole and terror 
endemic to the growing cultural consciousness of EMPs as an existential threat. They just did 
not arise from the openly panicked exchanges of the Joint Commission Hearings. A report 
written by the Metatech Corporation414 for the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 2010 
directly states as its purpose a summary of EMP processes as both a way to educate the 
uninitiated as well as dispel prevalent and pervasive myths and misunderstandings 
concerning its threat. It states in its introduction: 
  The U.S. military has taken E1 HEMP very seriously for a long time,  
  including hardening and testing efforts.  On the civilian side, the problems  
  have not really been addressed. There has been a wide range in the perception 
  of E1 HEMP as a threat.  There are skeptics – those that think E1 HEMP does 
  not exist, or that the models are wrong, or the field levels are not as bad as  
  calculated. There are also those who believe we cannot do anything about it – 
                                                             
413 The converse works here as well.  Where this kind of eschatological narrative helps to capture the 
“essence” of an EMP strike, so too can an EMP strike aid the development of this longstanding narrative 
conceit. 
414 Located in Goleta, CA 
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  if it happens we will just have to deal with it then. Then there are others that 
  think every electronic device in the country will fail, and we will go back to 
  the Stone Age. There are many such exaggerated scenarios; for example, it is 
  doubtful that more than a very small fraction of vehicles will suddenly stop 
  working – but how long will they be able to run with gasoline supply  
  disruptions from possible electric power grid problems?415  
There is much to unpack in this single paragraph alone. To start, it is illuminating (and 
refreshing) to see a report that even acknowledges the effect of such information on the 
public consciousness, something almost entirely absent from the U.S. Joint Commission 
reports at the very least (reports that Metatech references throughout the body of their own).  
That it alludes to EMP skeptics, something of a non-presence in the aforementioned reports, 
is interesting in and of itself, as the rhetoric surrounding EMPs is one of increasing certitude, 
far away from the persistent debates over something like climate change. That said, the 
progressive shift in the Joint Commission reports towards pleading a case for attention 
underscores the possibility that this very skepticism was at play within the U.S. government 
itself at the time of the testimonies. Further, Metatech’s acknowledgement of an element of 
resignation takes on added significance when placed against the Japanese responses to the 
threat, particularly those of Takashi Onizuka. As far as Metatech is concerned, apparently, 
such an attitude falls under the same umbrella of both skepticism and hyperbole, suggesting 
that it fails to grasp the total scope of the dialogue (in this case by ignoring the actual 
progression of events and anticipated success of immediate defense maneuvers). Still, it is 
the derisive take on disastrous thought that offers the most compelling information, as it 
directly targets erroneous aesthetic renderings of EMP strikes that have invaded the cultural 
consciousness, in their eyes. Of note is their succinct negation of The Day After, plainly 
                                                             
415 Savage, Edward, James Gilbert & Willam Radasky.  The Early-Time (E1) High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse 
(HEMP) and Its Impact on the U.S. Power Grid.  Metatech Corporation.  Jan. 2010. 1-2. 
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disputing the film’s climactic scene in which the simultaneous malfunction of cars leads to a 
death trap from the direct nuclear strike that follows. By following up this assertion with a 
plausible danger on the infrastructural level, Metatech appears to suggest that much of the 
inflated rhetoric surrounding EMPs stems from an expected transfer of a vast infrastructural 
danger to the immediately individual stratum: it is the malfunction of one’s personal property 
that heralds destruction, ignoring the network collapse that would only show its eroding force 
within the days to come. But even this is met with an overdetermined infrastructural scope on 
the part of civilians, as evidenced by their claim that there are many who inordinately believe 
that an EMP will cause an immediate collapse and return back to “the Stone Age”, a 
functional reset in terms of history and time itself.   
 It is this “extremism”, in their words, that appears to be their primary target.  The 
bulk of the following report lays out the processes and dangers of EMPs once again in 
exacting detail, but its appendix once again devotes attention to what it deems to be “EMP 
myths”. Ironically, much of this section actually works to instill more fear into the reader, as 
the majority of the myths take the form of contesting misplaced ideas of safety with regards 
to small devices and the safety of unplugged equipment.416 However, the appendix begins 
with a particularly resonant claim that directly alludes to the ultimate lack of macro-scale 
data.  The report states, “Some general emphasis of comments fall into either “the world as 
we know it will come to an end” if there is a high-altitude nuclear burst, or the other extreme: 
“it’s not a big deal, nothing much will happen.” Since we really have never had a nuclear 
burst over anything like our current modern infrastructure no one really knows for sure what 
                                                             
416 Specifically speaking, smaller devices may be in danger due to a destructive accumulation of heat from the 
pulse, rather than direct overloading of circuitry, and that damage can still occur within unplugged electronic 
systems, albeit rarely.  
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would happen, but both extremes are not very believable.”417 In the end, Metatech takes a 
position of carefully considered speculative doubt, something that it suggests is the most 
responsible path when navigating EMP discourses. While one should be healthily concerned 
and take knowledgeable measures of protection, one must avoid lapsing into unproductive 
hysteria.  While this is, of course, an honorable path in the face of any unknown danger, 
Metatech seems to underestimate just how frightening the unknown can be on a purely 
affective level. Suspending the ability to focus cognitive or rational attention on a containable 
concept, the human mind fails to attach its primary affective response (in this case, fear) to a 
cognitively quantifiable object: an EMP will always remain just out of grasp in knowability, 
and thankfully so. This is what allows such “myths”, or metaphors, to spread so profligately, 
by Metatech’s own distinction. As another almost humorous example thereof, it is 
apocryphally said that the United States Air Force hired Bill Nye to create an educational 
video titled “Hollywood vs. EMP” for its soldiers that explains the difference between the 
realities of EMP strikes versus their increasingly aggrandized portrayal in entertainment 
media. Unfortunately, this video was never made available for the general public in any 
form, but that it ostensibly exists within this military framework suggests a splitting within 
the struggle against EMPs: the EMPs themselves, and an increasingly disabling imaginative 
function at work (something also seen at hand in the doubled arguments of the Joint 
Commission reports as well.)  
 The point here is that the lack of experiential data with EMPs leads to a speculative 
nexus that allows (if not promotes) a runaway inflation of its potential danger. While I have 
                                                             
417 Savage, Edward, James Gilbert & Willam Radasky.  The Early-Time (E1) High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse 
(HEMP) and Its Impact on the U.S. Power Grid.  Metatech Corporation.  Jan. 2010. A.1 
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argued the deleterious effects of this kind of runaway narrative construction and fear in terms 
of comparatively benign phenomena like the dark web, it must be remembered that EMPs do 
possess destructive power. The aim here, then, is to question what about them facilitates their 
connection to the greater lineage of darkness narratives, outside of their obvious material 
connection to darkness itself. The obvious and stark difference here is that while the deep 
web or numbers stations possess a symbolic attachment of darkness, EMPs deal in actual 
darkness, thus changing the grounds for their metaphorical deployment. Furthermore, they 
are also effectively the latest development in a longer narrative of concerns regarding 
weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons, chemical warfare, and weaponized 
disease.  In many significant ways, the current panic over EMPs mirrors the nuclear panics of 
the Cold War, during which a nuclear strike was considered universally imminent (not 
without some reason) and was met with hyperbolic narrative projections and almost cynical 
attempts at self-preservation in equal measure. Once again, it is critical to note, though, that 
these particular vectors of mass death have all either seen practical deployment towards their 
intended purpose or similar events on the same scalar level. The gas warfare of the WWI 
trenches, the Spanish flu pandemic (amongst others), the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki: each of these events has scores of evidence to their names, narrative and visual 
alike. In this sense, fears of their effects are grounded in directly proportionate data and 
visualizations, despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of those fears are held by 
people who have never directly experienced them. Testimony persists, and offer a bridge to 
the lived experience of such disasters. 
 But how can one visualize ultimate darkness, a kind that swallows up an entire 
country as far as the eye can see, and, critically, continues ceaselessly? Furthermore, how can 
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one comprehend the experience of effectively total disconnection within the scope of 
contemporary system integration. While I argue that Metatech is correct in their challenging 
of myths (specifically that of vehicle malfunction), it is also insightful in its 
acknowledgement of the true threat being the failure of larger systems outside of immediate 
property.  Indeed, these fictional images and myths are so transfixing that some have argued 
that the cultural focus on EMPs has blinded the public to the true threat surrounding their 
deployment. An article by Medium titled “The Overrated Threat From Electromagnetic 
Pulses”, Matthew Gault shifts Metatech’s main thrust, claiming that given the lack of EMP 
testing both for defensive and offensive measures, the lack of data actually leaves little 
chance for an EMP even being successfully deployed in the first instance. While this perhaps 
is the very type of dangerous skepticism against which Metatech cautions, the article makes a 
particularly thoughtful claim shortly thereafter, asserting that at heart, fears towards EMPs 
work to obscure the reality that a country hit by such a strike would officially be a country set 
to engage in direct nuclear conflict, if not already in the throes thereof. Hence, the EMP itself 
would be the last of a country’s worries if the immediate destruction of nuclear weaponry 
was set to follow, a doubled assault captured in The Day After no less.418 In claiming EMPs 
to be “overrated”, Gault appears to argue that they have reached prominence through the 
shock of the new, a fashionable threat that obscures the age-old menace.   
 While I too hold interest in this hierarchization of responses, I separate my argument 
from Gault’s here, for reasons outside of his apparent flippancy on the matter. Instead, I 
propose that EMPs hold court over a particularly powerful territory within the processes of 
                                                             
418 Gault, Matthew.  “The Overrated Threat From Electromagnetic Pulses.”  Medium.  A Medium Corporation. 
https://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-overrated-threat-from-electromagnetic-pulses-46e92c3efeb9    
24 Jul. 2016 
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metaphorical deployment. Given that the prescribed and speculative darkness of an EMP 
ultimately delineates a limit of experiential understanding, and coupled with the fact that its 
deadly force comes not from the physical destruction of the body itself, EMP-related death 
(in this case taken to mean a blackout to the scale of a country or large proportion thereof 
along with a dispersed area of damage across multiple technological strata) is ultimately a 
void of unknowing, especially were one to be released without a related nuclear explosion.  
Furthermore, rather than principally erasing physical structures in the way that either nuclear 
or conventional bombing would, an EMP possesses an even greater threat to erase culture, 
deleting vast amounts of data, financial structures, and communicative capabilities to 
facilitate said culture. For a thermonuclear bomb to achieve this result in a country as large as 
the United States, it would take significantly more than one attack to have a culturally 
destructive effect to the same degree as an EMP. Keeping Dr. Peter Pry’s remarks in mind, 
the potential for a physically destructive strike maintains the potential ability to strengthen 
national and cultural character, whereas an EMP would work to erase it. Because of these 
aspects, there is a terrifying finality to speculative narratives of EMP events, lifting it to an 
almost metaphysical level, and under such conditions, where experience and explanation fail 
to capture the totality of a concept, absolute metaphor steps in, following Blumenburg’s 
theory.   
 As such, I argue that EMPs trigger a particularly dense fear towards total darkness via 
disconnection, a hypothetical severance of all technology that facilitates a metaphorical 
attachment to a particularly long-standing and mythic cultural narrative: the plague of 
darkness. I would note here that this claim opens up several strange questions, the most 
important being whether or not this would suggest an unconscious death drive akin to that 
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principally outlined by Freudian psychoanalysis. In other words, does this claim suggest 
either a cultural affinity towards death or a fundamental apocalypse narrative residing 
beneath all cultural operations as an engine. I do not claim that to be the case here, but 
instead argue that EMPs serve as an unexpectedly resonant phenomenon in relation to the 
earliest known metaphorical framings of the concept of darkness, both as a narrative device 
but also an ontologically charged mythic trope. I also do not claim here that this narrative is 
always brought to mind consciously when synced to the concept of an EMP. In certain cases, 
such as Terror in Resonance, the allusion to a purgative darkness plague seems all but 
obvious in intention, but in others EMP can serve to trigger the activation of this dormant 
cultural trope, so to speak. I argue that it is due to this latter effect that EMP narratives often 
fall into their unique trifecta of erasure, invasion, and renewal as a single unit rather than 
addressing them separately. The darkness plague myth tends to be articulated as a composite 
narrative of these three aspects. As with the selection of examples used to demonstrate 
cultural responses, I will select the most prominent example of these mythic narratives as a 
measure of specified curation over an exhaustive taxonomy, and yet I argue that the 
metaphoric relations at play exceed mere circumstance. 
 The most direct example of a plague of darkness comes from the Bible, in which God 
deploys a literal plague of darkness as punishment for the maltreatment of the Jews on the 
part of Egypt. The pertinent passage reads as follows: 
  Then the Lord said to Moses, “Stretch out your hand toward the sky so that 
  darkness spreads over Egypt—darkness that can be felt.”  So Moses stretched 
  out his hand toward the sky, and total darkness covered Egypt for three days. 
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  No one could see anyone else or move about for three days. Yet all the  
  Israelites had light in the places where they lived.419 
As one of the ten plagues of Egypt, the plague of darkness is framed as one of the most 
severe, swallowing the land and severing all interaction and motion between the Egyptians.  
Rather than panic and resistance, the plague causes stasis, a paralysis of action that stops the 
kingdom in its tracks. Of note is how this particular darkness is one “that can be felt”, 
immediately framing it as distinct from a “natural” darkness, such as the kind that occurs 
regularly at nightfall. It is a blanketing darkness, one that invades and erases all connection 
for the length of its period. Notably, of the ten plagues, darkness is the ninth, arriving shortly 
before the final plague in which the firstborn of every Egyptian family is slaughtered by the 
Angel of Death.  In this sense, darkness serves as the herald for the holocaust to come, a 
calculated loss of life that is reaped as if a crop or tithe. This economic relationship is also 
significant, as the death of the firstborn is framed as the ultimate price for the Egyptian’s 
ongoing abuses and sin. Along with the other plagues, darkness serves as a signal for a moral 
debasement on the part of the Egyptians, a cultural catastrophe that meets equal recompense 
in the personal catastrophe of death. This reading is reinforced by the passage’s mentioning 
of the Isrealites, noting that in their homes and living areas light persisted, illuminating them 
as the chosen and blameless people. That said, the passage suggests that the darkness cast 
over the Egyptians is so thick that they would not even be aware of such enclaves of light, 
thus the engulfing peril of situation. 
 The biblical plague of darkness actually stands as one of the only direct narrative 
encapsulations of such an event, the genetic line of its symbolism arising in claims of 
                                                             
419 Exodus 10: 21-23.  The Holy Bible, New International Version.  Biblica, Inc.: 1973.   
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darkness sweeping the land or standing in as an aesthetic backdrop for morally degenerate 
societies, the very kind of metaphors explored earlier in this project. Prior to this, the only 
existing deployment of darkness to similar effect is within the Greek underworlds of Erebus 
and Tartarus, hearkening back to the introductory chapter. It is The idea of moral recompense 
likewise finds home here, as both Erebus and Tartarus were manifestations of the afterlife 
designated entirely for immoral or aberrant people. The darkness of both realms served both 
as their primary aesthetic signifiers as well as their main source of punishment. I argue here 
that this framework of moral justification is critical to the metaphorical operations within 
EMP fears.  At the moment, I would like to highlight the immediate aesthetic resonance 
between these mythical/theological depictions of such total darkness with the descriptions 
seen in the aforementioned fictional examples of EMP narratives. By nature of EMPs largely 
deployed within the narrative context of war, they are almost always charged with the tone of 
righteous conflict, in which one side uses dramatic measures to blot out its enemy.  While 
this would seem discordant with the passage from Exodus, insofar that it is told from the 
perspective of the eventual victor versus the victim as with The Day After and its like, this 
reflexive shift is indeed significant, and I will elaborate on this shortly. For the moment, I 
wish to concentrate on how in the prior three examples, much like the biblical plague, the 
darkness of the EMP serves as a herald for death in each case. The Day After is the most 
obvious of the three in this case, wherein the EMP traps citizens in place and causes them to 
be vulnerable to the following nuclear strike. It is still worth noting the issue of stasis here, as 
both Egypt and Kansas are frozen in place, unable to escape the erasure to follow.  Modern 
Warfare 2 forces the player to experience the EMP while in direct armed combat, and as such 
the player is surrounded by death catalyzed by the EMPs exposure of systemic 
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vulnerabilities. While there are no direct scenes of Tokyo citizens dying following the EMP 
strike of Terror In Resonance, the city itself is shown as a lifeless shell shortly thereafter, 
bereft of movement outside of the three children playing in their new paradise. That said, 
physical death does in fact follow the event, but for Nine, fatally shot as he threatens to 
detonate a second nuclear bomb hidden within a nuclear power plant. Unlike nuclear bomb 
narratives in literature, television, film, etc., EMPs are relegated in these instances as heralds 
of total destruction to come, much like the placement of darkness as the ninth plague of ten in 
the Bible. This of course has much to do with the way that they work: as already discussed, 
in the worst outcome, theirs is a prolonged destruction over a period of time rather than a 
concentrated blast.   
 Were this the only resonant connection between these examples, then this would very 
likely stop at a circumstantial relationship indeed, but it is the narrative function of sin and 
subsequent punishment that I propose as the most significant bridge at work. All three of 
these fictional examples attach their EMP events to narratives of just repayment via 
symbolism or direct narrative exposition. I would return here to the scene in The Day After 
wherein the terrified driver abandons his car to flee towards the surrounding forest. To 
reiterate my earlier claim, it is as if in this moment he has realized the folly of his 
dependence on technology to facilitate his safe escape, rejecting the now worthless object 
and running back towards nature as a means to shield him from impending death. That this 
scene is framed within a cascading sequence of electronic failures suggests a greater 
symbolic thrust at play, wherein the entire national dependence on electronics is within an 
instant revealed as a foolish trust in the strength of a very weak shield. Likewise, Modern 
Warfare 2 seems to punish its players for having grown accustomed to its technologically 
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advanced systems, stripping them of their luxuries in a level that appears close to the 
conclusion of the game. After committing techniques and strategies to muscle memory, the 
Russian EMP forces the player to reacclimate to the game under the worst possible 
conditions, all as a replication of the moment of dreadful realization highlighted in The Day 
After. Terror In Resonance is all but explicit in this regarded, as the EMP set off over Tokyo 
exists entirely as a punishment for the actions of both the experimenting scientists as well as 
the passive culture that allowed such atrocities to take place unnoticed. Trapped in a daze, the 
residents of Tokyo fail to realize just how the demands of science and technology led them to 
a point wherein doing potentially fatal experimentation on children is permitted for the 
greater pursuit of knowledge, hence Nine and Twelve’s desire for all of them to “wake up”.  
In these instances, the renewal the follows the invasive and erasing force of the EMPs is not 
just one of the society within the sources themselves (the scorched American landscape in 
The Day After, the symbolic destruction of Washington D.C. in Modern Warfare 2, the 
deserted Tokyo of Terror In Resonance), but also a renewal of the relationship to one’s 
immediately surrounding culture and technologies, both functional and ethical in nature.  In 
all cases, the EMP strikes at the connections with such technologies (i.e. the car, the game 
mechanics, the integrated electronic infrastructure respectively) and forces the question as to 
what led to such immediate disaster: the EMP itself, or these dependent relationships. In 
more direct terms, if the EMP and its darkness is taken to be a herald of destruction, who or 
what is to blame for allowing the following destruction to take place? Returning to an earlier, 
related question: if an EMP can purportedly “destroy the American spirit”, to what exact 
degree do we seemingly identify ourselves through this technology? 
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 I would like to emphasize here that it is not within the purview of this chapter to offer 
definitive answers to these questions, as any attempt would be philosophically fraught at 
best. Instead, the aim is to inquire into why this particular relationship appears to exist at all, 
as this ethical framing of technological dependence extends beyond the confines of EMPs 
alone. While I again will limit the following examples to only a small selection in the interest 
of space, they could not be more explicit in this particular philosophical view.  Specifically 
speaking, starting in the mid-1970’s (incidentally around the time that EMPs and practical, 
rather than sensationalized, nuclear threat began to enter into the cultural consciousness) a 
dominant strain of French postmodern thought frequently took recourse against what it 
deemed to be the perilous attachment to technology in contemporary society. Spearheaded by 
Jean Baudrillard and Paul Virilio, the two frequently harangued the Western world for 
effectively poisoning their own subjective integrity with technical apparatuses, going as far 
as to claim them to be the source of an impending cataclysm. Baudrillard’s principle target is 
the destruction of reality via simulation, a point he drives into the ground in his most famous 
work Simulacra and Simulation. But it is in a lesser known late work of his, The Perfect 
Crime, where he affixes a cultural dependence with technology onto his fatalistic philosophy 
of the virtual.  While the chapter “The Irony of Technology” furthers this general claim, 
positing in typically obtuse fashion that technology has led to a toxic irony of existence, 
wherein the increased confidence of technology to unveil the secrets of reality has resulted in 
an ironic realization that all things are ultimately unknowable despite closer inspection. It is a 
single paragraph near the beginning, however, wherein he puts forth his condemning edict on 
the foolhardy dependence on technology endemic of the contemporary moment.  He states, 
“All our technologies might, therefore, be said to be the instrument of a world which we 
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believe to rule, whereas in fact the world is using the machinery to impose itself, and we are 
merely the operators.”420 Again, I harbor no aims to prove or disprove this particular point, 
but instead wish to use it to represent the very kind of ethical pinning operating at the heart of 
this particular subset of fear. Taken in congruence with EMPs themselves, through 
Baudrillard’s withering lens, they are the expression of a world turning its technology back 
on its assumed masters as a way to violently expose them as nothing more than mere 
“operators”. Taken further, it is as if this assumed control is the great sin, the act that opens 
the door for the destruction of reality as humans assume it to be, one wherein a single tipping 
event exposes it as mass illusion, or in other words, an existence laid bare from the veil of 
technological interconnectivity and left to atrophy and collapse. In this sense, Baudrillard 
offers a newly configured form of technological guilt, one fulfilled by the punishment of 
technology pulling itself away and revealing its true dominance in one fatal moment. That a 
later chapter references the Tower of Babel serves to cement his place within this mythic 
framework of sin and punishment. The Tower of Babel of course is conceptually inscribed 
within the particular framework of darkness as well, a biblical narrative concerning the 
divine punishment of the human race in a moment wherein it used the extent of its 
technological prowess to attempt to climb to heaven and face God. While the decimation of 
the tower and subsequent fragmentation of a unified human language into its multiplicity of 
dialects is not a narrative or literal darkness per se, it still can be read as a conceptual 
darkness, a clouding of communication that casts the human race into temporary stasis before 
it is renewed into its current form. 
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 Virilio is, to his credit, much more direct in his accusations, modifying Frederic 
Jameson’s productive claim that postmodern space requires the development of new 
perceptual apparatuses into an eschatological screed against the dangerous acceleration of 
technology beyond the point of human perception. In his book The Information Bomb, he 
views the internet as the greatest calamity yet, a moment where humankind oversteps its 
boundaries and once again enters into a Tower of Babel situation. He writes: 
  Every political revolution is a drama, but the coming technical revolution is 
  without doubt more than just a drama.  It is a tragedy of knowledge, the  
  Babelish confusion of individual and collective bodies of learning.  As Aesop 
  said of language, the Internet is both the best and the worst of things.  It is the 
  advance of a limitless – or almost limitless – communication; and at some  
  point it is also the disaster – the meeting with the iceberg – for this Titanic of 
  virtual navigation.421 
The obvious hyperbole of his claims notwithstanding, Virilio places himself in a long line of 
techno-anxiety dating back to Plato, representing a fear that each subsequent development in 
communication technology pushes humankind further away from productive intellect and 
actual communication, instead hurtling it towards a disaster of unintelligibility and 
catastrophe. While Virilio is never quite clear on how the internet will lead to said 
destruction, his affixing of this line of technical peril to the greater paradigm of self-earned 
punishment is pertinent to this analysis at large, if for no other reason than to demonstrate the 
persistence of this line of thought over the course of literal millennia. That this reflexive 
condemnation for the use of technology has persisted for so long offers an immediate 
doorway through which EMPs can be joined to this line as well. When taken in concert with 
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the grand scope of their effects as well as the symbolic potential of the darkness that they 
unleash, their function as morally engendered punishments is easily constructed. 
 This of course begs the question as to whether or not Baudrillard, Virilio, and all 
those in this vein of techno-fatalism carry the same eschatological tone indictive of mythic 
and theological frameworks. While I would not be inclined to make a blanket claim here for 
the whole, I do believe it to be the case with regards to this particular set of writers, insofar 
that they propose a remarkably consistent rhetoric of guilt and punishment with regards to 
overdetermined technical relationships. The next question, then, is if this same appropriation 
of these eschatological narratives finds its place incontrovertibly at the heart of EMP 
anxieties. This is significantly more difficult to assign with certainty, as at heart this claim 
would remain as speculative as the very fears towards EMPs themselves. Nevertheless, if at 
the heart of this entire project is the desire to identify and isolate the narrative histories of 
darkness that take root in certain contemporary media phenomena, when the actual material 
danger of EMPs are set aside, what is left is this history of guilt and apocalyptic rhetoric. It is 
the very mechanism through which the “myths” of EMPs take shape, the very kind that 
organizations such as Metatech attempt to disrupt. While the narrative resonance that EMPs 
possess with regards to the concept of the plague of darkness is productive for the purposes 
of analysis, as with the dark web, it is reductive in terms of praxis or action. In other words, 
in being attached to a history of guilt and divine punishment, myths of retribution, the fear 
held towards EMPs threatens to eclipse a tempered and vigilant attitude towards 
approachable and effective protection. 
 Whatever the case, EMPs push the limits of Blumenberg’s concept of absolute 
metaphor close to its breaking point. As articulated in the introduction for this project, 
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darkness is generally deployed as a stopgap to explain singular concepts, such as unchecked 
productivity, death, or unknown danger, amongst others. Absolute metaphor stands in for 
unresolvable or ungraspable phenomena, the moments where rational conceptualization fall 
short. But an EMP is very quantifiable in terms of scientific conceptualization, while at one 
and the same time possessing a persistent metaphoric dimension, something that links it to 
the other phenomena addressed across the breadth of this project. Perhaps unique to the 
complex of EMPs and other darkness plagues/punishments, darkness symbolizes a fear of 
violent and deadly renewal, caused by an invading force and catalyzed by total erasure. On 
top of this, there is something singularly creeping and uncanny about the effects of EMPs, a 
death caused not by an assault on the body or an obliteration of physical structures, but a 
rapid withering of the technical threads that bind society. Even if, as Metatech claims, that an 
EMP would not set back the clock, so to speak, or cause every device to collapse, its damage 
is in fact proportionate to the level of technological sophistication that an affected country 
possesses. Analogically speaking, it is the same effect through which darkness gains greater 
presence in contrast to luminosity, and vice versa. It is through this that EMPs can so easily 
be attached to the mythic narrative of darkness as a tailor-made punishment, and perhaps this 
latter effect that above all makes the particular fear towards EMPs so difficult to define in 
simple terms. Hence, the absolute metaphorical force of EMP-related darkness takes hold, 
insofar that the massive blackout contains so many more inherent fears than the simple loss 
of power itself. But as the relatively limited metaphorical deployments of darkness likewise 
struggle to capture the whole, perhaps it is the case that EMPs, for the time being, serve as 
the total concretization of darkness as an absolute metaphor, the most singular expression of 
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the multiplicities of fear associated with the dark: disconnection, death, erasure, invasion, 
renewal, production, danger, etc.  
 I conclude this chapter with a very explicit connection, if for no other reason than to 
demonstrate the ease with which EMPs can be drawn into this eschatological framework. An 
apocalyptic religious website called omegashock.com posted an article in 2013 questioning if 
God’s judgement will come in the form of an EMP strike, personally bringing to mind Dr. 
Peter Pry’s depiction of the Carrington Event as ‘God’s EMP”.422 Concluding that due to the 
great moral debasement of the United States, God’s impending judgment is inevitable, the 
article proposes that an EMP would be a large possibility concerning its manifestation.  
Charmingly, the article then offers ways to protect oneself from said EMP, appearing to miss 
the central function of such a judgment scenario, that being its universality. The main source 
of frustration for the writer comes from the fact that the U.S. government has done so little to 
initiate national protective measures from the disaster. The moral failure of the nation is an 
unavoidable given in the eyes of omegashock.com, but the truly maddening fault is the 
failure to deploy further technology to block the destruction of all technology. As always, an 
EMP will only collectively highlight our lapse in judgment after it has done its damage and 
has “woken us up”. It is a seemingly preventable catastrophe, but effectively unimaginable in 
its scope; it is potentially the righteous hand of judgment and renewal, but something against 
which must be defended; total destruction and infinite production. It is the mythic Nyx made 
material; it is the definitive symbol of darkness in the technological sphere. And so the most 
advanced of technologies stokes the fires of the most ancient and longstanding mythos.  
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Perhaps the most toxic effect of this process is how adroitly we can be convinced of its 
justice.            
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Conclusion: Living Shadows 
 What merit lies in studying the narrative aspects of these media-technological 
phenomena? Or, more specifically, what is there to gain in identifying the metaphorical and 
conceptual histories that precondition the responses to these phenomena?  It is an unorthodox 
gesture to apply a sort of literary analysis to technological objects or events, and yet the field 
of media studies thrives nevertheless. This is not to say that media studies wholly replicates 
the tools of literary criticism, or even that it always derivates from them. But if literary 
analysis and theory are a means to interrogate the mimetic and hermeneutic capabilities of 
texts, then the exploration of mediating processes and technological praxes certainly lends 
itself to a similar analytic methodology. At risk of leaning into cliché, much as how one may 
derive insights into their culturally configured relationships with the world through the text, 
so too may one uncover cultural practices and relationships at large through media and 
technological practices. Technology mediates our desires, augments our capacities, and 
recursively contributes to our cultural and social coordinates. But like the text, these evolving 
practices will always import along with them the traces of previous relationships and 
imbrications; they always arrive part and parcel with narrative histories.   
 In his seminal book The Political Unconscious, Frederic Jameson offers a parallel but 
harmonious critique when taken in concert with the aims of this dissertation. Whereas I 
began my analysis with a schema of metaphor and concept, Jameson frames his critique in 
terms of “master narratives”, deployed almost identically to the manner in which I have used 
“narrative” throughout my work. Detailing the seductive tendencies of such narratives, he 
writes: 
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  …if interpretation in terms of expressive causality or of allegorical master  
  narratives remains a constant temptation, this is because such master  
  narratives have inscribed themselves in the texts as well as our thinking about 
  them; such allegorical narrative signifieds are a persistent dimension of  
  literary and cultural texts precisely because they reflect a fundamental  
  dimension of our collective thinking and our collective fantasies about history 
  and reality.423 
This passage introduces a disrupting metatextual aspect to the  very kind of analysis upon 
which I have embarked in this dissertation. Essentially, Jameson argues that even the 
framework of my analysis, that there are conceptual and narrative histories at play within 
media-technological history, is itself conditioned by my own experience with these “master 
narratives.” A pertinent question: wherein does my own experience and culturally 
preconditioned relationships inform my approach? As Jameson would have it, in the very 
first instance. He writes, “Rather, texts come before us as the always-already-read; we 
apprehend them through sedimented layers of previous interpretations, or – if the text is 
brand-new – through the sedimented reading habits and categories developed by those 
inherited interpretive traditions.”424 Even the most novel of “texts” will link into what 
Jameson calls “reading habits”, a phrase I take to mean a process of inscription into codified 
patterns of reception. In this dissertation, the resonant literary histories I attached to novel 
media-technological phenomena would fit this definition, as they serve to precondition the 
means through which these phenomena are approached, in even the subtlest of ways.  
Narrative is an ontological concept for Jameson, as he states, “I take [narrative] to be the 
central function or instance of the human mind.”425 Even when approaching “the new”, we 
connect our experiences to these always-already-read textual or narrative histories, and the 
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fundamental human experience of the world is narrative at the core. It is a generative 
function, mythical in its configuration, insofar that it is used as a means to construct a 
coherent interpretation of the world. It is the “political unconscious”, a “symbolic meditation 
on the destiny of community”426. 
 And so, the demarcation boundary between traditional “texts” and cultural 
manifestations thereof fades within Jameson’s critique, to the point that he eschews the word 
“text” entirely. In critiquing Althusser’s conception of history as an “absent cause” He 
writes: 
  We would therefore propose the following revised formulation: that history 
  is not a text, not a narrative, master or otherwise, but that, as an absent cause, 
  it is inaccessible to us except in textual form, and that our approach to it and 
  to the Real itself necessarily passes through its prior textualization, its  
  narrativization in the political unconscious.427   
This is a crucial passage, one that appears to upend all that has been discussed to this point.  
However, it provides the most important keystone element to my own work here. “Master 
narratives”, like “absolute metaphors” and “conceptual complexes” are seductive in their 
apparent ease, an ease with which that offer a pathway of least resistance towards holistic 
understandings. They explain the unexplainable, register patterns and provide predictable 
outcomes: they are our comfort zone as narrative creatures. But as Nietzsche, Blumenberg, 
and Jameson assert, narratives are at the core artificial processes. They are not universals, 
nor could they ever transcend to that state with full totality. As Jameson argues, humanity 
may be a species of narrative creators, and we may be conditioned to read the world through 
narratives passed down through centuries, but in acknowledging this, so too must one 
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acknowledge the human capacity to shift and reconfigure “master narratives” or “absolute 
metaphors” when necessary.   
 And so this leads me back to the question with which I started my conclusion: what is 
there to gain in applying this strategy to these particular media-technological phenomena?  
As I put forth in my introduction, the culturally preconditioned responses to the four 
instances that I have examined are ones of fear and dread. While each case involved a fear 
towards a specified target, and I argue that they each draw from a unique narrative history as 
an encoding mechanism, all four lapse into the greater “master narrative” of opposing the 
Other.  What complicates this issue is the fact that in certain of these cases, the targets of 
opposition are justified and sound. Take the “Dark Web” for instance: I harbor no hesitation 
in stating that it is a healthy behavior to fundamentally reject the trade of child pornography 
and abuse videos. But as I demonstrated in my own small sample of primary research, by no 
means does this activity speak for the whole of the “Dark Web” platform. But I, along with 
The TOR Project, acknowledge the insistent effects of conceptualization in the Nietzschean 
sense: all differences are eradicated in service of an internally consistent narrative, and all are 
subsumed in darkness for ease of interpretation.One must ask: what potential applications are 
lost to this narrative, and (in TOR’s line of reasoning) how does this narrative preclude the 
ability for the “Dark Web” to rectify its own problems?  Consider the deleterious effects of 
regarding the light maps of North Korea and Africa as confirmation of the “Dark Continent” 
myth, as if their darkness is a given destiny.  In what ways does this preconditioned attitude 
foster an indifference, a tacit acceptance of a pernicious colonial narrative? 
 Even more complicated are the cases of numbers stations and EMPs.  There is no 
escaping the context of war and conflict with these two instances: numbers stations are 
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hypothesized as international spy transmission, and nuclear EMPs are literal weapons of war.  
However, in the latter case, to what end is the association of EMPs with divine punishment 
and justified destruction worth?  Rather than viewing them as a fatalistic self-identification of 
weakness through the opposition of a menacing Other, something taken as an almost pre-
destined fall, could the narrative be realigned with a motivation to oppose the global 
conditions that lead to an EMP as a diplomatic option in the first place? I am not naïve here, 
and I do not wholly believe in the collective wishing away of global dispute through the 
power of theory. But I do contest that, at the least, the idea that such events are inevitable 
outcomes for the technologically advanced is something that should be disarmed.  Numbers 
stations are perhaps the most benign of the four cases, despite their immediate connection to 
sedition and otherworldly danger. That said, one can possibly see the seeds of a beneficial 
shift away from a conflict narrative in the aestheticization of numbers stations samples, such 
as The Conet Project and the work of Wilco. Perhaps this transposition indicates a defanging 
of the darkness narrative as used in this particular case, shifting their mysterious qualities 
from the realm of horror and towards one of aural beauty. 
 Similar efforts are being undertaken at this very moment. Returning to Edensor once 
again, he outlines a variety of attempts to shift darkness away from its negative associations, 
including a particularly fascinating instance of praxis. He writes: 
  A key agent in the gradual process through which darkness has been revalued 
  has been the International Dark Sky Association, an organization with a global 
  reach in campaigning against the spread of light pollution and for a reduction 
  in the wasteful use of lightning, and above all, in promoting the incidence of 
  star-filled skies untainted by skyglow.  An expanding number of designated 
  places diverge between International Dark Sky Communities, Parks, and  
  Reserves. There are currently ten communities, eight in the United States, that 
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  implement stringent lighting codes, deliver educational programs, and develop 
  citizen support for dark skies.428 
What is compelling to me about the work if the International Dark Sky Association is its 
focus on reconfiguring the parameters of “health”. Taking a bold stance against the centuries-
old association of light with progress and social well-being, they put forth the idea that it is in 
fact light that is the encroaching danger, as the artificiality of urban illumination forces 
human beings out of their natural milieu. It is a noble effort, in my eyes, and I find it, like 
Edensor, to be a refreshing change of pace regarding the cultural import of darkness.  
However, there is a large caveat to this approach. While this project may indeed promote a 
healthy reevaluation of the beneficial effects of darkness, it still could not eradicate 
darkness’s associations with hidden dangers or obscured threats. In fact, it may cross the line 
into an almost irresponsible lack of attention to this detail. For example, I am hard-pressed to 
think that such a project would gain significant ground in an area wherein there already exists 
a significant anxiety towards criminal activity after dark, justified or hyperbolic the same. 
 Ultimately, when squaring off against a “master narrative”, “absolute metaphor”, or 
“conceptual configuration” such as that of darkness, and I hold the three to be 
interchangeable for the point at hand, one must always be aware of the limitations to these 
efforts.  At best, one can hope to shift the grounds of engagement. This is not to say that 
neither Edensor nor the International Dark Sky Association is aware of this fact, and it is 
certainly not the case for the former. Rather, my point here is that any critical discussion 
must consider the rugged persistence of such negative narrative histories and conceptual 
deployments, for they must be addressed in tandem with any shift towards more positive 
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interpretations. As Jameson put, once again, “master narratives” are seductive, and the more 
easily replicable they are, the more apt they are to enthrall us. The metaphors and concepts 
that build these narratives are additive in nature, and they rarely can be destroyed wholesale.  
As such, it is my contention that one should be aware of the narrative histories that condition 
their interpretations from the outset, as “always-already-read” textual phenomena. Only then 
can one grasp the means to address and dismantle their negative repercussions at a 
fundamental level.   
 And so it goes with these “dark zones” in media-technological culture.  In linking 
back to heavily reinforced narratives of the Other, they deal in the currency of fear with great 
efficacy. As I have argued, these narratives hold a greater significance that extends beyond 
their particular cases, as they stand (for me) as eye-opening testaments to the mobility of 
metaphor into even the least obviously “textual” spaces. And while a certain dose of fear is a 
healthy response to any danger, one must always be aware of the cultural forces that 
determine what threatens them, as well as the limit over which fear crosses into debilitating 
grounds. For instance, it is understandable to be afraid of the idea of an EMP, but one should 
always consider the narrative from which one sources this fear. It is one thing to fear the 
destabilization of national electrical grids, it is another to imagine it as the immediate 
destruction of all electrical equipment, a myth in terms of the science behind the event. And 
as with the case of “dark continents”, when this threat is constituted as an entire national 
population, the toxic sequelae of discrimination and racism never fall far behind. If we can 
never wholly dismantle the negative metaphorical and conceptual manifestations of darkness, 
we can at the least temper our own anxieties, and put to productive use the creative powers of 
narrative that make us what we are. 
